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Abstract 
Learning from accidents: human errors, preventive design and risk mitigation 
Raphael N. Moura 
Recent technological accidents, which resulted in severe material losses, multiple fatalities 
and environmental damage, were deeply associated with human errors. Direct human 
actions or flawed decision-making processes have been increasingly tied to devastating 
consequences, raising major concerns regarding industry’s ability to control risks.  
The most common approach to estimate the probability of human errors and weigh their 
impact to the overall risk is the application of a suitable Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) 
technique. However,  uncertainties associated with behavioural aspects of humans dealing 
with advanced technology in complex organisational arrangements turn this type of 
evaluation into a challenging task to perform, an issue that brings difficulties to ensure 
sound predictions for human actions when interfacing with complex systems. 
Consequently, the development of innovative strategies to overcome existing limitations to 
understand how these sociotechnical systems could fail is of paramount importance, 
particularly the intricate relationship between humans, technology and organisations. This 
PhD research project is devoted to approach this multidisciplinary problem in a systematic 
manner, providing means to recognise and tackle surrounding factors and tendencies that 
could lead to the manifestation of human errors, improving risk communication and 
decision making-processes and ultimately increasing confidence in safety studies. 
The initial part of this thesis comprises a large-scale analysis of human errors identified 
during major accidents in high-technology systems. Detailed accident accounts were 
collected from regulators, independent investigation panels, government bodies, insurance 
companies and industry experts. The raw data is then scrutinised and classified under a 
common framework, resulting in a novel and comprehensive major-accident dataset, the 
Multi-attribute Technological Accidents Dataset (MATA-D). 
The second stage applies advanced data analytic techniques to gain further insight into the 
conditions leading to the genesis and perpetuation of errors, essentially making use of 
cluster analysis and classification. The application of different clustering methods reveals 
common patterns among accidents, and the usage of an artificial neural network approach 
(self-organising maps) algorithm allows the translation of the multidimensional data into 
visual representations (2-D maps) of accidents’ contributing factors. This stage generates 
appropriate information to increase the understanding of these sociotechnical systems, to 
overcome barriers to communicate risk and to enable a wide-ranging “learning from 
accidents” process. 
The final part of the research project builds upon the self-organising maps algorithm 
output, focusing on a deeper interpretation of specific clusters to disclose strategies to 
minimise human factors weaknesses and reduce major accidents. An important practical 
implication suggested by the data analysis is that human errors, in most of the cases, 
constitute reasonable responses to disruptive transactions between the technology and the 
organisation, which impact human cognitive functions. Accordingly, the recognition that 
human errors are mistakenly seen as root-causes of major accidents and the examination of 
these interaction problems from a new perspective provided an effective way to recognise 
hazards and tackle major risks, delivering realistic proposals to improve design, decision-
making processes and to build trust in safety assessments. 
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I. Introduction 
Modern developments in structural analysis, engineering, risk and human reliability 
approaches are undoubtedly conveying more dependable and consistent systems, 
progressively reducing the likelihood of failures. Yet, technological accidents resulting in 
severe material losses, multiple fatalities and/or environmental damage are being 
increasingly perceived as a product of human errors. The Gulf of Mexico’s Macondo well 
blowout, the Fukushima nuclear accident, the Air France 447 Flight hull loss and the South 
Korean Sewol Ferry capsize are examples, to name but a few, of disasters in which direct 
human actions or flawed decision-making processes were intimately related to devastating 
consequences. 
 
Although the daily debate concerning the safety of industrial systems is normally confined 
to knowledgeable groups such as designers, engineers, psychologists, sociologists and 
philosophers, major accidents have the power to amplify the discussion to the general 
public and even force an outlook shift regarding certain technologies. As a result of the 
Fukushima disaster, the German government decided to shut-down eight nuclear reactors 
and reject the construction of new ones (Schneider et al., 2012). Correspondingly, the 
Taiwanese government postponed the start-up of a new reactor at the Lungmen Power 
Plant, and halted the construction of a second one, which clearance is conditional to a 
positive outcome in a nationwide referendum (Ishikawa, 2015).  
 
In modern societies, it is precisely when a disaster strikes that the public is made aware of 
the technological risks and uncertainties carried by industrial activities, which might 
provoke a societal distrust climate with wide-ranging consequences. Boosted by staggering 
media coverage, especially in the face of catastrophes, human error becomes a concern to 
wider societal groups, and thus a very relevant research topic. 
 
For engineering applications, the expression “human error” is typically defined as a failure 
to perform a certain task that leads to an adverse consequence (Moura et al., 2017b). In 
order to estimate the probability of human erroneous actions and evaluate the human 
factors impact to the overall risk, the most common approach is to apply a suitable Human 
Reliability Analysis (HRA) technique. However, uncertainties related to the behaviour of 
individuals dealing with advanced technology in intricate organisational environments turn 
this kind of evaluation into a challenging task to perform. Therefore, new strategies are 
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required not only to better understand how human perform in such complex 
circumstances, but also to validate current approaches to model human performance and 
evaluate risk.  
 
To tackle the need for appropriate and sufficient performance data to support HRAs, the 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) developed the Scenario Authoring, 
Characterization, and Debriefing Application – SACADA dataset (Chang et al., 2014). The 
dataset is fed by plant staff (mainly training instructors and operators), and its prime aim is 
to collect operator simulator exercise data executed during nuclear power plants training 
programmes.  
 
Preischl and Hellmich (2013) extracted human reliability data from the German licensee 
nuclear power plant events report system, obtaining HEP estimates using Bayesian 
methods. Their objective was to validate and extend the THERP (Swain & Guttman, 1983) 
human reliability analysis approach, and new data for twenty-one HEPs for which there 
were no previous data were presented. Previously, Groth and Mosleh (2012) had proposed 
a Bayesian belief network using data from nuclear power plant operating events, in order to 
produce a causal model for performance influencing factors from multiple sources, and 
calculate HEPs for HRAs. The data was exclusively extracted from nuclear industry sources, 
i.e. the Human Events Repository Analysis - HERA dataset (US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 2008) and from worksheets used to analyse the behaviour of operators during 
abnormal operating conditions. 
 
Forester et al. (2014) presented a large-scale international empirical study, which compared 
HRA predictions with crew performance outcomes when responding from basic to complex 
simulated scenarios in nuclear power plant (NPP) control rooms, using the Halden Reactor 
Project’s HAMMLAB (Halden Human-Machine Laboratory) research simulator. The 
considered scenarios were modelled in a probabilistic risk assessment of the plant. 
Important strengths and weaknesses of several HRA methods were exposed, revealing a 
solid improvement path for current and future HRA approaches, particularly in the domain 
area of the study (crew performance in NPP control rooms). Some of the limitations of this 
work, such as difficulties to separate analyst and method effects, were later addressed in 
Forester et al. (2016), which compared HRA approaches with personnel actions when 
responding to simulated emergency scenarios from a U.S. NPP simulator. This new study 
not only discussed the analysts influence (e.g. HRA method implementation inconsistencies 
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from individuals) by using multiple teams to test the consistency of HRA predictions, but 
also included visits to the reference plant to collect data and interview people. This is 
particularly important, as HRA methods might require particular data beyond the pure 
scenario description and simulation results, in order to deliver consistent outputs. Although 
it is fair to believe that the results might be extrapolated to general scenarios requiring the 
usage of emergency operating procedures, the scope of both studies (Forester, 2014, 2016) 
is limited to the evaluation of human reliability analysis approaches for NPP crews in the 
control room. 
 
Recently, Kim et al. (2017) have suggested a new classification scheme for human error 
probability (HEP) estimations from simulator data. He conducted an extensive literature 
review comprising existing methods such as THERP (Swain & Guttman, 1983), HEART 
(Williams, 1986), CREAM (Hollnagel, 1998) and ATHEANA (Cooper et al., 1996), as well as 
datasets such as CORE-DATA (Gibson & Megaw, 1999) and SACADA (Chang et al., 2014) in 
order to quantify the nominal HEP estimates for the newly-developed framework. The 
selection of the factors is largely based on the analysis of audio-visual records of simulated 
tasks involving emergency operating procedures.  
 
The development of the MATA-D and the application of an artificial neural network and 
other clustering/classification approaches to identify interaction among factors differ from 
current initiatives, in the sense that the objective here is not to quantify human error, to 
validate current HRA approaches or to develop a new method to do so. The intent is to 
enhance risk perception through the recognition and representation of multidimensional 
contributing factors interacting with human factors and thus affecting human performance.  
 
Despite the fact that one of the features of the underlying MATA-D framework (originally 
used in CREAM HRA method) is the capacity to capture detailed cognitive functions and 
failure modes (Kim et al., 2017), the focus of the current work is not on the immediate 
factors shaping human actions, but on higher interactions between organisations, 
technology and human factors. The contribution to knowledge is a method which allows 
the identification of comprehensive contributing factors directly and indirectly affecting 
human actions and cognition, exposing the fact that improving human performance is not a 
self-contained effort: it will necessarily depends on technological and organisational 
enhancements. This research is a step forward in this identification process, addressing 
important needs of the practice and practitioners (e.g. creating synergy between human 
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factors and system design and engineering communities) through the usage of major-
accident investigation information, ultimately adding to current efforts to fulfil these data 
gaps from a new perspective. Accident analysis can offer factual data about the influencing 
factors leading to those events, and support a deeper examination of the ongoing dynamics 
involved in undesirable occurrences.  
 
The dissemination of information about previous events is considered to be a crucial step 
towards improved operations (Lindberg et. al, 2010) and to reduce the likelihood of future 
events. Thus, the establishment of a “learning from accidents” process is particularly 
relevant for high-technology organisations, where major risks make more traditional 
knowledge expansion approaches such as trial-and-error unacceptable (ESREDA, 2015).  
 
Accordingly, many initiatives aiming at the collection of operational data are being 
conducted, most of them using web-based incident reporting systems to gather 
information regarding safety events. Examples are the International Reporting System for 
Operating Experience, operated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the 
Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD/NEA); the Aviation Safety Reporting System, maintained by the US National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration; the Licensee Event Report from the US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission; the Integrated Operational Safety System maintained by the 
Brazilian National Agency for Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels; and the World Offshore 
Accident Database, developed by DNV-GL. Yet, difficulties to use the data to promote an 
effective learning strategy are acknowledged, and many researchers indicate that 
organisations have not been as successful as expected to absorb past occurrences’ lessons 
(Kletz, 1997, Leveson, 2011, Le Coze, 2013, ESREDA, 2015).  
 
This thesis largely relies on the data generated by independent investigations of major 
accidents, in opposition to near-misses or minor events, due to two fundamental reasons. 
Firstly, high-consequence events provoke wide-ranging data collection processes to support 
in-depth investigations. The data generated turns out to be very detailed, and valuable 
cross-industrial lessons can be learned, especially regarding complex interactions among 
contributors in higher hierarchical levels. Secondly, the dynamics involved in major-
accidents are perceived to be extremely rare, requiring unique conditions to develop into 
the observed high-consequence events. Therefore, it is suggested that the subtleties 
captured by detailed investigations are hardly prospectively foreseeable, making these 
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events significantly different from linear deviations and single-point failures, which are 
expected to occur in the course of regular operations. 
 
Additionally, datasets comprising near-misses or minor operational occurrences usually lack 
detailed information about the organisational environment in which workers are placed, 
since scant attention and resources are dedicated to events with very limited (if any) 
consequences. Frequently, factors immediately identifiable such as equipment failures and 
operating errors turn out to be recorded as causes of events, without thoughtfully 
considering the bigger picture. Furthermore, the disproportionate emphasis on operators’ 
errors might override the disclosure of profounder technology or organisational issues. 
Detailing procedures or retraining personnel are direct (and cheaper) solutions to manage, 
if compared to the discontinuation of components and equipment, design modifications or 
profounder changes to the sociotechnical system. 
 
The appreciation of the organisational context is of paramount importance to fully 
understand the underlying conditions leading to an accident (Reason, 1990; Hollnagel, 
1998; Cooper, 1996; Sträter, 2000; Dekker, 2014), and data acquisition and handling 
shortcomings can be a serious obstacle to achieving this enhanced comprehension. There 
must be a balance between the search for human, technology and organisational features, 
and sufficient resources should be allocated to identify all nuances of these complex, multi-
faceted interactions. In a more realistic perspective, it is the dynamics of unanticipated 
interactions among potential contributors that are, in fact, pivotal to the manifestation of 
major accidents, and not mere isolated factors or causes.  
 
Therefore, an effective data source for learning purposes must be able to deliver detailed 
information about accidents, being targeted at the search for contributors without biases 
and preconceptions and, most importantly, expose the intricate interfaces among 
influencing factors. It should not be limited to the apparent erroneous actions in the sharp-
end, but investigate the motivations and understand cognitive processes behind human 
behaviour.  
 
Mostly because of the societal pressure following catastrophes, major accidents give 
impetus to comprehensive data collection processes to support in-depth investigations, 
which are typically executed by very experienced professionals. These experts have diverse 
academic backgrounds and are independent from the affected company, broadening the 
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examination prospects and being less subjectable to eventual pressures to direct the 
investigation or its outcome. Accordingly, Casal (2008) refers to historical analysis as the 
finest source of experimental data capable of delivering essential information to the 
validation of accident causation models. Also, the European Safety, Reliability and Data 
Association - ESREDA (2015) recognised that only large-scale events can make appropriate 
resources available to allow detailed examinations of systems and safety barriers, in 
contrast with near-misses (or deviations), which investigations are unlikely to go sufficiently 
deep to motivate major improvements in the sociotechnical system. An event such as the 
Macondo well blowout, occurred in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, was investigated by two 
regulators (USCG, 2010, BOMRE, 2011) and an independent federal agency (US-CSB, 2016), 
along with industrial and academic groups. Furthermore, an inquiry on the eleven resulting 
fatalities and the environmental damage took place, offering plentiful information 
regarding the conditions leading to the disaster. 
 
Still, incident analysis is not the only method to minimise high-technology risks. Qualitative 
and quantitative assessments have been widely used in high-technology industries, 
providing means to increase the reliability of components and systems, control hazards and 
promote safety. With this intent, a number of well-documented techniques and tools have 
been developed (and enhanced) since the 70s. Particularly, Probabilistic Safety Assessments 
(PSAs) have been successfully applied from the design conception to the final disposal of 
high-technology facilities, decisively contributing to the reduction of risks in high-hazard 
industries. The general idea is to quantify failures and adverse events, in order to evaluate 
systems, identify possible safety weaknesses, direct safety improvements and generate 
information for decision-making processes. PSAs are considered to be fundamental risk 
reduction tools, and are currently required by virtually all regulators and governments 
licencing processes involving, for instance, the construction, operation or modification of 
high-hazard facilities. 
 
Other risk reduction approaches focus on learning from organisations with notable safety 
history. The principle underlying the High-Reliability Organisations theory is that certain 
industrial groups dealing with high-hazard technologies are able to deliver outstanding 
safety records for long periods of time, thus presenting a considerably higher number of 
success cases than failure cases (or accidents). Therefore, researchers sharing this view 
(Roberts, 1990, Grabowski & Roberts, 1997, La Porte & Consolini, 1998, Roberts & Bea, 
2001) believe that it is possible to mitigate risks by studying the positive characteristics that 
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make these organisations perform better than others. The overwhelming amount of data is 
one of the most tempting advantages to embrace this approach, as billions of working 
hours producing successful outcomes (i.e. the absence of failures) could be made available 
from a single organisation. However, some accident theorists seem to disagree. The 
intricacy and unpredictability of organisational behaviour and apparently untreatable 
features of some modern technologies, such as complexity and high-coupling, are recurrent 
discussion topics among accident causation theorists (Cohen et al., 1972, Sagan, 1993, 
Perrow, 1999, Taleb, 2007). They suggest that these characteristics make major accidents 
unique and, to some extent, unavoidable. Taleb (2007) claims that data collected from 
standard operations and the information generated (or what can be learned from it) have 
no relation with the dynamics of disasters, deemed as outliers, or black-swans. He 
understands that the nature of major accidents is completely different, and the data 
provided by regular operations cannot give much insight into the genesis of major 
accidents. Ultimately, he believes that an excessive focus on success cases can even 
override the sources of extremely rare, low-probability events, in which an unfamiliar 
combination of contributing factors may be seen as highly improbable, and thus negligible.  
 
Recognising the different perspectives on how to approach major risks, this research 
project builds on the hypothesis that the examination of major accidents is able to provide 
a very rich data source through the detailed investigation accounts, enabling the 
exploration of the whole range of surrounding factors contributing to undesirable 
occurrences. The unfortunate events leading to catastrophic consequences undoubtedly 
offer an opportunity which cannot be left unexploited. In fact, it would be even socially 
unacceptable not to learn from those events, which sometimes leave long-lasting scars in 
modern societies. Therefore, it is the initial purpose of this research to develop a 
substantial dataset containing major accidents, in order to capture comprehensive 
information about disasters. 
 
To ease the impact of the High-Reliability Organisations theory central assertion, specifically 
the fact that there are fewer failure cases than success ones to be examined, this research 
project concentrates on the development of a dataset capable of absorbing a wider spectre 
of major accidents from diverse industrial backgrounds. With this intent, a non-specific 
dataset classification structure yet robust and adaptable to embrace various accident 
investigation outputs is being used. As a result, virtually all types of industrial activity, 
ranging from offshore oil & gas to aviation, are successfully captured by the Multi-attribute 
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Technological Accidents Dataset (MATA-D), creating an aggregate data volume suitable for 
the application of data mining approaches. 
 
The complex data have been subjected to different data clustering and classification 
techniques, in an attempt to disclose tendencies leading to major accidents. Barriers to deal 
with multidimensional data – the dataset matrix can capture up to fifty-three contributing 
factors per accident – are overcome through its conversion into two-dimensional graphical 
representations of the accidents and associated contributors. In special, the 2-D maps 
generated by the application of the self-organising maps (SOM) algorithm (Kohonen, 2001) 
provide innovative means to visualise and communicate high-technology risks, while 
preserving the original data for further interpretation. Common patterns among major 
accidents are revealed and used in many ways to enhance risk perception and enable a 
comprehensive “learning from accidents” experience. Implications to build trust on risk 
management approaches and to improve decision-making processes are then discussed. 
 
i. Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this research project is to critically assess the complex interactions between 
human factors, technological aspects and organisational contexts in high-technology 
facilities, in order to identify and tackle surrounding factors and tendencies that could lead 
to the manifestation of human errors and result in major accidents, mitigating risks. 
 
The main objectives of the research project are: 
 To execute a large-scale analysis of human errors by collecting and classifying 
accident data from real projects worldwide, combining major accidents from 
different industrial backgrounds under a common framework in order to make 
them comparable;  
 To understand the genesis and perpetuation of human errors, by applying 
advanced data mining techniques to disclose key features and significant trends in 
major accidents; 
 To propose an alternative approach to risk communication, by translating complex 
interactions among accidents’ contributing factors into graphical interfaces visually 
interpretable; 
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 To build trust and improve the quality of safety studies, using the in-depth MATA-D 
information to ensure that human factors, technology and organisational aspects 
were properly taken into account by risk assessments; and 
 To make recommendations to minimise the possibility of human errors, by means 
of improving the design of high-technology facilities. 
 
ii. Original Contribution 
The main outcome of this research is a wide-ranging analysis and interpretation of major 
accidents, providing conditions to learn from these undesirable events and offering 
opportunities to enrich the knowledge in the human factors field. A novel industrial 
accidents dataset, the Multi-attribute Technological Accidents Dataset (MATA-D), was fully 
developed, merging events occurred in numerous industrial backgrounds and countries. 
Methods to analyse and visually represent accident data are successfully proposed, and the 
graphical interfaces generated by the application of proper data mining techniques 
produced new insights into the conditions leading to accidents. The graphical output also 
provided unique means to understand and communicate risks. A new risk assessment 
verification scheme was established, based on the MATA-D common patterns disclosed by 
the application of the self-organising maps algorithm and on the innovative interpretation 
of its output.  
 
iii. Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of a series of published papers that embodies the results of the PhD 
research. From the total of eleven published papers, five representative works were 
carefully selected to describe the study sequence, detail the findings and highlight the 
conclusions developed throughout the PhD period. These works were predominantly 
developed by the author of this thesis, with the valuable support of the co-authors and PhD 
supervisors listed in the corresponding chapters.   
 
The first part of this thesis in Chapter 1 (Moura et al., 2016) introduces the Multi-attribute 
Technological Accidents Dataset (MATA-D), a proprietary dataset fully developed during the 
research, which contains 238 major accidents from different high-technology industrial 
sectors. The structure of the dataset follows the Contextual Control Model used as a basis 
for Hollnagel’s (1998) Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method. Accident reports 
prepared by regulators, independent investigation panels, government bodies and 
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insurance companies, among others, were obtained, scrutinised and classified under the 
dataset’s common framework, establishing the grounds for the subsequent application of 
data mining and clustering techniques. 
 
Chapter 2 (Moura et al., 2017b) and Chapter 3 (Moura et al., 2015c) present the successful 
application of different data mining approaches to the MATA-D dataset, aiming at the 
disclosure of relevant features and revealing common patterns among major accidents’ 
contributing factors. The latter chapter recurs to a tailored Hierarchical Agglomerative 
Clustering method, while the former applies an artificial neural network approach, i.e. self-
organising maps (Kohonen, 2001), to the dataset. The application of the SOM approach 
allows for the translation of the MATA-D multidimensional data into 2-D maps, and 
graphical interfaces produce further insight into the conditions leading to major accidents. 
The SOM maps interpretation provides innovative means to understand, visualise and 
communicate major risks. 
 
The subsequent chapters build upon the results of the SOM algorithm, demonstrating the 
wide-range applications of the research. This is the third part of the thesis. 
 
Chapter 4 (Moura et al., 2017d) uses the output of the clustering method and thus the most 
common interactions between human factors, technological issues and organisational 
aspects, as extracted from the SOM maps, to produce a new framework to verify safety 
studies. The outcome is a sixty-six-item attribute list, addressing wide-ranging features that 
should be taken into account by risk analysts, particularly when assessing high-technology 
industrial facilities. 
 
In Chapter 5 (Moura et al., 2017c), the focus is on MATA-D interactions which are 
connected with decision-making processes. Tendencies observed from the reinterpretation 
of the SOM output are compared with decisions made by the first-line management of an 
offshore facility, in the face of a real emergency scenario. It enables a broader debate of 
common managerial shortcomings, discussing practical means to improve emergency 
response decision-making processes in an offshore production platform, supported by the 
trends extracted from the major-accident dataset.  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part I 
The Multi-Attribute Technological Accidents Dataset (MATA-D) construction 
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Chapter 1: Learning from major accidents to improve system design 
Overview 
The first part of this research project focus on the development of a novel industrial 
accidents dataset, i.e. the Multi-attribute Technological Accidents Dataset (MATA-D). The 
underpinning idea was to collect major-accident data from different industrial backgrounds, 
and then categorise them under a common framework, in order to make events 
comparable and to create the basis for the study. 
 
A fifteen-month effort to obtain input data from institutions responsible for investigating 
major accidents resulted in the current version of the dataset, which contains 238 events. 
The development of a new dataset, limited to rare events (i.e. major accidents), was an 
attempt to overcome data collection problems on human performance, a relevant issue 
later addressed in this chapter. 
 
Therefore, detailed accounts on major accidents were collected from insurance companies, 
regulatory bodies, commissions of inquiry and investigation boards, such as MARSH Inc., 
the Australian Department of Industry and Resources (DoIR), the Australian National 
Petroleum Safety Authority (NOPSA), the Brazilian National Petroleum Agency (ANP), the 
European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA), the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA), the Norwegian Foundation for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (SINTEF), the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA), the UK Department of 
Employment, the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE), the US Bureau of Safety and 
Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board 
(CSB), the US Department of Energy (DoE), the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
the US Fire Administration (USFA), the US Minerals Management Service (MMS), the US 
National Transportation Safety Board and the US Occupational Safety and Health Agency 
(OSHA).  
 
The dataset structure follows the Contextual Control Model used as a basis for Hollnagel’s 
(1998) Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method. The chosen framework aims to 
provide new means to capture the connections (and possible disturbances) between 
human factors, technological issues and organisational aspects which resulted in 
catastrophic consequences, as described in several contemporary investigation reports 
from major accidents occurred in high-technology systems. This chapter presents a detailed 
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example of how the data was translated from the reports to the dataset categories (Table 
2, pp. 21). 
 
The statistical results suggested that a deeper understanding of human behavioural 
characteristics interlaced with current technology aspects and organisational context might 
reveal new opportunities to improve safety and mitigate risks. The accidents’ collection and 
the detailed data interpretation provided a rich data source to tackle major risks, and the 
chapter introduces the usage of integrated accident information to generate input to 
design improvement schemes. Additionally, after identifying specific correlations involving 
human factors and design failures, implications to improve the robustness of system design 
and the identification of some of the surrounding factors and tendencies that could lead to 
the manifestation of human errors were effectively addressed. The successful creation of 
the MATA-D paved the way for the next research steps. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 The human contribution to major accidents 
Recent major accidents in complex industrial systems, such as in oil & gas platforms and in 
the aviation industry, were deeply connected to human factors, leading to catastrophic 
consequences. A striking example would be the investigation report from the National 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (2011) of the April 
2010 blowout, in which eleven men died and almost five million barrels of oil were spilled 
in the Gulf of Mexico. The investigators unarguably emphasized the human factors role: 
features such a failure to interpret a pressure test and delay in reacting to signals were 
found to have interacted with poor communication, lack of training and management 
problems to produce this terrible disaster. Other contemporary investigation reports, such 
as the Rio-Paris Flight 447 (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation 
civile, 2011) and Fukushima (Kurokawa, 2012), share the same characteristics regarding the 
significance of human-related features to the undesirable outcome. 
 
Thus, the understanding of the interactions between human factors, technology aspects 
and the organisational context seems to be vital, in order to ensure the safety of 
engineering systems and minimise the possibility of major accidents. A suitable Human 
Reliability Analysis (HRA) technique is usually applied to approach the human contribution 
to undesirable events. 
 
1.2 Human reliability analysis: a brief review 
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) can be generally defined as a predictive tool, intended to 
estimate the probability of human errors and weigh the human factors contribution to the 
overall risk by using qualitative and/or quantitative methods.  
                                                          
1 Original publication in Moura, R. et al., 2016. Learning from major accidents to improve 
system design, Safety Science Journal 84: 37–45, DOI 10.1016/j.ssci.2015.11.022. 
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In the early 60’s, the first structured method to be used by industry to quantify human 
error was presented by Swain (1963), which later evolved to the well-known Technique for 
Human Error Rate Prediction - THERP (Swain & Guttman, 1983). This technique was initially 
developed to deal with nuclear plant applications, using in-built human error probabilities 
adjusted by performance-shaping factors and dependencies (interrelated errors) to deliver 
a human reliability analysis event tree. Some researchers (e.g. Reason, 1990; Kirwan, 
1997a; Everdij and Blom, 2013) refer to THERP as the most well-known method to assess 
human reliability and to provide data to probabilistic safety assessments. 
 
The accident model acknowledged as the “Swiss Cheese model”, developed by Reason 
(1990), can be addressed as the most influential piece of work in the human factors field. It 
has been widely used to describe the dynamics of accident causation and explain how 
complex systems can fail through a combination of simultaneous factors (or as a result of 
the alignment of the holes of the Swiss cheese slices (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. “Swiss Cheese Model” after Reason (1997) 
 
Many Human Reliability Analysis subsequently developed were, to some extent, inspired by 
this model. Examples are the Human Factors Analysis Methodology – HFAM (Pennycook 
and Embrey, 1993), the Sequentially Outlining and Follow-up Integrated Analysis – SOFIA 
(Blajev, 2002), the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System – HFACS (Shappell et 
al. 2007), extensively used to investigate military and commercial aviation accidents, and 
the Systematic Occurrence Analysis Methodology - SOAM (Licu et al., 2007).  
 
Some holes due 
to active failures 
  
Defences 
in depth 
Other holes due to 
latent conditions 
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The concept that accidents arise from an arrangement of latent failures, later renamed to 
latent conditions (Reason, 1997), and active failures in complex systems demonstrated 
accuracy and practicality to guide prevention measures (Hopkins, 1999). Reason’s studies of 
human errors have focused on the work environment, human control processes and safe 
operation of high-technology industrial systems, and included management issues and 
organisational factors. 
 
There are several methods to assess human performance in different domains, and the 
development of such tools was notably triggered by the advances in high-technology 
industrial systems, particularly nuclear plants, aerospace, offshore oil and gas, military and 
commercial aviation, chemical and petrochemical, and navigation. Some of them were 
assessed by Bell and Holroyd (2009), who reported 72 different techniques to estimate 
human reliability and considered 35 to be potentially relevant. Further analysis highlighted 
17 of these HRA tools to be of potential use for major hazard directorates in the United 
Kingdom. These techniques are usually separated by generations, which basically reflect the 
focus of the analysis. 
 
The first generation methods, developed between the 60’s and early 90’s, are mainly 
focused on the task to be performed by operators. Essentially, potential human erroneous 
actions during the task sequence are identified, and the initial probability is then adjusted 
by internal and external factors (performance shaping factors, error-forcing conditions, 
scaling factors or performance influencing factors, depending on the methodology) to 
deliver a final estimation of human error probabilities. The key step in this approach is 
selecting the critical tasks to be performed by operators, which are considered to be 
elements or components subjected to failure due to inborn characteristics, thus having an 
“inbuilt probability of failure”. These methods are widely recognised and commonly 
preferred by practitioners, probably because they provide a straightforward output such as 
an event tree or a probability value that can be directly integrated to Probabilistic Risk 
Assessments. Some examples are THERP, HEART (Human Error Assessment and Reduction 
Technique), presented by Williams (1986), and JHEDI (Justification of Human Error Data 
Information), introduced by Kirwan and James (1989). 
 
Alternatively, second generation techniques have been developed from late 90’s and are 
based on the principle that the central element of human factors assessments is actually 
the context in which the task is performed, reducing previous emphasis on the task 
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characteristics per se and on a hypothetical inherent human error probability. “A Technique 
for Human Error Analysis” – ATHEANA (Cooper et al., 1996), the Connectionism Assessment 
of Human Reliability (CAHR) based on Sträter (2000) and the Cognitive Reliability and Error 
Analysis Method (CREAM) by Hollnagel (1998) are good examples of this kind of approach, 
all reflecting the focus shift from tasks to context to provide a better understanding of 
human error and integrate engineering, social sciences and psychology concepts. More 
recent literature (e.g. Kirwan et al., 2005; Bell and Holroyd, 2009) alludes to the Nuclear 
Action Reliability Assessment – NARA (Kirwan et al., 2005) as the beginning of the third 
generation methods. However, it seems to be merely an update of first generation 
techniques, i.e. HEART, using more recent data from newer databases such as CORE-DATA 
(Gibson and Megaw, 1999).   
 
All these methods provide a number of taxonomies to handle possible internal and external 
factors that could influence human behaviour. Modern data classification taxonomies are 
mostly derived from Swain’s (1982) work, in which he organised human errors in errors of 
omission and errors of commission, being the former a failure to execute something 
expected to be done (partially or entirely), while the latter can be translated as an incorrect 
action when executing a task or a failure to execute an action in time. The issue of 
modelling human errors through the prediction of human behaviour during complex rare 
events was addressed by Rasmussen (1983), who envisioned the Skill-Rule-Knowledge (SRK) 
model. He differentiated three basic levels of human performance: skill-based, when 
automated actions follow an intention (sensory-motor behaviour); rule-based, when there 
is a procedure or technique guiding the action; and knowledge-based, represented by 
actions developed to deal with an unfamiliar situation. Reason (1990) split human errors in 
slips and lapses, when an execution failure or an omission occurs, and mistakes, which 
result from judgement processes used to select an objective, or the means to accomplish it. 
Later, Rasmussen’s theory was encompassed by Reason to further categorise mistakes in 
rule-based mistakes, when a problem-solving sequence is known, but an error choosing the 
right solution to deal with the signals occurs; and knowledge-based mistakes, when the 
problem is not under a recognisable structure thus a stored troubleshooting solution 
cannot be immediately applied. Reason also highlighted an alternative behaviour from a 
social context, called “violation”. This concept was split in exceptional and routine 
violations, both emerging from an intentional deviation from operating procedures, codes 
of practice or standards. 
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Although the classification schemes are usually connected to the industrial domain for 
which they were originally developed, some of them are nonspecific (e.g. HEART) and thus 
have been successfully applied in a broader range of industries. 
 
Regardless of the variety of HRA methods available to enable practitioners to assess the 
risks associated with human error by estimating its probability, the substantially high 
uncertainties related to the human behavioural characteristics, interlaced with actual 
technology aspects and organisational context, turn this kind of evaluation into a very 
complicated matter, thus has been raising reasonable concern about the accuracy and 
practicality of such probabilities. 
 
Those concerns resulted in significant efforts towards the validation of HRA methods. 
Kirwan (1997a, 1997b), compared HRA outputs against known data, essentially verifying if 
the estimations matched the true values. The usage of real data from operational 
experience (including near misses)  is considered of “first order”, while the validation based 
on simulations, experimental literature and expert judgment is referred as approximate or 
“second order” validation. A third order (or convergent) validation would involve the 
comparison among HRA techniques. In his view, the usage of real data from operational 
experience is clearly the best solution. Correspondingly, Preischl and Hellmich (2013) relied 
on human reliability data from the German licensee nuclear power plant events reporting 
system to obtain HEP estimates, later comparing some of the results with the THERP 
handbook tables, in order to validate it. They found the results derived from the reporting 
system to be in fair agreement with THERP, but also identified twenty-one new HEPs, which 
they suggest that should be added to the THERP dataset. 
 
Using a high-fidelity simulator (the Halden Reactor Project’s HAMMLAB), Forester et al. 
(2014) compared HRA outputs from several approaches with results from personnel 
responding to simulated emergency scenarios in a nuclear power plant control room. 
Shirley et al. (2015) assessed the requirements and identified objective needs (such as 
restricting the data collection to high-fidelity simulators) for the validation of a specific 
technique (i.e. THERP) using simulator data, presenting a useful guide for future validation 
works. 
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1.3 Human performance data limitations 
Data collection and the availability of meaningful datasets to feed human reliability 
analyses, to assess human performance in engineering systems and  to understand how 
human factors interact with systems and organisations are relevant issues constantly 
addressed by risk and safety management practitioners and researchers. Many studies in 
the early 90’s addressed these issues, and both the unavailability of data on human 
performance in complex systems (Swain, 1990) and limitations related to the data 
collection process (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1990) were considered to be 
problems extremely difficult to overcome. In order to fulfil the need for appropriate data to 
support HRAs, a number of recent works (Groth & Mosleh, 2012, Preischl & Hellmich, 2013, 
Kim et al., 2017) were developed, mainly focusing on improving the estimation of human 
error probabilities.  
 
Other data collection efforts recognised the importance of understanding accident 
scenarios to mitigate risks, and attempted to use operating experience. The Storybuilder 
Project (Bellamy et al., 2006), for instance, concentrated on the classification and statistical 
analysis of occupational accidents to construct a general accident causation model. Still, 
Grabowski et al. (2009)  pointed out the exponential rise of electronic records as an 
operational data collection problem, claiming that data validation, compatibility, 
integration and harmonisation are increasingly significant challenges in maritime data 
analysis and risk assessments. Problems related with the integration and harmonisation of 
data may be intensified by attempts to classify and compare accidents from different 
industrial backgrounds, if an adequate framework is not selected. 
 
This work aims to generate a new data source, to serve as a suitable input to the 
understanding of human performance under high-hazard scenarios and to expose how it 
can be affected by technology and organisational aspects. Moura et al. (2015a) have 
previously discriminated some of the difficulties that might be preventing the development 
of a comprehensive, cross-industrial dataset with this intent. Main issues can be 
summarised by: (i) dissimilar jargons and nomenclatures used by distinct industrial sectors 
are absorbed by the classification method, making some taxonomies specific to particular 
industries; (ii) the effort to collect human data from accident reports and real operational 
experience is time-consuming, and could favour, for instance, the immediate use of expert 
elicitation or less-than-adequate available data, instead of developing a new dataset; (iii) 
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the accuracy of the collection method is very difficult to assess, and distinct sources (e.g. 
field data, expert elicitation, performance indicators or accident investigation reports) can 
lead to different results; and (iv) the interfaces between human factors, technological 
aspects and the organisation are context-dependent and can be combined in numerous 
ways, due to the variability of the operational environment and the randomness of human 
behaviour.  
 
These significant drawbacks will be minimised by the development of a novel industrial 
accidents dataset, bringing together major accident reports from different industrial 
backgrounds and classifying them under a common framework, which is capable of 
absorbing accident narratives from several sources. In spite of being a time-consuming and 
a laborious process, the accidents collection and the detailed interpretation will provide a 
rich data source, enabling the usage of integrated information to generate input to design 
improvement schemes.     
  
Accident investigations can be considered to be one of the most valuable and reliable 
sources of information for future use, provided that several man-hours from a 
commissioned expert team are applied in an in-depth analysis of an undesirable event 
sequence, providing detailed insight into the genesis of industrial accidents. 
 
2. Classification Method 
2.1 The Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) taxonomy as a 
common framework to classify accidents 
In a previous work, some of the most used taxonomies in human reliability analysis were 
examined as possible inputs to the establishment of a data classification framework for a 
global accidents dataset. The three nomenclature sets considered by Moura et al. (2015a) 
were The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System - HFACS (Shappell et al. 2007), 
the Error Promoting Conditions (EPCs) from the Human Error Assessment and Reduction 
Technique (HEART) and the CREAM categorisation. 
 
Primarily, CREAM is a HRA approach, thus its taxonomy was not only designed to support 
the search for causes in retrospective evaluations (or accident analysis), but also to provide 
human error probabilities estimations. Although some important limitations for the use of 
CREAM as a HEP estimation method are known, such as the fact that the CREAM failure 
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types assignment is too subjective and not sufficiently detailed to account for differences 
observed in crew performance (Forester et al.,2014), the method is still capable of 
supporting prospective and retrospective evaluation initiatives (Ung, 2015, Zhou et al., 
2017).  
 
Some of the limitations appear to be intimately associated with the flexibility of the 
method, as a trade-off between detailing the factors directly affecting human actions and 
including higher level organisational ones (to explain past events) had to be reached, in 
order to enable the method to capture factors serving both purposes.  
 
However, the current work exclusively relies on previously executed analyses of major 
accidents – within the “retrospective analysis” class – to build a dataset comprising 
immediate and latent contributing factors, which are mostly exposed in detailed accident 
investigations. The main objective is to better understand major accidents and ultimately 
identify significant interactions between organisations, technology and human factors, to 
improve human performance under complex scenarios and reduce risk. With this intent, 
the taxonomy is solely used to construct the dataset structure, not following Hollnagel’s 
(1998) procedures to perform accident analyses or prospective analyses.  
 
Several important initiatives (Cooper et al., 1996, Gibson & Megaw, 1999, Chang et al., 
2014, Kim et al., 2017) are focused on estimating human failure probabilities to serve HRA 
data needs and allow further integration with PRAs. Nonetheless, there is a growing need 
to understand complex decision-making processes in abnormal or accident scenarios, to 
identify human interactions with latent system failures and to explore organisational 
factors (Oxstrand, 2010).   
 
Provided that generating HEPs is out of the scope of the current work, the aforementioned 
taxonomy issues are not supposed to affect the research outcome. Perfectly supporting the 
envisioned application, the classification method has shown a great potential to capture 
appropriate information from accident narratives, as previously discussed in Moura et al. 
(2015a) and further demonstrated in section 3.4 of the current work. Therefore the 
development of the dataset is intended to support an improved understanding of operator 
performance, especially under complex major-accident scenarios, meant to provide a key 
contribution to operational safety. 
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Additionally, the fact that CREAM uses a nonspecific taxonomy, thus adaptable to most 
industrial segments, and its natural separation between man, technology and organisation, 
facilitating the accidents classification, made this terminology to be selected, in order to 
originate the structure of the new dataset.  
 
Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the dataset classification structure. 
Figure 2. “Man” categorisation, adapted from Hollnagel (1998). 
 
  
Figure 3. ““Technology” categorisation, adapted from Hollnagel (1998). 
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Figure 4. “Organisation” categorisation, adapted from Hollnagel (1998). 
 
The 53 factors which could have influenced each of the 238 assessed accidents are 
organised in the three major groups depicted in Figures 2, 3 and 4. The “man” group 
concentrates human-related phenotypes in the action sub-group, representing the possible 
manifestation of human errors through erroneous actions (Wrong Time, Wrong Type, 
Wrong Object and Wrong Place), usually made by operators in the front-line. These flawed 
movements cover omitted or wrong actions; early, late, short, long or wrong movements, 
including in an incorrect direction or with inadequate force, speed or magnitude; skipping 
one or more actions or inverting the actions order during a sequence.  
 
Possible causes or triggering factors with human roots can be classified as Specific Cognitive 
Functions, or the general sequence of mental mechanisms (Observe-Interpret-Plan) which 
leads the human being to respond to a stimulus. Also, temporary (e.g. fatigue, distraction or 
stress) and permanent disturbances (biases such as a hypothesis fixation or the tendency to 
search for a confirmation of previous assumptions) can be captured under the sub-groups 
Temporary and Permanent Person-related Functions. These are the person-related 
genotypes. 
 
The second major group (Figure 3) represent technological genotypes, associated with 
procedures, equipment and system failures, as well as shortcomings involving the outputs 
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(signals and information) provided by interfaces. The last group (Figure 4) encompasses 
organisational contributing factors, representing the work environment and the social 
context of the industrial activity. It involves latent conditions (such as a design failure), 
communication shortcomings and operation, maintenance, training, quality control and 
management problems. Factors such as adverse ambient conditions and unfavourable 
working conditions (e.g. irregular working hours) are also included in this category. 
 
3. Review of 238 major accidents: the multi-attribute technological accidents 
dataset (MATA-D) 
3.1 MATA-D conception: data selection 
To overcome the problems of the data collection process and the quality variability of 
different data sources, this work limits the data gathering to detailed accounts of accidents 
occurred in the industrial segments listed in Table 1. Accident reports and detailed case 
studies contain comprehensive information about the events, which can be interpreted and 
modelled into the groups and sub-groups shown in Figures 2, 3 and 4, to serve as input to 
the newly-created Multi-attribute Technological Accidents Dataset (MATA-D). The original 
reports were obtained from reliable sources such as regulators, investigation panels, 
government bodies, insurance companies and industry experts. A detailed account of the 
contributing institutions can be found in Moura et al. (2015a). The dataset covers major 
accidents occurred worldwide, from the early fifties to today. Table 1 shows the accidents 
time-spam per industrial activity. 
 
It is worth mentioning that the data selection criterion brought two significant gains. The 
use of real-life accounts reduces uncertainties related to the accurateness of the data, and 
investigation reports supply detailed technical info, evidences and an in-depth analysis of 
the interfaces between human factors, technology and the organisation in which the event 
occurred. This seems to be one of the finest sources of information available, from which 
MATA-D is fully designed. 
Table 1.  MATA-D events distribution by industry 
Industry 
Accidents 
Period 
#   % 
Refinery 39 16.39 1978 - 2011 
Upstream (Oil & Gas)  37 15.55 1975 - 2012 
Chemicals Factory 29 12.18 1975 - 2011 
Petrochemicals 25 10.50 1974 - 2008 
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Nuclear Industry 23 9.66 1953 - 2011 
Civil Construction 16 6.72 1968 - 2011 
Terminals and Distribution 15 6.30 1975 - 2012 
Aviation Industry  13 5.46 1996 - 2013 
Gas Processing  09 3.78 1977 - 2008 
Metallurgical Industry 07 2.94 1975 - 2011 
Waste Treatment Plant 05 2.10 2002 - 2009 
Food Industry 04 1.68 1998 - 2009 
Other 16 6.72 1980 - 2011 
 
3.2 MATA-D usage  
This new accident dataset aims to provide researchers and practitioners with a simple and 
innovative interface for classifying accidents from any industrial sector, reflecting 
apparently dissimilar events in a comparable fashion. The binary classification for the 
evaluated factors (presence or absence) allows data interpretation using uncomplicated 
statistical methods or sophisticated mathematical models, depending on the user’s 
requirements.   
 
Moreover, the detailed descriptions available for each identified factor, as can be seen in 
the example given in Table 2, allows comprehensive understanding and analysis of single 
accidents, as well as the disclosure of the precise evidence of failures associated with 
psychological (cognitive functions), engineering (e.g. design and equipment failures) and 
organisational (e.g. management problems and training) aspects. These descriptions 
provide an effective translation of highly technical content reports to a linguistic approach 
easily understood by practitioners from outside the engineering field, facilitating cross-
disciplinary communication among professionals and academics. Many applications can be 
developed from these unique characteristics.   
 
3.3 Features of the data sample 
1,539 fatalities were recorded in 67 of the 238 analysed events. Some of the reports also 
contained damage recovery information, and 95 events were accountable for more than 
£20 billion in material losses. Apart from these significant features, it is acknowledged that 
many additional costs arise from major accidents. It is reported (Fowler, 2013) that British 
Petroleum (BP) paid around US$ 14 billion in indenisations related to the Gulf of Mexico oil 
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spill clean-up, and Bell (2012) described a 35.00% stock price drop from the event 
occurrence in 2010 to 2012. 
 
However, the most significant feature of the dataset events is that all of them involved a 
major emission, fire, explosion or crash, exposing humans and/or the environment to 
serious danger. Thus, these events largely fit the definition of “major accident”, according 
to the United Kingdom’s Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations (1999). 
 
3.4 MATA-D Construction: data interpretation and classification demonstration 
method 
The analysis and classification of nearly 250 accident reports (some events were 
investigated by more than one entity and had multiple records) was a time-consuming 
process, but enabled the comparison among accidents from different industries. 
Investigation reports varied from a few to a maximum of 494 pages.  
 
The process involved the interpretation of the accidents reports and their subsequent 
classification under the common taxonomy to create the dataset.  
 
Table 2 exemplifies how one of the collected accidents was carefully decomposed and 
recorded in the MATA-D database. This example scrutinises a severe explosion of 
flammable gasoline constituents released from a refinery's hydrofluoric acid (HF) alkylation 
unit, examined by the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (2005b). The 
release, ignition, fire and several explosions occurred during the preparation of a pump 
repair, which was being removed by maintenance workers. As a consequence, six 
employees were injured, the production was stopped for approximately 6 months and a 
damage repair cost of US$ 13 million was reported. 
 
 
Table 2.  Oil Refinery Fire and Explosion classification example 
Group Sub-Group  Factor  Description* 
Man Execution Wrong Type Movement in the wrong direction: 
during a seal repair, the operator 
attempted to isolate the pump by 
closing a plug valve. He moved the valve 
wrench to a perpendicular position in 
relation to the flow, believing this was 
the closed position, but the valve was 
actually open. 
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Man Specific 
Cognitive 
Functions 
(Observation) 
Observation 
missed 
Overlook cue/signal: The valve stem 
was equipped with a position indicator, 
but the operators overlooked it. The 
indicator was correctly indicating the 
open status.  
Man Specific 
Cognitive 
Functions 
(Observation) 
Wrong 
Identification 
Incorrect identification: the mechanic 
specialist recognised the valve as closed 
due to the wrench position and, 
following a safety procedure, placed 
locks and tags on the valve, to prevent 
its inadvertent opening. 
Man Specific 
Cognitive 
Functions 
(Interpretation) 
Wrong 
reasoning 
(i) Deduction error: Operator and 
mechanic specialist firmly believed that 
the closed valve position was always 
identified by the wrench being 
perpendicular to the flow of product. 
(ii) Induction Error: after unbolting the 
flare line, a small release of a high 
flammable component was observed 
for a few seconds. As the flux stopped, 
the operator inferred that the pump 
was de-pressurised and the removal 
was safe. However, vent line was 
clogged by scale.      
Man Specific 
Cognitive 
Functions 
(Planning) 
Priority error After the installation of the locks, the 
operator noticed that the position 
indicator was showing that the valve 
was open, but he maintained his plans 
and left the plant to fetch the necessary 
tools for the pump removal. 
Man Permanent 
Person Related 
Functions 
Cognitive 
bias 
Confirmation bias: search for 
information was restricted to looking at 
wrench position, which confirmed the 
operator’s assumption that the valve 
was closed, dismissing a further 
consideration of the fully functioning 
position indicator. 
Technology Temporary 
Interface 
Ambiguous 
Information 
Position mismatch: wrench collar was 
installed in an unusual position. Usually, 
the perpendicular wrench position 
indicates the closed state, while the 
parallel wrench position indicates the 
open status. Thus, wrench position 
(open-close) was inverted and thus 
conflicting with the position indicator.  
Organisation Organisation Maintenance 
Failure 
(i) There was no effective 
preventive/predictive maintenance 
programme to maintain pumps 
operational, as interventions (repair / 
parts replacement) took place only 
when equipment failed. The 
investigation of possible failure 
mechanisms (the actual causes of the 
breakdowns) never occurred. 
(ii) Flare line was clogged by scale. 
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Organisation Organisation Inadequate 
Quality 
Control 
(i) Despite the recurring failures of 
several pump seals in the plant (prior to 
the accident, 23 work orders for similar 
defects were issued), quality control 
procedures failed to ensure the 
adequacy of the equipment to the 
transported product and to certify that 
maintenance procedures were suitable.  
(ii) Quality control failed to identify the 
inadequate installation of the wrench 
collar, which allowed the wrench bar to 
stay in an unusual position, unfamiliar 
to operators. 
Organisation Organisation Design 
Failure 
The valve actuator (wrench) collar had a 
squared shape and could be installed in 
any position, thus there was a 
discrepancy between the design of the 
valve and its actuator. Design should 
have prevented the wrench installation 
in an unusual position. Also, further 
investigation identified that the original 
actuator was a gear-operated one, and 
the design change to a wrench actuator 
failed to address further safety 
implications, such as the produced 
mismatch between the position 
indicator and the wrench position. 
*Adapted from the evidence/accounts from the US Chemical Safety and Hazard 
Investigation Board (2005b) Case Study. 
 
The classification method was applied to the above accident and the Table 2 clearly 
exemplifies how the investigation report from an event occurred in a specific industry (i.e. a 
refinery) can be decomposed into general categories, enabling the association with most 
industrial sectors. This classification method allowed the creation of a dataset composed by 
major accidents from industries with no apparent connection, but sharing common 
features (groups, sub-groups and factors) which contributed to serious events. In addition, 
the dataset preserves the main characteristics of the scrutinised events at the description 
column, facilitating the prompt understanding of complex investigation reports and 
allowing further analysis of single or grouped events, if required.   
 
A seemingly pure human error (which could be described by the removal of the pump 
without closing the isolation valve or, more specifically, opening the isolation valve instead 
of closing it) can be explained by some cognitive mechanisms triggered by technology and 
organisational issues. The worker tried to isolate a pump for maintenance by putting the 
valve wrench in a perpendicular position in relation to the piping, which is a widely 
accepted convention for the closed state of a valve. He disregarded the position indicator at 
the valve body, assuming the wrench position as a sufficient proof of the pump isolation. A 
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mechanic specialist who was responsible for double-checking the isolation, for safety 
reasons, also deduced that the valve was closed just by looking at the wrench position, and 
locked the valve. This allows the identification of valuable cognitive functions influencing 
the human erroneous actions, assisted by the terminology of the classification method, 
such as the observation missed, the wrong identification, wrong reasoning and priority 
error. A person-related cognitive bias was also categorised, explaining why the operator 
ignored the position indicator.  
 
Even more important, the link between technology, design and human factors can be 
clearly established: the ambiguity of the information provided by the interface (unfamiliar 
wrench position versus position indicator), triggered by the design failure, motivated the 
operator to reason in a way that the error of opening the isolation valve, instead of closing 
it, was plausible. Other organisational contributors, such as the quality control faults of the 
wrench installation and the mechanical integrity programme, were also captured by the 
classification scheme.  
 
3.5 MATA-D Results & Analysis 
Following the same method presented in Table 2, 238 major accidents were scrutinised and 
computed into the MATA-D. Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 summarise the results obtained from the 
interpretations of the accident reports analysed by the authors, as well as the resulting 
categorisation. 
 
Table 3.  Data Classification results (main groups). 
Group 
Frequency* 
# % 
Man 136 57.14 
Technology 196 82.35 
Organisation 227 95.38 
*Number of events where groups appeared. 
 
Table 4.  Data Classification results (factors & sub-groups). 
Factor 
Frequency* 
Sub-Group 
Freq.* 
# % % 
Wrong Time 35 14.70 Execution 54.60 
Wrong Type 28 11.80 
Wrong Object 06 2.50 
Wrong Place  75 31.50 
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Observation Missed  37 15.50 Cognitive Functions** 47.50 
False Observation  08 3.40 
Wrong Identification 06 2.50 
Faulty diagnosis 31 13.00 
Wrong reasoning 27 11.30 
Decision error  22 9.20 
Delayed interpretation 11 4.60 
Incorrect prediction 09 3.80 
Inadequate plan 23 9.70 
Priority error 17 7.10 
Memory failure 02 0.90 Temporary Person 
Related Functions 
13.00 
Fear 05 2.10 
Distraction  14 5.90 
Fatigue 07 2.90 
Performance Variability 03 1.40 
Inattention 05 2.10 
Physiological stress 02 0.80 
Psychological stress 07 2.90 
Functional impairment 01 0.40 Permanent Person 
Related Functions 
7.60 
Cognitive style 00 0.00 
Cognitive bias 17 7.10 
Equipment failure 131 55.00 Equipment 56.30 
Software fault 06 2.50 
Inadequate procedure 105 44.10 Procedures 44.10 
Access limitations  03 1.30 Temporary Interface 18.90 
Ambiguous information 06 2.50 
Incomplete information 42 17.60 
Access problems  04 1.70 Permanent Interface 3.40 
Mislabelling  04 1.70 
Communication failure 25 10.50 Communication 29.00 
Missing information 49 20.60 
Maintenance failure 83 34.90 Organisation 94.10 
Inadequate quality control 144 60.50 
Management problem 22 9.20 
Design failure 157 66.00 
Inadequate task allocation 143 60.10 
Social pressure  17 7.10 
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Insufficient skills 86 36.10 Training 54.20 
Insufficient knowledge 84 35.30 
Temperature 03 1.30 Ambient Conditions 8.80 
Sound  00 0.00 
Humidity 00 0.00 
Illumination 02 0.80 
Other 00 0.00 
Adverse ambient condition 17 7.10 
Excessive demand 13 5.50 Working Conditions 11.30 
Poor work place layout 06 2.50 
Inadequate team support 08 3.40 
Irregular working hours 09 3.80 
*Number of events where factors or sub-groups appeared. 
** Cognitive functions detailed on Table 5. 
 
Table 5.  Data Classification results (cognitive functions). 
Cognitive Function 
Frequency* 
# % 
Observation 47 19.70 
Interpretation  79 33.20 
Planning 38 16.00 
*Number of events where cognitive functions appeared. 
 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 specify the number of appearances of the man-related, technology and 
organisational phenotypes and genotypes identified in the major accidents examined. 
Percentages relate to the total of events (238). 
 
At least one human element was identified in 57.14% of the cases, with 54.60% of direct 
erroneous actions (phenotypes). Cognitive functions accounted for 47.50%, with the 
interpretation genotype appearing as the most relevant (33.20%). At least one technology 
genotype was recognised in 82.35% of the accidents, highlighting equipment failure 
(55.00%) and inadequate procedures (44.10%) as the foremost factors related to this group. 
Organisational issues appeared in 95.38% of the accidents, emphasising design failures 
(66.00%), inadequate quality control (60.50%) and inadequate task allocation (60.10%) as 
the most significant genotypes within the group. 
 
Table 6 presents a macro-analysis of the major groups (man, machine and organisation), 
indicating that a single group causing a major accident is not common. Merely 0.84% of the 
examined events showed an erroneous action with a man-related genotype resulting in an 
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accident. Exclusively technological factors were responsible for the undesirable outcome in 
only 3.78% of the cases, while 7.56% of the events were solely explained by organisational 
factors. On the other hand, combinations involving a minimum of two groups featured 
significantly in the dataset. A Man-Technology arrangement appeared in 47.48% of the 
cases, while a Man-Organisation combination performed in 56.30%. The Technology-
Organisation pair figured together in 78.57% of the events. In 47.48% of the cases, the 
three groups appeared together. Table 6 summarises these results. 
 
Table 6. Macro-analysis (main groups). 
Group / Combination 
Frequency* 
# % 
Only Man 02 0.84 
Only Technology  09 3.78 
Only Organisation 18 7.56 
Man-Technology 113 47.48 
Man-Organisation 134 56.30 
Technology-Organisation 187 78.57 
Man-Technology-Organisation 113 47.48 
*Events where a single group or combinations appeared. 
 
There is a close relationship between the design failure genotype and the man group: 
72.80% of the erroneous actions (execution errors) were accompanied by a design failure, 
such as in the case study presented on Table 2.  In addition, 62.50% of temporary and 
permanent person related functions and 74.34% of cognitive functions were connected to 
design failures. 
 
Also, it is important to notice that the design failure is the most significant single genotype 
from all three groups, appearing with an incidence of 66.00%, followed by inadequate 
quality control (60.50%), inadequate task allocation (60.10%) and equipment failure 
(55.00%). Despite the significance of these further contributing factors, which can be used 
in future studies to improve the organisation of work and disclose operational strategies, 
the following discussion will focus on the design failure genotype features and connections 
revealed by the statistical analysis. 
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4. Discussion 
4.1 Improving robustness of system design  
Design failures were detected in 157 of the 238 major accidents included in the MATA-D, 
clearly emphasising the need for further developments in design verification schemes. 
These deficiencies are examples of embedded failures in the system design, which can stay 
dormant for many years before aligning with human errors, technology issues and other 
organisational problems to result in a serious occurrence. The failures related with the 
design of the Fukushima nuclear power plant, such as insufficient tsunami defences 
combined with the lack of flood protection for batteries, which caused the loss of DC 
power, remained dormant for decades. Similarly, icing problems of the original speed 
sensors in the Airbus 330 airplane persisted for approximately 8 years before triggering the 
catastrophic Rio-Paris flight crash in 2009. Although these design flaw examples could be 
promptly addressed (before the alignment of the holes in the Figure 1), the lack of a robust 
dataset containing useful information about the multifaceted interaction between human 
factors, technology and organisation in complex systems may be preventing standards and 
regulations from addressing the human performance problem in earlier stages of the 
lifecycle of engineering systems, such as design, in a structured way. The MATA-D 
construction intends to break this tendency, being composed by major accidents from high-
technology industries to create means of analysing this kind of catastrophic events. Also, 
major accidents are notably rare events, and the wide-ranging taxonomy used to classify 
events in the MATA-D allows the accumulation of data from several industrial sectors to 
perform a deeper analysis and disclose early contributors and significant tendencies leading 
to human errors. 
 
Other studies were able to identify this relationship between human errors, technology and 
organisational issues. Bellamy et al. (2013) analysed 118 incidents involving loss of 
containment in Dutch Seveso plants and identified that 59% of the failures to use/operate a 
safety barrier were associated with human errors. Despite the application of a different 
classification system for human errors and the inclusion of events with minor consequences 
(only 9 out of 118 events were major accidents reportable under Seveso II Directive), these 
figures might well be related with the present study findings, in which 57.14% of the 238 
major industrial accidents were found to have human contributing causes, as reflected in 
the “man” category statistics. 
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The comparison of single group accidents with the statistics for at least two simultaneous 
groups on Table 6 confirms that high-technology systems require a complex interaction of 
multiple failures in order to produce a major accident. It is important to notice that not only 
a number of barriers need to be breached, but it also has to interact in a very particular 
way. This makes the prediction of all design interactions and responses to human, 
technology and organisational events virtually impossible, highlighting the importance of 
developing design verification schemes to raise the awareness level of designers relating to 
major accidents. Therefore, providing some straightforward information based on the most 
common interactions occurring in complex accidents may be of assistance. The relationship 
between design failures and human factors indicates that the design damage tolerance 
criteria must be tested against specific human-related factors disclosed by this research. 
The direct association of execution errors and cognitive functions with design problems is a 
valuable finding, demonstrating how design failures can deeply influence human behaviour. 
 
Design failures particularly appear to trigger failures in the human capacity to interpret 
system status (wrong reasoning and faulty diagnosis), enable potential observation misses 
and cause some execution errors (sequence, timing and type).  
 
Based on these findings, an effective design review process should carefully address 
circumstances where some system analysis/diagnosis, interpretation or hypothesis 
formulations are required before taking an action. The common man, technology and 
organisation interfaces discussed indicate that it is likely that cues, measurements or 
information originally intended to lead to a human action have a substantial probability of 
being missed, an effect explained by some specific cognitive functions (inferences, 
generalisations or deductions) highlighted by this study.  
 
The aim of the review would be to improve system design by making it responsive to 
common active failures translated as human erroneous actions, such as omissions; jumping 
forward a required action; performing a premature, delayed or wrong action; and 
performing a movement in the wrong direction, with inadequate speed or magnitude. Of 
course these operators’ “action failures” occur in a greater frequency than accidents, and 
should be considered customary, or part of a non-mechanic behaviour. Consequently, 
human performance will vary, and it seems that addressing design shortcomings which can 
affect human behaviour, by learning from major accidents in an informed and structured 
way, is a reasonable path to reduce major accidents and tackle the genesis of human errors. 
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4.2 Using the MATA-D for a design review process: an example 
One suitable example of effective design improvement approach would be to apply a 
design review process which considers the connections between human erroneous actions, 
cognitive functions and design failures highlighted during this study. 
 
The role of the proposed review process is to identify and correct design imperfections that 
could lead to major accidents. Primarily, due to the complexities of high-technology 
systems, it is important to bear in mind that one reviewer is unlikely to hold all necessary 
knowledge to assess all design disciplines and aspects (system functionalities, materials, 
mechanics, structure, fabrication methods, electrics, chemistry, corrosion protection, risk, 
compliance etc.). The person in charge should be able to form a team, identifying and 
engaging with experts in the respective fields (face-to-face meetings), whether or not they 
are directly involved in the business. Designers, manufacturers, constructors and operators, 
for instance, are obvious interested parties, but referring to external parties, such as 
associations, academic institutions and regulatory bodies, will also aggregate significant 
value to the group task, being “time” the key constraint to be managed during this phase.     
 
In summary, the first step would be to (i) identify and rank the safety critical elements (SCE) 
within the installation. One helpful definition of SCEs is found in the UK Safety Case 
Regulations (2005), in which the term is defined as any part of an installation whose failure 
could cause or contribute to a major accident, or elements designed to prevent or limit the 
effect of a major accident. Considering the wide range of high-technology installations 
encompassed by the MATA-D (e.g. oil and gas, nuclear plants and aviation), the SCEs list will 
vary enormously from facility to facility, depending on the industrial segment assessed. 
Then, (ii) the information associated with the critical elements (e.g. material and 
functionalities description, conceptual and detailed design, fabrication and installation 
drawings and process and instrumentation diagrams) are used to disclose the relevant 
human tasks, and (iii) the identified operations would be tested against the basic execution 
errors disclosed by this study (i.e. omissions; jumping forward a required action; performing 
a premature, delayed or wrong action; and performing a movement in the wrong direction, 
with inadequate speed or magnitude), to identify undesirable effects affecting the critical 
elements documented in step (i). Next stage would involve (iv) the assessment of 
indications intended to trigger human actions, such as cues, measurements and displays. 
The possibility of missing them, as discussed in previous sections, should prompt deep 
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consideration about the alternative measures in place (e.g. redundancy, double-check, 
automatic shut-down, supervisor intervention) to provoke human responsiveness. The last 
review step would comprise the (v) analysis of complex tasks, which can be defined as the 
ones requiring observation of signals, its correct interpretation and system diagnosis.  
 
The mental modelling is inherent to the worker’s level of knowledge, the information 
available and the work environment/situation, among other factors, thus the matter of a 
human inadequate reasoning while evaluating relevant conditions linked to critical 
elements must be considered in the review. Although this may seem, at first glance, an 
excessively challenging task to be undertaken by the design reviewer, the MATA-D results, 
which indicate specific mechanisms leading to poor interpretations, can be used to build a 
systematic assessment process. The available inputs to diagnose the undesirable condition 
should be listed and evaluated, in order to identify where: a) information (e.g. instructions, 
codes & standards, manuals, signals, communication); b) knowledge (e.g. level of training, 
education and engineering practice) and c) the work situation (e.g. adverse ambient 
conditions, irregular working hours, and inadequate work place layout) are likely to induce 
inferences, generalisations or deductions which can lead to invalid results. 
 
Also, most of the industrial fields allow the designers to choose among a wide range of 
standards and protocols as an input to design. Thus, compliance verification is similarly a 
significant method to detect information imperfections, i.e. if the engineering best 
practices for the existing condition are being applied. The usage of codes and standards 
which consider human factors as well as the disclosed interactions should be preferred.  
 
Consequently, this design review process should be able to identify possible blind spots and 
reflect a “design clarity” degree, indicating if the expected functions defined in the 
conceptual phase are thoroughly satisfied during the earlier stages of the installation 
lifecycle. 
 
5. Conclusions 
5.1 A new method to apply past accidents lessons to design reviews 
Learning from past accidents is essential to minimise the possibility of undesirable events 
recurring, but this is not a trivial task. The particular sequence of events resulting in a 
serious accident is multidimensional and highly associated with the perfect alignment of 
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very specific circumstances within a work environment. Consequently, limited learning is 
likely to arise from the analysis of a single event or even a few accidents, justifying the need 
for a broad comprehensive understanding of the common features and mechanisms 
leading to human error, which is the aim of the large major accidents collection.  
 
A new accident dataset, created from detailed investigation reports and using a 
classification that admits events from different industries, was then introduced.   
 
This work also described some advantageous findings for designers and practitioners who 
deal with major hazard control, in the sense that it is essential to take human error into 
account during design. Accordingly, improved insight into erroneous actions and influencing 
factors was revealed, as the vast collection of real-life accidents (i.e. 238) presented 
relevant relationships between man, technology and organisation and disclosed common 
patterns within disasters from different industrial segments.  
 
Specific human factors to be addressed in a design review were then presented in the 
discussion section guidelines, reducing the burden and the time required to apply extensive 
human error lists to predicted tasks or complicated methodologies during the development 
of new projects. This approach, due to its simplicity, can be easily adapted to current design 
review processes, effectively raising awareness for the development of strategies to 
minimise human error through design. 
 
The MATA-D includes valuable lessons from several high-technology industries, such as 
upstream, refining, aviation and nuclear, involving specialists from different fields and 
providing common input to major hazard control strategies. This new dataset can be used 
for any application requiring technical input from past major accidents. 
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Part II 
Major accidents data classification and analysis, human errors 
understanding and graphical representations 
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Chapter 2: Learning from major accidents: graphical representation and analysis 
of multi-attribute events to enhance risk communication 
 
Overview 
 
Chapter’s 2 key feature is the analysis of the MATA-D dataset developed in the previous 
chapter, with the support of adequate mathematical methods. Recognising that major 
accidents are complex, multi-attribute events, originated from the interactions between 
intricate systems, cutting-edge technologies and human factors, the purpose is now to 
reduce the high-dimensionality of the data captured by the proprietary dataset, in order to 
overcome barriers to learn from major accidents and enable stakeholders to fully 
understand and communicate risk. 
 
Perspectives on learning from disasters have been lately discussed, generally suggesting 
that lessons from undesirable events have not been fully understood or implemented, 
especially regarding high-technology systems. Schröder-Hinrichs et al. (2012) examined 
some widely-known maritime accidents, and argued that catastrophic sinking events such 
as the Titanic and the Costa Concordia seem to encompass the same underlying human and 
organisational factors, despite the 100-year distance separating them. Likewise, Le Coze 
(2013) compared a group of major accidents occurred in the first decade of the 21st 
century with events in the 70s and 80s (e.g. nuclear: Chernobyl vs. Fukushima; offshore 
production: Piper Alpha vs. Deepwater Horizon; aviation: Tenerife vs. Rio-Paris) arguing that 
similarities among these accidents produced a déjà vu feeling. Biases associated with the 
attribution of excessive weight to the human error contribution to accidents and public 
pressure towards blame allocation (Hopkins, 2006, Johnson, 2008) are some of the issues 
that can also inhibit a favourable learning environment.  
 
The general strategy used in the current research to convey risk information involves the 
manipulation of integrated data to display similarities (or shared tendencies) in a particular 
collection of major accidents. With this purpose, an artificial neural network approach, i.e. 
self-organising maps - SOM (Kohonen, 2001), was applied to the MATA-D dataset, revealing 
common patterns and disclosing significant features. Due to the intrinsic characteristics of 
the SOM algorithm, the chosen approach successfully reduced the dataset dimensionality 
without data loss, fully preserving the input data in a 2-D matrix output. This is particularly 
useful to enable interpretations of the dataset beyond the mere presence or absence of 
specific contributing factors.  
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The chosen method allowed a comprehensive analysis of the interactions among 
contributors, harmonising complex tendencies leading to major accidents with simple and 
straightforward visual representations. The contributing factors and their interactions were 
presented in a convenient graphical alternative, producing further insight into the 
conditions leading to major accidents and supporting a novel and comprehensive ‘‘learning 
from accidents” experience. Accident examples illustrate some of the tendencies disclosed 
by the SOM. The intention is to provide additional means to help stakeholders absorb risk 
information, thus improving risk communication and enhancing risk perception. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Perspectives on learning from accidents and understanding human errors 
Major accidents have a multidimensional nature, arising from a wide range of contributing 
factors interacting in a seemingly random and sophisticated fashion to result in large-scale 
technological disasters. Many of these contributing factors are developed since the design 
conception, comprising of technical and non-technical issues and ultimately including the 
alluring influence of human errors.  
 
The term “human error” has been coined in several different fields such as engineering, 
economics, psychology, design, management and sociology, with numerous interpretations 
and diverse objectives.  Although most of the researchers and practitioners would 
(probably!) agree that human error can be generally understood as a failure to perform a 
certain task, the indiscriminate usage of the label “human error” to define some sort of 
human underperformance can be highly controversial. Hollnagel (1993, 1998), Woods et al. 
(2010) and Dekker (2014) claim that errors are best seen as a judgment in hindsight, or an 
attribution made about the behaviour of people after an event, being a quite misleading 
term, of limited practical use and nothing more than a tag. Conversely, Reason (1990, 2013) 
favoured the usage of the nomenclature, describing three necessary features to define 
human error: (i) plans; (ii) actions (or omissions); and (iii) consequences, surrounded by two 
situational factors: intention and absence of chance interference. Therefore, according to 
Reason, human errors can be acknowledged when an intention is reflected in a planned 
                                                          
2 Original publication in Moura, R. et al., 2017. Learning from major accidents: Graphical 
representation and analysis of multi-attribute events to enhance risk communication, 
Safety Science 99: 58-70, DOI 10.1016/j.ssci.2017.03.005. 
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sequence of actions which fails to accomplish its projected outcome, with observable 
consequences. The plan can be flawed or the action(s) can be imperfect, and some chance 
agency (e.g. an act of God or force majeure) is not recognisable. 
 
The understanding of human error is typically encapsulated by a wider concept entitled 
“Human Factors”. This applied discipline has grown significantly after World War II, where 
the consideration of the human aspect was deemed necessary for achieving a realistic 
reliability assessment (Swain and Guttman, 1983; Dhillon, 1986). Since then, the multi-
disciplinary nature of the human factors studies, which focus on the relationship between 
humans, tasks, technologies, organisations and the surrounding environment, allowed for 
some variances among the views and needs of engineers, psychologists, sociologists, 
managers and the general public. Hollnagel (1998) suggested that the original engineering 
and design approach aimed at analysing humans as components, in order to assign a 
human failure probability (or human error likelihood) to risk and safety assessments. 
Adopting a different perspective, psychologists attempted to understand mental processes 
and awareness mechanisms leading to erroneous actions, while sociologists were looking 
for flaws in the socio-technical system, usually attributing errors to management and 
organisational shortcomings.  
 
But how do stakeholders see errors, especially after a major accident? Two common 
attitudes towards human errors were distinguished by Dekker (2014). The first one is what 
he called the “old view”, which considers errors as causes. On the other hand, the “new 
view” regards human errors as consequences of accidents, effects or symptoms of some 
sort of organisational shortcoming.  Hollnagel (1998) highlighted that human error has been 
seen as the cause of events (when accidents are said to be due to the human intervention), 
the event itself (when an action, e.g. pressing the wrong button, is said to be a human 
error) or the consequences (the outcome of the action is said to be an error, e.g. the driver 
made the error of fuelling a petrol-fuelled car with diesel, inferring a car malfunction).  
 
The general approach to human errors and the level of comprehension of human factors 
will deeply affect the process of learning from accidents. Major events are likely to trigger 
exacerbated societal reactions and impair communication channels, demanding an 
immediate and strong response from industry and authorities to ensure accountability. In 
those cases, acknowledging that humans are pivotal in any engineered system, the 
temptation to expose a scapegoat may limit the search to individuals who made errors 
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throughout the lifecycle of the industrial process. If the concept of errors as causes of 
events prevails, the investigation will aim at the culprits’ exposure, the blame allocation and 
the imposition of penalties, and thus valuable lessons regarding organisational and 
technological aspects can be lost. Hopkins (2006) and Johnson (2008), discusses the tension 
between the requirement to learn as much as possible from events and the public pressure, 
highlighting that fear of litigation can act as an important barrier to learning the lessons 
from accidents.  
 
That is why Reason’s characterisation of human errors turns out to be extremely beneficial, 
tying up two loose ends: firstly, the need for recognition and common understanding of 
human error, a deeply rooted concept in both technical and general public reality, serving 
as a useful bridge between the two worlds; and secondly, a clear and convenient definition, 
focused on the internal and external characteristics of the analysed subject and on the 
genesis of error. This approach allows for the search for profounder issues related to 
accidents and can help to reduce the knowledge gap among authorities, the general public 
and wider stakeholder groups, in order to accomplish an improved learning environment. 
 
1.2 Recent catastrophes in complex, multi-attribute accidents 
The relevance of human factors and the impact of human errors in industrial accidents 
were extensively emphasised by contemporary studies. Human error was regarded as a 
major contributor to more than 70% of commercial airplane hull-loss accidents (Graeber, 
1999). Correspondingly, according to Leveson (2004), operator errors can be considered the 
cause for 70–80% of accidents, given recurrent deviations between established practice and 
normative procedures. Considering the cost issue, a review by the United Kingdom 
Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Club indicated that US$541 million per year is lost by the 
marine industry due to human errors (Dhillion, 2007). 
 
Major accidents have the potential to capture the public’s attention and demand strong 
responses from authorities. The Fukushima accident in March 2011 has triggered a 
considerable shift in the way the nuclear industry was seen by governments and the 
general public.  
 
Mr. Kiyoshi Kurokawa, the chairman of the independent investigation commission for the 
Fukushima nuclear accident, stated in the official report that the tsunami and technical 
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issues were not the sole reasons for the tragedy, declaring that human factors as well as 
deeper Japanese cultural issues were vital contributors (Kurokawa et al, 2012): "What must 
be admitted – very painfully – is that this was a disaster 'Made in Japan'. Its fundamental 
causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture (…). Therefore, we 
conclude that the accident was clearly 'man-made'”. 
 
This wide-reaching accident was drawn into the international media’s spotlight. In a global 
perspective, it has driven the German government to immediately shut-down eight reactors 
(their restart is highly unlikely) and reject the construction of new units (Schneider et al., 
2012). Thus, the phasing-out of nuclear plants and the replacement with renewables or 
other energy sources in Germany seems to be irreversible. Also, the former Republic of 
China’s president Ma Ying-Jeou decided to limit the operating lifespan of nuclear power 
plants to 40 years, and declared that the continuation of the ongoing construction of a new 
nuclear power unit in Taiwan would be decided by a public referendum (Ishikawa, 2015). It 
appears that the political climate due to the public’s perception of risk is highly 
unfavourable to nuclear power, especially after Fukushima. 
 
Recently, prosecutors called for the death penalty for the captain of the MV Sewol, a South 
Korean ferry that sank in April 2014 and left 304 fatalities, most of them pupils on a school 
trip. He was found guilty and sentenced to 36 years in prison, and 14 crewmembers were 
jailed from 9 to 25 years. Families and protesters affirmed that lessons were not learnt 
from a series of previous accidents (BBC, 2014). 
 
These are examples, to name but a few, of how the process of learning from accidents can 
be compromised if risks are not adequately communicated, due to the natural distance 
between experts’ views and the public’s perception.  
 
From an engineering perspective, the highly complex interaction between operators, 
technology and organisations is a recurring subject arising from investigations involving 
major events. The Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile 
(2011) official report on the AF-447 Rio-Paris Airbus A-330 accident on 1st June 2009 
acknowledged an apparently simple equipment defect (icing of the Pitot probes) resulting 
from a design failure, which led to some inconsistencies of the flight speed indicators. This 
deficiency triggered several human-related events (wrong system diagnosis and 
inappropriate control inputs, among others), ultimately resulting in the airplane hull-loss in 
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the Atlantic Ocean, with 228 victims. The investigation report also highlighted some 
intricate factors such as the de-structuring of the task-sharing in the cockpit during the 
response to the anomalous event, training shortcomings in a predictable flight mode 
(manual handling of the airplane in high altitudes), and the lack of indication of the 
airspeed inconsistencies in the flight console, exposing a complex combination of several 
factors leading to the catastrophe. 
 
These major accident examples, mostly involving up-to-date technologies with numerous 
systems under normal operation (e.g. Airbus (2016) states that around 1,200 A330 
airplanes are operated by over 100 companies, meaning that an aircraft takes off or lands 
somewhere every 20 seconds!), illustrates the complexity behind erroneous actions, mental 
models, technology, organisational issues, culture and the environment in high-technology 
industries. This highly interdisciplinary and intricate setting, including the influence of the 
utmost public and media attention and the fact that human errors are palpable and a 
compelling argumentation to explain undesirable events, brings a substantial challenge to 
stakeholders. How to develop means to learn from multi-attribute events and translate 
these lessons into an approachable scheme for researchers, practitioners, policymakers and 
society, in order to communicate and tackle risks appropriately? 
 
Consequently, this work aims to overcome barriers to dealing with complex datasets 
containing incident/accident information, by means of applying an unsupervised learning 
neural network approach to a proprietary accident dataset. The Multi-Attribute 
Technological Accidents Dataset (MATA-D) presented by Moura et al. (2016) will be 
converted into two-dimensional graphical representations of accidents and their 
corresponding surrounding factors. The 2-D interfaces will provide innovative means to 
communicate high-technology risks and to disclose tendencies that could lead to the 
genesis of errors, facilitating and enhancing interactions among internal stakeholders and 
the general public.   
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2.  Analysis Method 
2.1 Capturing the complexity underlying major accidents: fit for the past, adaptable 
to the future 
The underlying dynamics observed during critical events is so great that some renowned 
accident causation theorists consider the failures in complex, tightly coupled systems as 
inevitable (Perrow, 1999), or not prospectively foreseeable (Taleb, 2007). This is due to the 
acknowledged difficulties to capture and understand all facets of socio-technical systems 
and all circumstances leading to catastrophes, which pose a challenge to researchers and 
practitioners. As a result, any method to capture lessons from accidents will have inherent 
limitations. In this work, a data-based approach which starts from the available information 
(detailed accounts from major accidents) and uses an artificial neural network process to 
generate useful knowledge is proposed. The dataset structure is flexible and expandable: 
new accidents can be added, or prospective analyses can be conducted in order to increase 
the database.  
 
Other dataset frameworks inspired by novel accidents causality models based on systems 
theory and system thinking, such as the System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes 
(Leveson, 2011), could be used for accident analyses, and the artificial neural network 
approach presented in this work would be equally applicable. However, the data required 
to construct a reasonable model based on some new approaches would require accident 
investigators to have previous knowledge of those approaches and carry out a targeted 
data collected process to suit the framework. Consequently, it is unlikely that the massive 
amount of data from early major accident accounts currently available would be 
immediately adaptable. Even considering a broader, virtually ideal holistic approach, 
potential influencing factors such as the percentage of profit allocated to safety, the 
influence of political decisions on industrial segments or the impact of the change of 
controllers and investors on companies, would not be fully available for earlier accidents, 
implying a new start point for data collection and thus a drawback to embrace past events.      
Therefore, the choice of the dataset framework took into account the possibility of starting 
from the available information reflected on past accounts to generate immediate 
knowledge. On the contrary, to construct a dataset based on a fully new framework, many 
years of catastrophic events (fortunately major accidents are rare) would be necessary, and 
even the most comprehensive model would still hold intrinsic limitations. 
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Additionally, this study presents an expansion of conventional reductionist models. The 
focus of the analysis method lies on the examination of the interfaces among contributing 
factors, instead of specifying root-causes in a classical chain of directly related events. 
Although accident reports are intended to present a logical explanation to accidents, 
usually comprising a sequence of events through time, non-linear interactions among 
contributing factors can be also identified during in-depth investigations, allowing a 
systemic learning process. Irrespective from the accident causation method used to 
understand events, it was possible to classify all of them under the common framework in 
which the dataset was based, as seen on Moura et al. (2016). 
 
For example, The Piper Alpha Accident Report (Cullen, 1990) revealed design, construction, 
management, operational and human factors interfacing in an undesirable fashion to result 
in 167 fatalities and billions of pounds in property losses in July 1988. The 
recommendations (106 in total) arising from the report addressed changes to oil & gas 
offshore facilities, industry, the UK government and trade unions. New legislation (The 
Safety Case Regulations) was developed after a full review of existing legislative 
arrangements, progressing from the former prescriptive regime to the current 
performance-based safety management model. Even the responsibility for safety oversight 
was transferred from the Department of Energy which used to regulate both revenue 
collection and safety, to the Health & Safety Executive (Paté-Cornell, 1993).  
 
Therefore, accident narratives arising from detailed investigation processes can give 
impetus to broader safety improvement measures, and the collective understanding of 
previous occurrences is able to reveal new interfaces, contribute to a holistic safety 
understanding and improve stakeholders’ risk awareness level.   
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2.2 The Multi-attribute Technological Accidents Dataset (MATA-D) 
Many researchers (e.g. Swain, 1990; International Atomic Energy Agency, 1990; Grabowski, 
2009) referred to the lack of reliable data on human performance in high-technology 
systems and the complications associated with the collection, consistency and 
interpretation of data. 
 
In addition, most of the near-misses datasets contains condensed descriptions of events, 
generally limiting the information to direct or immediate causes (e.g. operator failure, 
equipment defect), due to usual constraints (i.e. time, budget, human resources) to 
conduct in-depth analysis of inconsequential events. The main shortcoming with non-
detailed data is that the context in which workers are placed is usually overlooked.  
However, it is widely accepted (Reason, 1990; Hollnagel, 1998; Cooper, 1996; Strater, 2000; 
Dekker, 2014) that the context is actually the central element to be studied, in order to 
provide a full picture and a better understanding of undesirable events.  
 
The European Safety, Reliability and Data Association (2015) stated that major accident 
investigations allow for a detailed analysis of preventive and protective systems, as well as 
the exploration of events and surroundings conditions leading to accidents. In addition, 
high-impact events usually provide impetus for the application of lessons learned to 
minimise reoccurrence, as observed in the wake of disasters such as the Texas City 
Refinery, the offshore production platform Piper Alpha and the Nuclear Power Plant in 
Fukushima (Fukasawa, 2012; Dahle, 2012). Society’s risk perception, the regulatory 
approach and industry’s behaviour towards safety were affected in a global scale by these 
events. 
 
Although major accidents seem to be one of the finest sources of information available, 
they are considered to be rare events (Reason, 1997; Taleb, 2007), and the currently 
available data might not be enough for the application of traditional statistical approaches. 
Thus, a method to allow the seamless learning process between different industrial sectors 
is necessary, in order to generate sufficient data for a suitable analysis. Nevertheless, 
transversal learning is not trivial, due to differences among technologies, industrial jargon 
and contexts in complex systems. To overcome these issues, the authors developed a 
major-accident dataset, using a common framework, the Contextual Control Model used as 
a basis for the Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (Hollnagel, 1998), to classify 
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data captured from investigation reports prepared by regulators, investigation 
commissions, government bodies, insurance companies and industry experts to explain the 
contributing factors and causes behind major accidents. The framework is comprehensive, 
containing 53 contributing factors distributed in groups (man, technology and organisation) 
and subgroups (erroneous actions, specific cognitive functions, temporary and permanent 
person-related functions; equipment, procedures, temporary and permanent interface; 
communication, organisation, training, ambient and working conditions).  The data 
structure is represented in Figures 1, 2 and 3. Further information about the decision to 
develop a new dataset and all the details regarding the creation and content of the Multi-
attribute Technological Accidents Dataset (MATA-D) can be found in Moura et al. (2016). 
 
The use of high-consequence accident reports to feed the MATA-D proved to have many 
benefits. Deep investigations involve internal and external experts in the search for 
evidence and to disclose contributing factors and relevant interactions between humans, 
technology and organisations. Therefore, uncertainties associated with the consistency of 
the input data were reduced, and the selected framework permitted the classification of 
events from diverse industrial backgrounds under a common taxonomy, making them 
comparable. Consequently, the MATA-D structure allows for the application of 
mathematical methods, aiming at the disclosure of common patterns and at the 
recognition of significant features. This way, the genesis of multi-attribute events can be 
better understood and communicated.  
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Figure 1. “Man” categorisation, adapted from Hollnagel (1998) 
 
Figure 2. ““Technology” categorisation, adapted from Hollnagel (1998) 
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Figure 3. “Organisation” categorisation, adapted from Hollnagel (1998) 
 
The dataset includes 238 major accidents from several industrial segments, as detailed in 
Table 1.  
Table 1. MATA-D Accidents distribution by industrial sector, after Moura et al. (2016) 
Industrial sector 
Accidents 
# % 
Refinery 39 16.39 
Upstream (oil & gas) 37 15.55 
Chemicals  29 12.18 
Petrochemicals 25 10.50 
Nuclear Power Plants 23 09.66 
Civil Construction 16 06.72 
Terminals & Distribution 15 06.30 
Aviation 13 05.46 
Gas Processing 09 03.78 
Metallurgical industry 07 02.94 
Waste Treatment Plant 05 02.10 
Food Industry 04 01.68 
Others 16 06.72 
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2.3 The data mining process 
The aim of the data mining process is to disclose common structures among accidents and 
significant features within the major-accident dataset. In this work, making an attempt to 
go beyond the general statistical analysis presented by Moura et al. (2016), a well-known 
clustering approach named Self-Organising (or Kohonen) Maps (SOM), developed by 
Kohonen (1998), is applied to the MATA-D. The objective is to convert the 53-dimensional 
dataset (a matrix of 238 accidents holding 53 possible contributing factors each) into a low-
dimensional (i.e. 2-D) array, enabling the data visualisation and interpretation. 
 
Essentially, the SOM algorithm consists of an initialisation followed by three processes: (i) 
competition; (ii) cooperation; and (iii) adaptation. The network learning begins with the 
attribution of arbitrary values for the initial weight vectors. Then, the training starts with 
the competition process, where the winning output neuron (best matching node) is the one 
which minimises the Euclidean Distance ‖?⃑? − 𝑚𝑖⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑‖ for each input pattern (Eq. (1)). After 
defining the output winner, the cooperation process consists of the application of a 
neighbourhood function (usually the Gaussian function Eq. (2)) to define the spatial 
influence of the best matching unit upon the neighbour neurons. The last process is the 
adaptation one, where the weights of all neighbour neurons are sequentially updated while 
both the learning rate and the neighbourhood function decrease with time, following the 
Eq. (3). This sequence is repeated (through iterations) until the map converges 
(Kohonen,2001; Andreev and Argyrou, 2011). 
𝑣(𝑡) = arg min𝑖𝜖Ω‖𝑥(𝑡) − 𝑚𝑖(𝑡)‖    (1) 
ℎ𝑐𝑖(𝑡) = ∝ (𝑡) ∙ exp (
‖𝑟𝑐−𝑟𝑖‖
2
2𝜎2(𝑡)
)    (2) 
𝑚(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑚𝑖(𝑡)+∝ (𝑡)ℎ𝑐𝑖(𝑡)[𝑥(𝑡) − 𝑚𝑖(𝑡)]  (3) 
 
Kohonen (2013) has shown that a variation of the updating rule (Eq. 3) would be useful to 
eliminate convergence complications and generate steadier asymptotic mi values. 
Therefore, a batch-learning version of SOM (Batch-SOM) was revealed for practical 
applications, in order to generate more consistent outcomes. Eq. (4) shows the Batch-SOM 
updating rule developed by Kohonen. 
𝑚𝑖
∗ =  
∑ 𝑛𝑗ℎ𝑗𝑖𝑥𝑗̅̅ ̅𝑗
∑ 𝑛𝑗ℎ𝑗𝑖𝑗
     (4) 
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With the new update rule (Eq. 4), the definition of a learning parameter ∝ is no longer 
necessary, as the batch-learning implies that the codevectors are being updated once, 
rather than in a recursive fashion. Each best matching node 𝑚𝑖
∗ represents the centroid of 
an influence region defined by 𝑥?̅? (the mean value of a group of input vectors x(t)), the 
neighbourhood function hji and the number 𝑛𝑗 of samples. 
 
The representation of the dataset (a 53-dimension input space, Figure 4) in a 2-D 
topographic map shows the MATA-D events organised by similarity, i.e. accidents with 
analogous contributing factors will be close to each other (e.g. Figure 5). This enables the 
generation of clusters which can be analysed in an integrated way, revealing tendencies 
within a group of major accidents.  
 
One of the most important features of the SOM’s learning process is that it comprises an 
unsupervised learning process, dismissing the need for any pre-classification, pre-selection 
of the number of clusters or the definition of main/leading factors (Kohonen et al, 1996). 
Consequently, the data mining process is not affected by external parameters, avoiding 
potentially biased concepts regarding the main factors influencing accidents and potentially 
leading to human errors. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Clustering Results 
The application of the SOM algorithm brought together accidents by resemblance – the 
more similar the accidents are, the closer they are positioned in the output space. Figures 4 
and 5 show the input space (a matrix 238 x 53) and the output space (a 2-D representation 
of the events). 
 
𝐴1.1 … 𝐴1.53
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐴238.1 … 𝐴238.53
 
Figure 4. Input Space: A dataset containing 238 samples x 53 features 
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Figure 5. Output Space: A reorganised 2-D grid 
 
Maps were generated from the 238 records with 53 possible attributes each. The output 
space was trained with 111 batches, and the width of the kernel (the radius of the Gaussian 
neighbourhood - Eq. (2)) was 0.41. This value is set to be the smallest to form meaningful 
clusters while maintaining the best possible representation of data differences, with 
attribute values being averaged less. Maps were produced by the expert version of 
Viscovery SOMine® software, in order to enhance graphical visualisation. 
 
The Viscovery® SOMine software has a clustering quality indicator, a histogram which 
classifies conceivable groupings by attributing an index for each possible clustering 
arrangement.  The 4-cluster final map attained the highest quality measure (Figure 6) and 
thus was adopted as a useful arrangement for further interpretation. 
  
 
Figure 6. Cluster Quality Indicator (Viscovery SOMine®) 
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Other analysis methods can be used to evaluate the quality of the map, such as the error 
quantisation and frequency computation. For the current application, quantisation errors 
were very small, and both the data frequency and the error quantisation were evenly 
distributed throughout the map, indicating that the network was well-trained and the 
mapping quality is good.  
 
Tables 2 and 3 present the clusters’ statistical results. The application of the SOM strengths 
the contribution of many factors and provide stimulus to further interpretation. Example 
are Wrong Place and Inadequate Task Allocation in Cluster 1; Decision Error and Adverse 
Ambient Conditions in Cluster 2; Wrong Time and Design Failure in Cluster 3; and 
Equipment Failure in Cluster 4. Factors which original contributions were scattered in the 
overall dataset are now visible, case of Social Pressure in Cluster 1 (from 7.1% to 17.5%), 
Adverse Ambient Conditions in Cluster 2 (from 7.1% to 14%) and Priority Error in Cluster 3 
(from 7.1% to 15.4%). Other factors (e.g. Wrong Object) did not show a decisive alteration 
between the overall and the clustering frequency and should not be taken into account 
when interpreting the clustering, as they did not have an important role in the formation of 
the groupings. These are not statistically significant to the clustering. 
 
Table 2. Clusters’ Features 
Cluster Events # 
Contributing Factors # 
Min Max Mean Median Mode 
C1 80 04 24 9.62 09 09 
C2 57 01 10 4.56 04 02 
C3 39 05 22 8.92 08 08 
C4 62 01 06 3.10 03 02 
 
 
Table 3. Overall dataset statistics (After Moura et al., 2016) and new clustering statistics 
 
 
Overall C 1 C 2 C 3 C 4 
 Accidents # 238 80 57 39 62 
Erroneous Actions 
Wrong Time 14.7% 13.8% 10.5% 41.0% 3.2% 
Wrong Type 11.8% 11.3% 7.0% 30.8% 4.8% 
Wrong Object 2.5% 3.7% 3.5% 2.6% 0.0% 
Wrong Place 31.5% 52.5% 36.8% 12.8% 11.3% 
Observation 
Observation Missed 15.5% 20.0% 12.3% 23.1% 8.1% 
False Observation 3.4% 6.3% 3.5% 0.0% 1.6% 
Wrong Identification 2.5% 5.0% 0.0% 5.1% 0.0% 
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Interpretation 
Faulty diagnosis 13.0% 26.3% 8.8% 12.8% 0.0% 
Wrong reasoning 11.3% 20.0% 1.8% 25.6% 0.0% 
Decision error 9.2% 5.0% 17.5% 17.9% 1.6% 
Delayed interpretation 4.6% 8.7% 1.8% 7.7% 0.0% 
Incorrect prediction 3.8% 7.5% 1.8% 2.6% 1.6% 
Planning 
Inadequate plan 23.0% 10.0% 7.0% 25.6% 1.6% 
Priority error 7.1% 6.3% 8.8% 15.4% 1.6% 
Temporary Person-
related Functions 
Memory failure 0.9% 1.3% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
Fear 2.1% 1.3% 0.0% 5.1% 3.2% 
Distraction 5.9% 11.3% 3.5% 7.7% 0.0% 
Fatigue 2.9% 7.5% 0.0% 2.6% 0.0% 
Performance Variability 1.4% 5.0% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
Inattention 2.1% 2.5% 0.0% 5.1% 1.6% 
Physiological stress 0.8% 1.3% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
Psychological stress 2.9% 5.0% 1.8% 2.6% 1.6% 
Permanent Person-
related Functions 
Functional impairment 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 2.6% 0.0% 
Cognitive Style 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Cognitive bias 7.1% 15.0% 1.8% 10.3% 0.0% 
Equipment Failure 
Equipment failure 55.0% 33.8% 22.8% 94.9% 87.1% 
Software fault 2.5% 6.3% 0.0% 2.6% 0.0% 
Procedures Inadequate procedure 44.1% 78.7% 42.1% 38.5% 4.8% 
Temporary 
Interface Problems 
Access limitations 1.3% 3.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Ambiguous information 2.5% 5.0% 0.0% 5.1% 0.0% 
Incomplete information 17.6% 36.2% 7.0% 20.5% 1.6% 
Permanent 
Interface Problems 
Access problems 1.7% 3.7% 0.0% 2.6% 0.0% 
Mislabelling 1.7% 2.5% 1.8% 0.0% 1.6% 
Communication 
Communication failure 10.5% 16.3% 5.3% 20.5% 1.6% 
Missing information 20.6% 37.5% 14.0% 15.4% 8.1% 
Organisation 
Maintenance failure 34.9% 56.3% 14.0% 33.3% 27.4% 
Inadeq. quality control 60.5% 81.3% 24.6% 79.5% 56.5% 
Management problem 9.2% 12.5% 5.3% 23.1% 0.0% 
Design failure 66.0% 85.0% 50.9% 87.2% 41.9% 
Inadeq. task allocation 60.1% 95.0% 68.4% 48.7% 14.5% 
Social pressure 7.1% 17.5% 3.5% 0.0% 1.6% 
Training 
Insufficient skills 36.1% 56.3% 12.3% 76.9% 6.5% 
Insufficient knowledge 35.3% 60.0% 17.5% 56.4% 6.5% 
Ambient 
Conditions 
Temperature 1.3% 1.3% 0.0% 2.6% 1.6% 
Sound 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Humidity 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Illumination 0.8% 1.3% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
Other 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Adverse amb. condition 7.1% 2.5% 14.0% 10.3% 4.8% 
Working 
Conditions 
Excessive demand 5.5% 6.3% 8.8% 5.1% 1.6% 
Poor workplace layout 2.5% 1.3% 7.0% 2.6% 0.0% 
Inadeq. team support 3.4% 6.3% 0.0% 7.7% 0.0% 
Irregular working hours 3.8% 10.0% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
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3.2 Clusters Description  
 
 
Figure 7. Clusters Identification 
 
Figure 7 presents the accidents positioned by similarity in the grid, separated in 4 (four) 
clusters with different dominating characteristics. 
 
Cluster 1 is the largest single group, covering 80 accidents which encloses between 4 and 24 
contributing factors. It is largely dominated by Inadequate Task Allocation (95.0%), when 
the organisation of work is lacking due to deficient scheduling, task planning or poor rules 
and principles. Additionally, accidents within this cluster were deeply influenced by Design 
Failure (85.0%) and Inadequate Quality Control (81.3%). From an organisational 
perspective, factors such as Insufficient Knowledge (60.0%), Maintenance Failure (56.6%) 
and Missing Information (37.5%) were also significant. The most important technological 
contributor was the Inadequate Procedure factor with 78.7% of incidence, followed by 
Incomplete Information (36.2%). From a human factors perspective, erroneous actions 
labelled as Wrong Place (when actions in a planned sequence are omitted/skipped, 
repeated, reversed or when an unnecessary action is taken) were in 52.5% of the cluster, 
mainly accompanied by interpretation issues, specially Faulty Diagnosis, with 26.3% of 
incidence. Observation Missed and Wrong Reasoning were also noteworthy human-related 
factors, both appearing in 20% of the cluster. 
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Cluster 2 grouped 57 accidents, all varying from 1 to 10 contributing factors and with low 
mean, median and mode figures (Table 2). Organisational factors such as Inadequate Task 
Allocation (68.4%) and Design Failure (50.9%), as well as the technological factor 
Inadequate Procedure (42.1%) were the most frequent in this grouping. Some hostile 
ambient and working conditions were highlighted, with Adverse Ambient Conditions 
(14.0%) and Inadequate Workplace Layout (7.0%) standing above the overall data 
distribution.  Decision Error (17.5%) was a noticeable human contributor, highlighting cases 
where workers were unable to make a decision or have made the wrong choice among 
possible alternatives.  
 
The leading factor for Cluster 3, which contains 39 major accidents, is a technological aspect 
labelled Equipment Failure, populating 94.9% of the grouping area. This cluster also 
presented very strong organisational factors, as Design Failure (87.2%), Insufficient Skills 
(76.9%), Management Problem (23.10%) and Communication Failure (20.5%) attained their 
maximum values in this cluster, being also the Inadequate Quality Control factor very 
relevant, with 79.5% of incidence. The human factors incidence is quite substantial, with 
actions occurring at the wrong time (41.0%) or being of the wrong type (30.8%). These 
cases include omitted, premature or delayed actions, as well as using disproportionate 
force, magnitude, speed or moving in the wrong direction. These human erroneous actions 
were accompanied by all three levels of cognitive functions, i.e. observation, represented 
by Observation Missed (23.1%), interpretation, with Wrong Reasoning (25.6%) and Decision 
Error (17.9%); and planning, with both Inadequate Plan (25.6%) and Priority Error (15.4%) 
attaining their maximum incidence. It is worth to notice that the number of contributing 
factors for each event in this cluster fluctuated from 5 to 22, with a mean of approximately 
9 and median and mode of 8.  
 
Cluster 4 contains 62 events, each one encompassing 1 to 6 contributing factors, recording 
a mean of approximately 3, median of 3 and a mode of 2 features.  For most of the 
accidents in this cluster (i.e. 87.1%), an Equipment Failure was the most frequent 
contributor to accidents, followed by Inadequate Quality Control (56.5%), Design Failure 
(41.9%) and Maintenance Failure (41.9%).  
 
Figures 8 to 21 show the self-organising maps for individual features. These figures detail 
how individual characteristics were distributed in the map after the application of the SOM 
algorithm. Colder colours (tending to blue) mean the absence of a feature, while warmer 
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colours (tending to red) mean the presence of a contributing factor. Multiple intersections 
of warm colours in different individual SOM maps can be interpreted as an 
interface/relationship. 
   
 
  Figure 8. Inadequate Task Allocation SOM   Figure 9. Inadequate Quality Control SOM 
 
  
      Figure 10. Design Failure SOM Figure 11. Insufficient Knowledge SOM 
 
 
 
 Figure 12. Wrong Place SOM Figure 13. Inadequate Procedure SOM 
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 Figure 14. Equipment Failure SOM Figure 15. Maintenance Failure SOM 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Insufficient Skills SOM Figure 17. Inadequate Plan SOM 
 
 
  
Figure 18. Wrong Time SOM Figure 19. Observation Missed SOM 
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Figure 20. Wrong Type SOM Figure 21. Wrong Reasoning SOM 
 
4. Discussion  
4.1 Clustering Interpretation 
The application of the SOM algorithm resulted in the reorganisation of accidents originally 
arranged in a 238 x 53 matrix (Figure 4) into topographic maps (Figures 5 and 7-21). Having 
the accidents grouped by similarity (considering the contributing factors), it is now possible 
to identify common patterns and highlight key relationships within the dataset. Moreover, 
the results are presented through a graphical interface, allowing analysts to effectively see 
the most frequent features or have further insight into contributing factors which might be 
of interest (such as Design Failures, Human Erroneous Actions, Quality Control and Task 
Allocation).   
 
The combination of three organisational factors (Inadequate Task Allocation, Inadequate 
Quality Control and Design Failure - Figures 8, 9 and 10) occupied most of the Cluster 1 
area, meaning that these aspects are leading contributors to the grouping. Human 
erroneous actions contribute to 70% of the cluster, being the Wrong Place (Figure 12) the 
most relevant one, covering more than a half of the grouping. The analysis of the individual 
maps clearly shows that Inadequate Procedures (Figure 13) are highly associated with this 
specific type of human erroneous action, meaning that incorrect, incomplete, ambiguous or 
instructions open to interpretation provoked specific problems to implement a sequence of 
operational movements. A deep relationship between Inadequate Procedures (Figure 13) 
and Insufficient Knowledge (Figure 11) can be perceived in Cluster 1, denoting that written 
instructions presumed some level of specific knowledge to recognise the situation and 
complete the operation, which was not the case in many events. 
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An example of this type of accident was described in a US Chemical Safety and Hazard 
Investigation Board (2004) safety bulletin, when operators were assigned to a cleaning 
process in a petrochemicals plant. They executed a nitrogen gas purging exactly as required 
by the written procedures, in order to remove a hazardous mixture from the pipe. 
Afterwards, they started a steam purge to finish the service. However, the procedural steps 
were not sufficiently detailed to ensure the removal of the mixture from the pipe, 
especially in the low points, and failed to describe the consequences of having flushing 
liquid in the system. The operators were unaware of the possibility of having residues in the 
line, as well as the chemical reactions that could occur. The steam purge heated the 
peroxide/alcohol mix above its thermal decomposition temperature, resulting in an 
explosion and fire. The SOM map exploration shows that this combination of contributing 
factors is not an isolated episode, but a recognisable pattern (or tendency) in Cluster 1, 
which should prompt the attention of risk analysts.   
 
The correlation of further factors, such as the design failure which allowed an unnecessary 
low-point section in the pipe route and the failure of the quality control to identify the low-
point trap as well as the deficient procedure are also persistent in this grouping.    
 
As in Cluster 1, Cluster’s 2 most common features were Design Failure accompanied by 
Inadequate Task Allocation and Inadequate Procedures. However, the results for these 
factors are close to the overall dataset figures (65.97%, 60.07% and 44.09%, respectively) 
and thus cannot be considered to be major influencing factors to generate this clustering. A 
noticeable feature in this cluster was Adverse Ambient Conditions, which attained 14% in 
this grouping. The exploration of these events demonstrates that not only major natural 
events such as hurricanes, typhoons or earthquakes should be considered from a risk and 
safety management perspective, but also more common adverse situations like torrential 
rain, electrical storms and even the presence of airborne particles. A straightforward 
example of the latter is the case where haze from forest fires carried atmospheric particles 
to the intake of an air separation unit of a gas processing facility, causing an explosion and a 
large fire.  
 
Equipment Failure (as shown in Figure 14) dominates almost the whole area of Cluster 3, 
but, in sharp contrast with Cluster 1, the association with Maintenance Failure (Figure 15) is 
not relevant any longer. In fact, the analysis of the maps indicates that the equipment 
failure events tend to be associated with Design Failure and/or Insufficient Skills (Figure 16) 
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for this grouping. Therefore, it can be learned that enhancing maintenance cannot be 
considered the only solution to minimise the possibility of equipment failures. The lack of 
skills (training / experience) to operate a system or equipment may well be combined with 
equipment faults, as well as with design shortcomings. 71.8% of the Cluster 3 area was 
covered by human erroneous actions, mostly Wrong Time and Wrong Type (Figures 18 and 
20). A profounder analysis of specific cognitive functions influencing human actions can be 
also attained. Observation Missed, Wrong Reasoning and Inadequate Plan maps 
represented many cases where events or signals that were supposed to trigger an action 
were missed; the operator misinterpreted a given signal or cue – a deduction or induction 
error; or the mental plan/solution to solve an issue was incomplete or wrong. The airplane 
accident report mentioned in the introduction (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la 
sécurité de l’aviation civile, 2011) perfectly illustrates circumstances where an equipment 
failure due to a design shortcoming can trigger cognitive disturbances, leading to errors and 
ultimately major accidents. The lack of skills of the co-pilot to handle some problems (i.e. 
the approach to stall) at high altitudes made him build an erroneous mental plan to react to 
the undesirable situation. He adopted a tactic applicable to low altitudes, destabilising the 
flight path with inappropriate control inputs. Therefore, these tendencies reveal that 
specific training, aimed at dealing with critical conditions and major hazards, is very 
complex and must be carefully selected. Instead of reassuring written procedures or 
transmitting instructions, an effective training strategy must embrace the systemic 
development of a problem-solving mindset. Although most of the simulation and training 
strategies are focused on conditioning the human to expected or predictable scenarios, 
critical situations will demand advanced decision-making skills and should focus on 
processes and techniques aimed at the identification and development of adequate 
operation alternatives.  
 
Equipment Failure is also the main contributor to Cluster 4, but the accidents within this 
grouping presented different characteristics from the former cluster. The map’s analysis for 
this cluster (i.e. Figures 9, 10 and 14) unmistakably shows that equipment problems were 
accompanied by quality control issues and design shortcomings. Although these 
relationships are quite clear, the low mode of 2 contributing factors prevents further 
tendencies from being accurately inferred in this grouping. 
 
Previous studies such as Groth and Mosleh (2012) successfully applied an analogous 
approach, in an attempt to develop causal insights from an incident dataset. Their objective 
62 
 
was to quantitatively incorporate those insights into a Human Reliability Analysis method, 
constructing a Bayesian Network mostly with data from the Human Events Repository 
Analysis (HERA) dataset. The HERA dataset contains risk-significant Nuclear Power Plant 
operating events, thus restricted to the nuclear industry but incorporating data points such 
as minor events, near-misses and inspection results. Only events containing human errors 
(at least one) are recorded. In summary, the results indicated four error contexts: (i) 
Training, Team and Complexity; (ii) Knowledge, Attitude and Organisational Culture; (iii) 
Attitude, Loads and Complexity; and (iv) Resources and Complexity.    
 
Although the first (i) and most significant error promoting context had been also 
acknowledged in the Cluster 3 interpretation above, significantly different taxonomies (and 
with different objectives) will necessarily lead to different results. While the taxonomy 
applied by Groth and Mosleh (2012) is detailed, in order to capture factors influencing 
single human errors in a specific and delimited scenarios, the classification system used to 
construct the MATA-D dataset generally contains higher hierarchical levels, intended to 
capture contributing factors affecting all human performance before and during the 
development of complex, rare events, i.e. major accidents. 
 
A more detailed set of performance influencing factors facilitates the quantification of 
contributing factors and the attribution of probabilities to human errors, fulfilling a vital 
requirement of HRA models, which is a major element of current probabilistic risk 
assessments. On the other hand, the recognition of complex patterns leading to human 
performance shortcomings and the understanding of the whole range of interactions 
involved in a major-accident event would require a far-reaching and comprehensive 
taxonomy, capable of conveying risk reduction information to interested parties in the 
blunt-end, such designers, as well as to communicate risks to diverse stakeholder groups.     
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5. Conclusions 
The successful conversion of multi-attribute, complex data from a major-accident dataset 
into a 2-D array revealed numerous possibilities of data clustering and interpretation, in 
order to disclose features, facilitate risk communication and enhance the learning process. 
The usage of graphical visualisation techniques such as topographic maps, which were 
generated by the SOM algorithm (Kohonen, 2001) in this research, provided additional 
means to help stakeholders absorb risk information and synchronise the textual 
explanation with meaningful visual representations.   
 
The application of an artificial neural network approach permitted the identification of 
common patterns and comparable contributing factors within four major accidents groups, 
revealing interfaces and conveying information to operators, designers, risk managers and 
the general public. 
 
Beyond the visual aid provided by the maps’ construction, it was possible to directly 
correlate real accidents with images, creating and enhancing a full learning experience that 
can be further expanded, depending on the objectives and the targeted public. This is due 
to the data mining approach, which fully preserved the input data (the MATA-D 238 x 53 
Matrix) in the output space (the 2-D Maps) and allowed the retrieval of the dataset records. 
Also, the interpretation of the graphs can help to understand and communicate the 
relationship between contributing causes for major accidents.  Figures 14 and 15, for 
instance, can be used to show to a sceptical operations manager that very advanced 
maintenance procedures do not guarantee that equipment will not fail, and further 
measures might be necessary.  
 
The strategy of representing accident data in maps allows the fast transmission of relevant 
information and increases the possibility that stakeholders will fix and remember the 
lessons learned from accidents, minimising the dominance of biased concepts such as the 
oversimplification of addressing human errors as the main cause of major disasters. 
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Chapter 3: A Clustering Approach to a Major-Accident Data Set: Analysis of Key 
Interactions to Minimise Human Errors 
 
Overview 
 
This paper was presented in the 2015 IEEE Symposium Series on Computational 
Intelligence. Essentially, it scrutinises an earlier version of the MATA-D dataset presented in 
Chapter 1 from another perspective, in order to disclose relevant features and indicate 
paths to the recognition of the genesis of human errors. This is a good example of the 
flexibility of the proprietary dataset, demonstrating that it is adaptable and can be used and 
integrated with other data mining and classification approaches.  
 
In order to understand the accident data and identify key similarities among events, a 
tailored Hierarchical Agglomerative Clustering method, using the Bray-Curtis dissimilarity 
and two different linkage functions – complete and average – are now applied to the 
dataset. Basically, the dissimilarity measurement, which was specifically chosen to fit the 
MATA-D data, aims to aggregate accidents with proximate contributing factors, while the 
linkage function extends the concept to align comparable clusters. In order to display more 
cohesive clusters and facilitate the interpretation of the output, the intermediate 
hierarchical level of the dataset was used for the groupings, meaning that the dimensions 
were reduced from fifty-three to fifteen before the application of the algorithm. These 
intermediate dimensions are: erroneous actions, observation, interpretation, planning, 
temporary person-related functions and permanent person-related functions; equipment, 
procedures, temporary interface and permanent interface; and organisation, training, 
ambient conditions and working conditions.  
 
Although the methodology presented a significant simplification in relation to the previous 
chapter, i.e. the hierarchical level of the contributing factors being considered, it 
successfully described common interactions between human factors, the organisational 
environment and technology. New attributes (e.g. fatality rate per cluster) were also taken 
into account, revealing which combinations appeared to lead to an increased loss of life, 
such as accidents featuring communication issues and interface problems.  
 
The hierarchical arrangement of the clusters in a familiar dendrogram structure also 
enabled a bird’s eye view of the dataset. Organisational environment dominated the 
clustering, and two large groups – Organisation-Technology and Organisation-Human 
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Factors – were instantly noticeable. Then, the lower branches (i.e. the nine clusters) were 
analysed, disclosing relevant features. A relationship between the complexity of the 
accidents (the ones containing more contributing factors) and advanced cognitive functions 
(the need to observe, interpret signals and create a strategy before acting) was established. 
Other interesting combinations were also highlighted by the cluster analysis. Conclusions to 
improve human performance based on these clustering results, such as the need to 
improve communication (make sure operators receive and understand messages) and the 
interface (warning and error messages) for the most complex cases, were successfully 
addressed. 
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1. Introduction 
Major accidents appear to be a collateral effect of the development of human activities, 
and the added complexity of high-technology systems seems to challenge the improvement 
of industrial safety records. Only in the last 5 years, a perplex society faced worldwide 
tragedies such as the Macondo Blowout in the Gulf of Mexico, the Fukushima Nuclear Plant 
disaster in Japan, the missing Malaysian airplane MH370 and the Korean Ferry which has 
capsized and killed 304 people. Similarly, Reason (2013) listed several analogous events in 
past decades (e.g. Seveso, Three Mile Island, Bhopal, Chernobyl and Piper Alpha) referring 
to them as man-made organisational disasters. 
 
Technical investigations arising from these events have generated a considerable amount of 
data, revealing an extremely intricate chain of contributing factors leading to disastrous 
consequences and highlighting the decisive part humans have played (Cullen, 1990; 
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011; 
Kurokawa et al., 2012). Factors such as management problems, lack of information, 
communication failures, fear, poor working conditions and reasoning shortcomings were 
combined with human erroneous actions during the operational stage, to result in the 
catastrophic failure of cutting-edge technologies and systems, which are perceived as highly 
reliable. 
 
One of the methods used to minimise human errors is to apply a suitable Human Reliability 
Analysis (HRA) technique to predict the probability of human error while executing the 
                                                          
3 Original publication in Moura, R. et al., 2015. A Clustering Approach to a Major-Accident 
Data Set: Analysis of Key Interactions to Minimise Human Errors, 2015 IEEE Symposium 
Series on Computational Intelligence, Cape Town, pp. 1838-1843. DOI 
10.1109/SSCI.2015.256. 
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tasks required during the operation of systems. Previous work (Bell & Holroyd, 2009) 
identified 72 different methods to assess human reliability, and some of these techniques 
are widely used by industry, such as the Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique 
HEART (Williams, 1986), the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction THERP (Swain & 
Guttmann, 1983), and A Technique for Human Error Analysis ATHEANA Barriere et al., 
2000). These techniques usually comprise a list of internal and external features called 
performance shaping factors, used to quantify the likelihood of human failure given the 
task and the existing contributing factors. In spite of the adequateness of HRA techniques 
to estimate human error probabilities, it is clear that uncertainties related to human 
behaviour, which are highly associated with cultural issues, the organisational context, the 
work environment, work pressures and relationships, training and technological aspects, 
among others, turn the outcomes of this kind of study largely imprecise. 
 
Therefore, in face of the decisive impact of human actions and decisions on the 
performance of engineering systems, associated with the uncertainties of current 
estimation methods, it is necessary to improve the understanding of the relationships 
among contributing factors. For that reason, the Multi-attribute Technological Dataset 
(Moura et al., 2015a) will be scrutinised by a suitable data mining technique, in order to 
overcome barriers to dealing with complex data and to reveal improvement opportunities. 
The dataset contains 216 major accidents from different industries, all classified under the 
same framework. The dataset structure was built upon the taxonomy developed by 
Hollnagel (1998) in the Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM). 
 
In the following sections, a short description of the data is given and the data pre-
processing steps are disclosed. Then, the review of the hierarchical agglomeration 
clustering is followed by the definition of the distance similarity criterion for the particular 
case. Finally, conclusions are built upon the relationships among contributing factors, 
revealing opportunities for the development of accident prevention schemes. 
 
2. Data Description 
A dataset containing information regarding major accidents was analysed. The 
documentation generated from more than 200 major accidents was scrutinised and 
comparable information was made available, such as the number of casualties, the year, 
the location and the industry in which the accident occurred. Along with this general 
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information, the disclosed contributing factors are of special interest. Previous research 
(Moura et al., 2015a) suggests that fifty-three hierarchically ordered attributes are capable 
of describing the contributing factors for accidents, allowing an adequate representation of 
the accident causation model. On the first hierarchical level, there are three entries: Man, 
Technology and Organisational Environment. The group Man generalises human errors, 
where a human action or cognitive aspect were directly involved. Man can be split into the 
following four subgroups: Erroneous Actions, Specific Cognitive Functions, Temporary 
Person-related Functions and Permanent Person-related Functions. The technology part 
can be divided in the following four categories: Equipment, Procedures, Temporary 
Interface and Permanent Interface. Organisational Environment is fragmented into 
Organisation, Training, Ambient Conditions and Working Conditions. Deeper levels of the 
hierarchy and more detailed information were described earlier by Moura et al. (2015a). 
 
The overall dataset contains 216 major accidents. To maintain the focus on the contributing 
factors analysis, these will be the data points considered by the data mining technique. 
Accidents are given as vectors in the fifty-three dimensional Boolean space, describing 
which conditions were present or absent when the accident occurred, thus the dataset can 
be represented by a 216x53 Boolean matrix. For these overall 11448 values, the dataset 
contains 1416 ones and 10032 zeros. Given the data, the goal is to find groups with 
common features, the so-called data clusters. Table 1 presents the factors’ list ordered by 
frequency in the MATA-D dataset. Design Failures was the most frequent factor and 
appeared in 64.35% of the accidents, while four factors (Cognitive Style, Sound, Humidity 
and Other) were not identified. 
 
Table 1. Features and corresponding frequencies 
Features Frequency (%) 
Design failure 64.35 
Inadequate quality control 59.26 
Equipment failure 58.33 
Inadequate task allocation 58.33 
Inadequate procedure 43.98 
Insufficient skills 37.50 
Maintenance failure 35.19 
Insufficient knowledge 34.26 
Wrong Place  26.85 
Missing information 19.91 
Observation Missed  15.28 
Wrong Time 14.81 
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Incomplete information 13.89 
Faulty diagnosis  12.96 
Wrong Type 12.96 
Wrong reasoning 12.04 
Communication failure 11.11 
Management problem 10.19 
Inadequate plan 9.72 
Decision error  8.80 
Adverse ambient condition 7.87 
Cognitive bias 7.87 
Priority error 6.94 
Social pressure  6.94 
Distraction  6.48 
Excessive demand 5.56 
Delayed interpretation 5.09 
Irregular working hours 4.17 
Inadequate team support 3.70 
Incorrect prediction 3.70 
Fatigue 3.24 
Physiological stress 3.24 
Ambiguous information 2.78 
Inadequate workplace layout 2.78 
Software fault 2.78 
Wrong Identification 2.78 
False Observation  2.31 
Fear 2.31 
Inattention 2.31 
Wrong Object 2.31 
Access problems  1.85 
Access limitations  1.39 
Mislabelling  1.39 
Performance Variability 1.39 
Temperature 1.39 
Illumination 0.93 
Memory failure 0.93 
Psychological stress 0.93 
Functional impairment 0.46 
Cognitive style 0.00 
Humidity 0.00 
Other 0.00 
Sound  0.00 
 
3. Data understanding and pre-processing 
In the earlier stages of the data analysis, a relevant aspect is data understanding (Berthold 
et al., 2010) through the application of simple statistics to get a general idea. Having the 
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knowledge that the presence of factors (i.e. ones) is especially important, rows and 
columns with few ones were initially challenged. There are fourteen monocausal accidents 
(lines in the matrix), representing accidents which showed a single contributing factor or 
cause, all arising from reports commissioned by insurance companies. This might imply that 
some insurance companies will not invest further time on lengthy investigations when a 
strong and sufficient reason, such as an equipment failure, has been found. For the current 
analysis, these monocausal accidents were all removed, as the applied clustering method 
would consider these data points as outliers. 
 
An examination of the raw data revealed that four out of fifty-three dimensions did not 
appear, i.e. Cognitive Style (part of the group of Permanent Person Related Functions), 
Sound, Humidity and Other (from the group of Ambient Conditions). Seventeen dimensions 
appeared less than seven times each (less than 3%). Although this could be useful 
information for the accidents causation understanding, for statistical analysis these 
dimensions hardly contain information. 
 
In order to verify the amount of information contained, a Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) was performed. The result, showing the explained variance of the dimensions, 
revealed that no further dimensions could be found, allowing its legitimate removal. 
 
Given that the dimensions are hierarchically ordered, data was aggregated considering 
whether or not an attribute was present in at least one of the groups within the categories. 
This aggregated dataset (in contrast to the original unaggregated dataset) contained fifteen 
dimensions. After filtering monocausal accidents and applying the aggregation, the Boolean 
matrix had a size of 202 x 15. The PCA performed on these new data did not show any 
duplicate dimensions. 
 
4. Methodology 
Having a Boolean representation of the accidents, the next step would be to define an 
adequate similarity measure to group datapoints. Accidents were considered to be similar if 
they have similar contributing factors. For two given Boolean vectors i and j, we counted 
the number of Ones for each event S(i), S(j) and further counted the dimensions in which 
both vectors show Ones simultaneously C(i, j). 
 
𝑑(𝑖, 𝑗) = 1 − 2𝐶(𝑖, 𝑗) (𝑆(𝑖) + 𝑆(𝑗))⁄   (1) 
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Equation 1 shows the Bray-Curtis dissimilarity of two accidents (Bray & Curtis, 1957), which 
is not a formal distance measure as the triangle inequality does not hold. Nevertheless, this 
dissimilarity measurement ensures that accidents are closer if they have common causes, 
meaning common Ones in the Boolean space. Dimensions with common Zeros do not 
increase the accidents’ similarity. The measure is normalised by the division of the number 
of ones contained in both vectors so that high similarities occur if two vectors have many 
common factors and only a few different dimensions. 
 
As the prime objective is to find groups of similar accidents, the Hierarchical Agglomerative 
Clustering described in Kruse et al. (2013) was applied. Every data point is considered as a 
cluster in the beginning, and then successively merged by similarity. The similarity criterion 
for two given accidents was already exposed, and the concept can be extended to clusters 
by using an appropriate Linkage Method. For two clusters A and B with their enclosed 
points a and b, respectively, their distances can be defined for complete and average 
linkage according to equations (2) and (3). 
 
dcomplete(A, B) = maxa∈A,b∈B(d(a, b))  (2) 
 
daverage(A, B) =
1
|A||B|
∑ (d(a, b))(a,b)∈AxB  (3) 
 
Clusters can be evaluated with silhouette score (Rousseeuw, 1987), which is an effective 
internal clustering evaluation measure returning values in [−1, 1]. Values are close to one 
when the resulting clustering returns relatively compact clusters, also having fairly high 
inter-cluster dissimilarities. 
 
5. Results 
 
The following analysis details the dendrogram of the complete-linkage distances. Reading 
from bottom to top, it shows the data points, which are iteratively merged into bigger 
clusters. This process ends when the cut value is reached. Above that value, the connecting 
edges are blue, and below it they are differently coloured, depending on the cluster. The 
cutting was performed at the 0.65 distance, where a reasonable jump in the clustering 
levels can be observed, as shown in Fig. 1. The resulting clustering shows a moderate 
silhouette score of 0.228, which is slightly better than the score for average linkage 0.221.  
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The clusters are enumerated from left to right. First single cluster comprises the only two 
events which contained just human factors as significant contributors to the accidents. This 
chunk is substantially different from the distribution in the remaining groupings, as the vast 
majority of the technological accidents of the MATA-D encompass at least one 
organisational or technological issue. Therefore, these two events can be considered 
outliers. 
 
All the remaining events involved organisational aspects (organisation, training, ambient 
conditions or working conditions) to generate the undesirable outcome. Clusters 2 to 5 
were highly associated with technological issues (equipment, procedures or interface), 
while clusters 6 to 9 showed the manifestation of humans factors (execution errors, specific 
cognitive functions and person-related functions). It is important to notice that the latter 
groupings (from 6 to 9) form a single cluster containing almost the same number of 
elements (102 of 106 events) when a different clustering criterion, i.e. the average-linkage 
method, is applied to quantify dissimilarities between clusters (Fig. 2). Additionally, the 
same points build the leftmost cluster of outliers.  
 
The main results of the individual analysis of the complete linkage clusters are summarised 
in Table 2, and will be detailed as follows. 
 
Cluster 2 (twenty elements) was dominated by wrong procedures (100%) and 
organisational issues (95%). Training was also significant (70%). No erroneous actions were 
observed.  
 
The third Cluster (twenty-nine elements) contained organisational issues (100%) with 
training problems (100%), also with a high incidence of equipment failures (75.9%). A 
marginal incidence (a single case) of erroneous actions was shown.  
 
Cluster 4 (six elements) main feature is the combination of organisational issues with 
communication problems (100% of the cases). No erroneous actions were observed, and a 
marginal incidence of temporary person-related functions, i.e. psychological stress, was 
shown.  
 
Cluster 5 (thirty-nine elements) contained organisational issues (100%) with equipment 
failure (82%). No human issues were observed. 
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Figure 1: Dendrogram for complete linkage clustering 
 
 
Figure 2: Dendrogram for average linkage clustering 
 
Table 2. Aggregated Data, Complete Linkage 
Cluster C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 
Accident # 2 20 29 6 39 17 17 25 47 
Median 2.50 6.00 6.00 4.00 2.00 13.00 5.00 10.00 8.00 
Average 2.50 5.20 5.66 4.33 2.77 13.65 7.24 10.00 8.30 
Mode n/a 7 5 4 2 13 5 6 9 
Fatalities # 5 159 67 2 248 471 6 132 388 
Death Rate 2.50 7.95 2.31 0.33 6.36 27.71 0.35 5.28 8.26 
 
The following 4 clusters contained direct human errors joining organisational issues to 
generate accidents. It is worth mentioning that Cluster 6 was the deadliest combination of 
factors, reflecting 471 fatalities and a death rate of 27.71 per event, followed by Cluster 9, 
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which encompassed 388 fatalities and attained a death rate of 8.26, as can be seen in Table 
2.  
 
All accidents in the sixth cluster (seventeen elements) contained organisational issues plus 
erroneous actions. These actions were explained by all three levels of specific cognitive 
functions, i.e. interpretation (94.1%), Observation (88.6%) and Planning (70.6%). Temporary 
person related functions were also significant (88.6%). An important feature of cluster 6 is 
that an interface problem (information provided by the systems, a technology problem) or 
communication issues (exchange of messages/information within the organisation) were 
shown in 100% of the cases. Training problems (82.4%) and poor working conditions 
(58.8%) as contributing factors were also above the overall average.  
 
The accidents in Cluster 7 (seventeen elements) showed organisational issues with 
erroneous actions (100%) again, but mainly combined with one specific cognitive function 
level (observation, with 70.6%). Equipment failures and communication issues also showed 
70.6% of incidence. 
 
Cluster 8 (twenty-five elements) contained the combination of organisational issues (100%) 
with erroneous actions (96%), but with an intermediate level of cognitive error 
(interpretation, with 84% of incidence). Wrong procedures (92%) were very significant, and 
equipment problems were also shown (72%). 
 
Cluster 9 grouped forty-seven cases (100%) containing erroneous actions with 
organisational (97.9%) and training (91.5%) issues. 95.7% of the erroneous actions were 
accompanied by intermediate to advanced specific cognitive functions, i.e. interpretation 
(61.7%) and inadequate mental planning (44.7%). 
 
 
6. Discussion 
 
A suitable cluster analysis algorithm was applied to a collection of 202 major accidents from 
the MATA-D dataset, in order to disclose relevant relationships among contributing factors. 
All clusters were largely dominated by the Organisational Environment group, confirming 
that design failures, poor quality control and inadequate task allocation are key 
contributing factors to major accidents. 
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The first cluster, which contained only two elements (less than 1% of the sampling), 
confirmed previous studies (Moura et al., 2015a) indicating that the possibility of having a 
single failure point leading to a major accident is very low. The two cases represented 
human erroneous actions following a serious violation of work procedures, such as smoking 
during a fuel tanker offloading or deviating from the recommended navigating route 
without any apparent reason. Although violations are not uncommon, it appears to occur in 
specific cases, such as under an uncertain environment (e.g. system is in an unrecognised, 
non-routine status), associated with unclear rules or procedures, or when operators 
distinguish some kind of tangible benefit (e.g. save money, time or effort through an easier 
way of performing a task) from non-compliance. However, these associations usually 
require further contributing factors (e.g. inadequate procedure, poor communication or 
training), which were not the case in the two analysed accidents. 
 
The algorithm application set apart a very significant group, i.e. 106 accidents (From cluster 
6 to cluster 9) in which organisational factors were accompanied by human erroneous 
actions. The exposed differences between these four clusters lie on the mental functions or 
disturbances, which triggered the action error. 
 
In spite of having only seventeen events, cluster 6 might represent a very important chunk, 
as it highlights the deadliest grouping, with a fatality rate of 27.71 deaths per event. In 
addition, accidents within this cluster have shown the largest amount of simultaneous 
contributing factors to generate an accident, with an average of 13.65 and mode of 13 
significant features. The justification is that a very complex chain of events or simultaneous 
failures took place in sophisticated systems (e.g. oil & gas, chemical or aviation industry), 
which would have required the whole range of specific cognitive functions (observation, 
interpretation and planning) to recover the system to a regular state and minimise the 
effects of the accident sequence. 
 
Although the path to recover the system to a normal state was generally clear in most of 
the cluster 6 cases, the operator was unable to make progress, due to two main reasons. 
First, a technology problem related to the man-machine interface failed to provide an 
accurate information (an indistinct or incomplete error message, for instance), and the 
communication channels of the organisation failed to deliver a complete information or 
feedback. Secondly, inadequate working conditions (e.g. excessive demand and irregular 
working hours) resulted in temporary person-related functions (e.g. distraction, fatigue or 
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psychological stress) to disturb the mental processing. Deprived from an accurate input 
from the system and from the organisation (information and training) to support the 
decision-making process, as well as undermined by inadequate working conditions, the 
operator was unable to respond appropriately. 
 
Cluster 7 erroneous actions can be explained by a simpler mental modelling, where a wrong 
observation was the triggering mechanism. Examples are failures to observe an 
indication/warning, a mistaken or partial identification of a status or an incorrect 
recognition of a signal. This cognitive failure to observe something can be directly 
associated with the substantial rate of concurrent equipment failures and communication 
issues, which prevented the operator from entering in a deeper state of cognition to build a 
more complex problem-solving mental plan. 
 
The twenty-five major accidents contained in cluster 8 shared similar characteristics with 
the previous grouping, but with erroneous actions largely commanded by a faulty reasoning 
(induction or deduction error) or an imperfect diagnosis of the system state. The additional 
contributors interacting with these human-related issues suggest a reasonable explanation 
for this: inadequate procedures, which can be specified by incorrect, obsolete or 
incomplete written instructions, directly affected the operator’s capacity to construct a 
mental plan and to understand the situation or system state, as the written information 
and the training, typically assumed to be precise, were not representative of the reality. 
 
Cluster 9 grouped the largest number of major accidents, with forty-seven events, and 
contained a very consistent amount of contributing factors per accident (average of 8.3). 
Accordingly, the causes for these accidents are quite well dissected, meaning that a reliable 
understanding of the grouping behaviour can be reached. The human erroneous actions 
were strongly influenced by advanced cognitive functions, supposing that a complex mental 
modelling was required to maintain the system under a regular operational state, i.e. a 
seamless interpretation and the construction of an accurate mental planning was 
necessary. However, the high incidence of training flaws, including not only the lack of 
suitable working instructions to improve the human performance and manoeuvring 
capacity, but also the dispossession of the necessary knowledge to fully understand the 
system behaviour, seem to have undermined the human capacity to act properly. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
7.1 Insights to improve human performance and minimise accidents 
 
The examination of complex accidents under an analytical method, i.e. a Hierarchical 
Agglomerative Clustering using distance measures tailored to the dataset characteristics, 
can offer wide-ranging insights into the data, which could be advantageous for the 
development of accident prevention schemes. It is now clear that different mechanisms are 
able to trigger specific cognitive failures, leading to human erroneous actions and 
subsequently disastrous consequences, and the decision-making process at any stage of 
high-technology facilities’ lifecycle can take advantage of the findings discussed earlier in 
this work. From the analysis of the technological accidents in cluster 6, which resulted in 
471 fatalities (27.71 per event), it can be concluded that efforts towards the improvement 
of the communication within the organisation (to make sure operators receive and 
understood messages) and from the interface (clear warnings and error messages from the 
system) would have enhanced the operator’s ability to recognise the system status. An 
evaluation of the whole range of information reaching the operators is indispensable to 
ensure a proper understanding of the operator’s cognitive model.  
 
The study has also revealed that the largest cluster (C9, with forty-seven accidents) was 
intensely associated with training aspects. Current industry’s response to training problems 
is usually short-duration courses and on-the-job evaluations. In spite of being valuable to 
some extent (primarily to improve practical skills and develop work experience), this 
approach is unlikely to improve the awareness level when operating complex systems. This 
is a robust indication that the knowledge level required to operate in high-technology 
environments is not well aligned with the system demands. 
 
As a result, the application of a multidisciplinary and more advanced recruiting and 
knowledge development programme might be a good way to minimise this gap. This should 
be fully tailored to the system and industry in which the operator will be allocated, in order 
to ensure that capabilities required to understand systems and operate them properly, 
including the recovery from complex and abnormal situations, are in place. 
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7.2 Future Developments 
The pronounced incidence of organisational problems in all clusters is an issue which 
deserves further investigation. This category includes failures in maintenance, quality 
control, management, design and task allocation. Some of them (such as a design problem) 
can be embedded in the system for many years. The analysed accidents have shown that 
there was enough time to spot symptoms of some future flaws before they were effectively 
exposed by an accidental sequence. In addition, a deeper examination of specific flaws (e.g. 
training) may provide cues to improve organisations and technologies.  
 
Testing distinct data mining methods, such as Frequent Itemset or Association Rule, might 
help revealing some extra factors in future works. 
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Applications 
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Chapter 4: Learning from accidents: interactions between human factors, 
technology and organisations as a central element to verify risk studies 
 
Overview 
 
Building on Chapter 2’s technique to cluster, classify and represent major-accident data, the 
following paper is the first application example presented in the current research. Many 
high-technology industries are subjected to major hazards, which are of great concern to 
different stakeholders groups. Accordingly, efforts to control such hazards and manage 
risks are increasingly made, supported by improved computational capabilities and the 
application of sophisticated safety and reliability models. Recent events, however, have 
shown that apparently rare or seemingly unforeseen scenarios, involving complex 
interactions between human factors, technologies and organisations, are capable of 
triggering major catastrophes. 
 
Recognising that major accidents might generate a disbelief climate and stimulate decision-
makers and wider stakeholder groups to treat risk assessments with scepticism, this 
application idea originated from the need to verify, validate and to build trust in the output 
of safety studies. The main objective is to provide practical means for regulators and 
reviewers to check if lessons from past accidents were taken into account by these studies, 
a common requirement from risk-based regulations which is not only difficult to 
implement, but also to verify. Consequently, a relevant contribution to verification schemes 
is proposed, through the conversion of the interactions among contributing factors 
occurring in distinct industrial environments into a useful, ready-to-use checklist. This way, 
stakeholders’ confidence in risk management will be naturally enhanced, by the assurance 
that tendencies and patterns observed in past major accidents are appropriately 
contemplated by safety studies.  
 
This paper first discusses some of the main accident theories underpinning major 
catastrophes, highlighting the complexity and the dynamics behind socio-technical systems. 
The accidents dataset presented in Chapter 1 (MATA-D), which contains major events 
occurred in high-technology industrial domains, serves as a basis for the data analysis. The 
clustering and data classification results disclosed by the application of the self-organising 
maps (SOM) technique in Chapter 2 enables further exploration of accidents’ information 
gathered from in-depth investigations. Graphical representations of the contributing factors 
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interacting in each cluster are also developed (e.g. in Figures 1 and 3), revealing novel 
means to represent accident data and disclose accident causation information. 
 
The interpretation of the SOM maps and the recognition of the complex interactions among 
contributors exposed common patterns in major accidents, which are then used in the 
development of a comprehensive attribute list to verify risk assessment studies. The 
questions presented in the checklist require a simple “yes” or “no” reply, and negative 
answers indicate possible shortcomings in safety studies, raising the awareness of safety 
assessors for complex risks involving interactions between human factors, technological 
issues and organisational aspects. 
 
The commitment to challenge risk assessments assumptions and results, in order to 
demonstrate that real complex accident scenarios were fully understood and used to 
improve the quality of high-technology engineering systems, is key to enhance societal and 
stakeholders’ trust on safety studies. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Accident causation models and implications to verify risk assessments 
Accident causation models lie beneath all efforts related with safety engineering, as they 
serve as a basis for accident investigation and analysis, to prevent future accidents in new 
designs and for the development of risk assessment techniques (Leveson, 2012). The rising 
interest in understanding the genesis of major accidents and the growing importance of 
technological issues to societies directed many schools of thought to approach the accident 
causation problem from different perspectives, leading, to a certain extent, to conflicting 
ideas on how (and if) hazards can be appropriately addressed and controlled.  
 
According to Perrow (1999), failures in complex, tightly coupled systems are inevitable, and 
thus the occurrence of accidents with catastrophic potential in some high-technology 
facilities (e.g. nuclear power and nuclear weapons) is unavoidable, constituting an expected 
or normal accident. His theory was developed after the Three Mile Island accident, a partial 
core meltdown that occurred in a USA nuclear power plant in 1979 which was his base 
case. To cut a long story short, he simply suggests the discontinuation of technologies such 
as nuclear plants and weapons (which he deems hopeless) as he understands that the 
inevitable risks outweigh the perceived benefits. Operator errors are frequent elements of 
the scrutinised case studies, highlighting how complex interactions of a series of failures 
can lead to flawed mental models. Perrow alludes to a sole possible managerial style to 
                                                          
4 Original publication in Moura, R. et al., 2017. Learning from accidents: interactions 
between human factors, technology and organisations as a central element to validate risk 
studies, Safety Science 99:196-214, DOI 10.1016/j.ssci.2017.05.001. 
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safely run these facilities: a military-shaped organisation, authoritarian and rigidly 
disciplined. However, he claimed that this administration structure would be socially 
intolerable and unsustainable during peacetime, for industrial civil activities. 
 
The Normal Accidents Theory was preceded by Cohen’s Garbage-Can Model (Cohen et al., 
1972, Davis et al., 1988), which presented an earlier recognition that organisations have 
high degrees of uncertainty, leading to ill-defined or competing preferences, ambiguous 
goals, unclear technology and fluid patterns of stakeholders’ involvement in the decision-
making process. While the Garbage Can theory indicates that major accidents will happen 
because organisational behaviour is extremely complex and unpredictable, the Normal 
Accidents Theory limits the inevitability of disasters to systems where complexity and tight 
coupling are observed. Though both theories share an unenthusiastic view of the human 
capacity to predict and control hazards, some distinct (and useful) elements can be 
extracted from them: the former clearly points towards organisational matters as the root-
cause of catastrophes, while the latter blames technological aspects, albeit assuming that it 
could be somehow mitigated by a particular type of military organisation. 
 
Taleb’s book The Black Swan – The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007) coined a popular 
and wide-reaching concept (Aven, 2015, Aven 2013, Paté-Cornell, 2012) to explain the 
occurrence of major accidents. He refers to events with extreme impacts as Black Swans, 
considering them as highly improbable events (or outliers) which are not prospectively 
foreseeable. His celebrated analogy was based on the fact that people in the “old world” 
only knew white-feathered swans before the English arrival in Australia, where the sight of 
a black swan came as a surprise. He concludes that predictions based on historical data 
cannot anticipate outliers, claiming that the usual focus on standard operations disregards 
the extreme or uncertain. According to his views, the dynamics in high-technology domains 
are far more complicated than can be anticipated, and conducting laborious pre-analysis 
and validation based on probabilistic modelling should be ruled out, as it has little effect in 
terms of major hazards control (or black swans prevention!). 
 
It is worth noticing that many widespread accident causation theories appear to consider 
the understanding of all complex interactions leading to major accidents during the 
operation of high-risk industrial facilities as a significant challenge still to overcome. 
According to this approach, objectives and preferences are being randomly defined, 
technologies are not fully understood by managers and workers, complex interactions 
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leading to major accidents are not predictable and stakeholders’ groups are fluctuating 
during the facility’s lifecycle. 
 
Conversely, researchers on High Reliability Organisations (Roberts, 1990, Grabowski & 
Roberts, 1997, La Porte & Consolini, 1998) address cases where organisations managing 
operations with high potential for disasters achieved excellent levels of reliability for long 
periods of time, appearing to function better than others. Based on the observation of 
success cases, they believe that it is possible to recognise scientific methods to sustain a 
nearly error-free operation, even in very hazardous environments. It is worth noticing that 
the examples used to ratify the High Reliability Organisations principles include nuclear 
power stations, putting it in sharp contrast with the Normal Accidents Theory. According to 
Perrow (1999), these are precisely the sort of facility susceptible to unavoidable failures, 
and thus society should consider abandoning it at once. 
 
Sagan (1993) conducted an in-depth analysis of the Normal Accidents and the High 
Reliability Organisations theories, presenting some of the competing viewpoints below.  
 
Table 1. Competing Perspectives on Safety with Hazardous Technologies (Sagan, 1993) 
High Reliability Theory Normal Accidents Theory 
Accidents can be prevented through good 
organisational design and management. 
Accidents are inevitable in complex and 
tightly coupled systems. 
Safety is the priority organizational 
objective. 
Safety is one of a number competing 
objectives. 
Redundancy enhances safety: duplication 
and overlap can make “a reliable system 
out of unreliable parts”. 
Redundancy often causes accidents: it 
increases interactive complexity and 
opaqueness, and encourages risk-taking. 
Decentralized decision-making is needed to 
permit prompt and flexible field-level 
responses to surprises.  
Organisational contradiction: decentralisation 
is needed for complexity, but centralisation is 
needed for tight-coupled systems.   
A “culture of reliability” will enhance safety 
by encouraging uniform and appropriate 
responses by field-level operators. 
A military model of intense discipline, 
socialisation and isolation is incompatible 
with democratic values. 
Continuous operations, training and 
simulations can create and maintain high-
reliability operations 
Organisations cannot train for unimagined, 
highly dangerous or politically unpalatable 
operations. 
Trial and error learning from accidents can 
be effective, and can be supplemented by 
anticipation and simulations. 
Denial of responsibility, faulty reporting and 
reconstruction of history cripples learning 
efforts. 
 
Despite the evident disparity between these schools of thoughts, especially regarding the 
possibility of preventing a major accident, Sagan perceived some common ground 
regarding the frequencies of these events. While the normal accidents theory states that 
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major accidents are inevitable, but extremely rare, high-reliability organisations theory 
postulates a nearly error-free operation by an enhanced safety management. Implicitly, 
there is a mutual recognition of the low probabilities of catastrophic events. After assessing 
several study cases on safety events involving U.S. nuclear weapon systems, Sagan (1993) 
concluded that the collected evidences provided stronger support to the Normal Accidents 
Theory. His observations indicated that factors such as excessive discipline (he identified 
evidences of extreme loyalty, secrecy, cover-ups, distain for external expertise and other 
self-protecting mechanisms), conflicting interests and constraints on learning have limited 
nuclear facilities’ organisational safety and could have resulted in major catastrophes if 
circumstances were slightly different. 
 
Therefore, Sagan’s resulting analysis of the theories can be considered even more 
pessimistic than the Normal Accidents Theory. Despite the claim that accidents are 
inevitable, Perrow left the door open for a social incompatible but safety-efficient 
managerial style: a military-shaped organisation with rigid discipline. However, his 
allegations were challenged by Sagan’s nuclear weapons handling sample, which included 
an alarming number of close calls. 
 
Other researchers recognise the difficulties in preventing major accidents, but focus on the 
development of strategies to reduce their likelihood.  Following this principle, James 
Reason developed an acclaimed and widely-known accident causation approach, which 
evolved from Heinrich’s et al. (1980) Domino Theory. Reason (1990) firstly developed the 
idea of having a combination of active failures and latent conditions to explain how 
complex systems can fail, later expanding it to a multi-barrier concept known as the Swiss 
Cheese Accident Model (Reason, 1997), which is widely used by academics and 
practitioners to describe the dynamics of accident causation. Successive cheese slices 
represent layers of defences, barriers and safeguards, all containing holes symbolising 
breaches caused by active failures and latent conditions. In the rare occasions when holes 
are perfectly aligned and all protective layers are overcome, an organisational accident will 
occur, usually having devastating consequences. A vital distinction between individual 
accidents and organisational accidents was highlighted by the theory, especially the risk 
that organisations will be tempted to rely on LTI (lost-time injury) or Bird’s pyramid-type 
methodologies to demonstrate safety performance, overlooking latent conditions that 
degrade barriers and lead to major accidents. Many risk management approaches derive 
from the multi-barrier concept developed by Reason, believing that the underlying 
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mechanisms causing organisational accidents can be correctly identified and properly 
managed. Human reliability approaches such as Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System – HFACS (Shappell et al., 2007), Systematic Occurrence Analysis Methodology – 
SOAM (Licu et al., 2007) and the Sequentially Outlining and Follow-up Integrated Analysis – 
SOFIA (Blajev, 2002), and accident causation analysis methods such as Bow-Tie 
(Zuijderduijn, 2000) and Cause-Consequence Diagrams (Nielsen, 1971) are examples, to 
name but a few, of risk assessment techniques deeply aligned with Reason’s approach. 
 
Contemporary approaches on accidents causality models try to apply systems theory and 
system thinking (e.g. Leveson, 2011) to disclose deeper factors contributing to accidents, by 
adding higher hierarchical levels beyond immediate events and analysing the interactions 
among factors and broader circumstances. Examples are how public opinion and 
governments’ movements influence the safety culture of an industrial sector. If the 
interaction among some of the constituent elements violates a set of constraints that 
guarantees the system safety integrity, an accident may occur. The focus of this systemic 
approach to accident causation is on understanding why the enforcement of constraints 
was unsuccessful. 
 
A comparable perspective was previously conceived by Rasmussen’s (1997) thoughts on 
system performance control. Instead of continually constraining individual elements to fit a 
pre-defined operational standard or limit, he focused on two features of system control 
theory: firstly, the need for adaptation of the system operation boundaries, i.e. increasing 
the margin from normal operation to loss-of-control; and secondly, increasing the 
awareness level of operational limits by making these boundaries visible to stakeholders. 
Rasmussen also noted that the pace of technology change is much faster than the 
modification time for management structures, and an even longer change lag is observed in 
higher hierarchical levels such as governments, regulations and society. This asynchrony 
defies risk modelling and challenges the rationale of using detailed methods and tools for 
analysing individual components or sub-systems, as satisfactory results in parts of a system 
might not reflect the safety status of the overall system.  
 
Current research (Hopkins, 2002; Hollnagel et al., 2011; Arstad and Aven, 2017) highlights 
the need for taking into account the complexity and the dynamic nature of high-technology 
systems to prevent major accidents. In summary, these works discusses how it is crucial to 
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challenge existing risk management assumptions, in order to identify oversimplifications 
and cope with the intricate interactions leading to the genesis of major events.  
 
When the utmost objective is the verification and validation of risk assessments for 
hazardous industrial process plants in a dynamic and fast-changing environment, the 
complexity of the interactions among system elements must be recognised, along with the 
unpredictability of organisational behaviour and the inherent difficulties to foresee 
extremely rare, low-probability events, as highlighted by accident causation theorists. 
Additionally, designed safety barriers are not static and tend to degenerate through time. 
Factors such as ageing, maintenance shortcomings, budget constraints, personnel 
fluctuation and pressure towards cost-effectiveness, to name but a few, can contribute to 
defeat barriers and thus defence-in-depth concepts, which largely serve as a basis for risk 
assessment studies. Hence, how the confidence of wider stakeholder groups, such as the 
general public, investors and governments, which are particularly concerned with major 
accidents and might lack knowledge, interest or appropriate time to go into too much 
technicalities of risk assessment methods, can be enhanced?  
 
The hypothesis underpinning the current work is that mapping patterns and common 
tendencies in major accidents, and demonstrating that these accident lessons can be fully 
understood and applied to new assessments in a logical and structured way, might reveal a 
realistic path to develop stakeholders’ trust and to contribute to verification schemes. 
 
1.2 Identifying common patterns and developing a risk assessment verification 
framework based on major accidents 
 
The fact that accidents causation theories disagree whether a truthful representation of the 
multidimensional interactions in major events is achievable or not turns risk assessment 
verification and trust in risk management into a challenging research topic. Although any 
model will imply the reduction of the complexity of operational reality, some attributes can 
be extracted from accident causation models in order to establish an acceptable framework 
to verify the applicability and accurateness of risk management strategies.  
 
It is disputed if the study of successful cases, as argued by high-reliability organisations 
theorists, will give some insight into the unusual, rare interfaces observed in major 
accidents. In contrast, the identification of common patterns arising from interactions 
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between human factors, technological aspects and organisations during catastrophic events 
seems to be a reasonable approach to support a verification strategy for risk analysis, at 
least to certify that lessons learned from previous accidents were contemplated in current 
studies. This novel approach might help in reducing the gap pointed out by Skogdalen and 
Vinnem (2012) when analysing a number of quantitative risk analysis from the Norwegian 
Oil & Gas industry. They identified that human and organisational factors (HOFs) were not 
taken into account during the estimation of the probabilities of a blowout. In contrast, the 
Deepwater Horizon blowout was deeply associated with HOFs such as work practice, 
training, communication, procedures, quality control and management. Previous analysis of 
238 major accidents (Moura et al., 2016) also indicated that 95% of these events presented 
some sort of organisational contribution to the undesired outcome, and 57% were directly 
associated with human factors, highlighting the importance of considering these significant 
features to develop realistic safety studies.  
 
Barrier and defences-in-depth concepts will rely on the integrity and availability of the 
designed barriers to hold hazards or to minimise their consequences. Addressing common 
organisational and technological shortcomings contributing to the degradation of critical 
safety barriers can reveal tendencies which make them fail upon demand. The pattern 
identification process would also support the application of a safety check against recurrent 
damage mechanisms, reducing latent failures and providing useful data to endorse the 
expected positive effect of the barrier during a real event. 
 
The disclosure of common patterns leading to major accidents will make operational 
boundaries visible to stakeholders, improving confidence in the decisions made and 
justifying the application of additional safety measures. The fact that the output will be 
directly associated with real events will facilitate the learning process and highlight the 
significance of addressing the identified concerns. 
 
Therefore, this research will focus on the development of a risk assessment verification 
scheme, based on the interactions between human factors, technological aspects and 
organisations during major accidents. The collection of events constitutes the Multi-
Attribute Technological Accidents Dataset (MATA-D) introduced by Moura et al. (2016), 
which captured major accidents occurred in high-technology industrial domains (e.g. 
aviation, oil & gas upstream, refineries and nuclear plants) and classified them under a 
common framework, the Contextual Control Model used as a basis for Hollnagel’s (1998) 
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Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method. This previous work presented one of the 
most complete statistical analyses of major accidents from different industrial sectors in the 
open literature. 
 
The application of an artificial neural network approach, specifically Kohonen’s (2001) Self-
organising Maps (SOM), will result in the conversion of complex accident data into 2-D risk 
maps. Events will be clustered by similarity, allowing the combined treatment of accidents 
with similar interactions but from distinct industrial segments. The development of the data 
visualisation provided by the SOM application will give rise to the development of a set of 
properties, attributes and recommendations for the verification of systems, safety barriers, 
human-machine interfaces and risk studies, enhancing risk perception and stakeholders’ 
trust. 
 
2. Analysis Method 
2.1 Using a major-accident dataset as a reliable data source 
Previous works have applied past accidents data to produce insight into the genesis of 
adverse events, in order to support researchers and practitioners by offering valuable 
contributions to the development of risk management strategies and to disclose 
contributing causes to accidents. Most of the existing datasets arise from accident/incident 
data reporting systems, and were voluntarily developed by companies/associations (e.g. 
DNV-GL World Offshore Accident Database, International Association of Gas Producers 
Process Safety Events Data), are enforced by states (e.g. UN International Civil Aviation 
Organization Accident Indent Data Reporting system – ADREP, UK HSE’s Reporting of 
Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations - RIDDOR) or are maintained by 
research centres (e.g. Paul Sherrer Institut’s Energy-related Severe Accident Database – 
ENSAD). These efforts to collect data are extremely valuable, but commonly refer to a 
single industrial sector (Baysari et al., 2008, Evans, 2011) or attempt to embrace from 
occupational accidents to process safety events (Bellamy, 2007, 2013). Generally, reporting 
systems also include a category called near-misses, which are hazardous occurrences that 
did not result in a loss/injury but had the potential to do so.  
 
The events’ scrutiny level during the data acquisition stage will involve some expected 
variations, as it will mostly depend on the consequences of the event and secondly on the 
societal interest in the subject. Consequently, near-misses will be directly reported by 
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companies, with the regulating body using this summarised data to develop performance 
indicators or to trigger further actions such as inspections. Regulators can investigate 
occupational accidents directly, or validate/rely on companies’ internal investigation 
procedures. Major accidents usually capture the media’s and societal attention, pushing 
governments and regulators to react accordingly. Due to the wide-ranging consequences 
observed, this type of event requires consistent investigation processes, usually undertaken 
by one or more regulators, independent investigation commissions or both. The European 
Safety, Reliability and Data Association (2015) has recently recognised that these events 
trigger comprehensive examinations concerning preventive and protective systems, along 
with a careful consideration of factors and surrounding conditions leading to accidents. An 
illustrative example would be the Transocean’s drilling rig Deepwater Horizon blowout and 
explosion occurred in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010, which was investigated by the 
licensee (BP, 2010), regulators (USCG, 2010, BOMRE, 2011), an independent agency (US-
CSB, 2016) and academic study groups (CCRM, 2011). Beyond doubt, catastrophic events 
lead to meticulous examinations and produce very detailed data about the conditions in 
which operations were inserted. Attributable to this extraordinary level of scrutiny, the 
data produced is indisputably more reliable and complete than any alternative source of 
information regarding accident causation.  
 
2.2 The SOM data mining applied to the MATA-D  
The current version of the MATA-D, containing 238 major accidents from different high-
technology industries (e.g. aviation, hydrocarbons exploration and production, refining, 
chemical industry, nuclear) will be used as a data source for this research. The dataset was 
fed from detailed major accident investigation reports, obtained from reliable sources such 
as regulators, independent investigation commissions and insurance companies (Moura et 
al., 2016). The dataset framework comprises 53 factors distributed in three main 
categories: man, technology and organisation. The structured but comprehensive nature of 
the MATA-D framework allowed for the effective application of several data mining 
approaches in previous research (e.g. Doell et al., 2015, Moura et al., 2015b, 2015c), such 
as agglomerative clustering methods, association rule mining techniques and neural 
networks. Cross-industrial common patterns in major events as well as significant 
relationships among contributing factors were successfully disclosed. 
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In this work, key interfaces between human factors, technological aspects and 
organisations will be identified through the application of a suitable artificial neural 
network technique, namely self-organising maps - SOM (Kohonen, 2001). This data mining 
approach is especially effective when an unsupervised method (i.e. the number of clusters 
or final categories in the output space are unknown) and the classification and visualisation 
of high-dimensional data are needed (Kohonen, 2013; Ultsch, 1993). Data mining efforts 
will result in the reduction from 53 dimensions (or contributing factors per accident) to 
two-dimensional maps. The 2-D SOM maps will be generated with the support of 
specialised software (Viscovery® SOMine expert version), to enhance the features’ 
visualisation and facilitate the interpretation of the SOM output.  
 
2.3 The SOM construction rationale and further data mining settings 
The self-organising maps (SOM) is a widely used clustering and data classification approach 
developed by Kohonen (2001). It holds important properties to group data by similarity and 
regarding the preservation of the input data, enabling visual representation possibilities for 
multidimensional datasets. Proportionally to the amount of data, the computational 
complexity of the SOM can be considered low and it is an easy-to-implement algorithm 
(Cottrell et al., 2016), allowing its straightforward usage on practical applications, with 
minor adjustments. 
 
In the current study, the objective of the data mining process is to provide an improved but 
simplified organisation and visualisation of the input data, which consists of a 238 x 53 
matrix (i.e. 238 major accidents containing up to 53 contributing factors). The SOM output 
is a topographic two-dimensional map, where accidents with analogous interactions among 
contributing factors are mutually attracted and contiguously positioned in a general grid. In 
order to highlight some specific interactions, individual heat maps containing the presence 
or absence of single properties are also plotted. The clustering process by similarity, in 
conjunction with the examination of the individual properties’ maps, enables the 
observation and interpretation of common tendencies associated with the major accidents 
contained in the MATA-D. 
 
Basically, the neural network is trained according to Eq. 1 (Kohonen, 2001), which indicates 
that the position at the grid will be occupied by the model m that minimises the distance 
between the input vector x(t) and an output node mi.  
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𝑣(𝑡) = arg min𝑖𝜖Ω‖𝑥(𝑡) − 𝑚𝑖(𝑡)‖  (1) 
 
In the output space, a neighbourhood function hji will define the influence zone around the 
winning output node (the one which is the closest to the input vector), which will be 
updated through the batch-learning rule (Eq. (2)) developed by Kohonen (2013) to 
eliminate possible convergence problems. The best matching node 𝑚𝑖
∗ will be located at the 
centroid of the influence region defined by the neighbourhood function hij; the 𝑥?̅?, which 
represents the mean value of a group of input vectors x(t) previously defined by v(t); and 
the number nj of input space samples x(t).     
   
𝑚𝑖
∗ =  
∑ 𝑛𝑗ℎ𝑗𝑖𝑥𝑗̅̅ ̅𝑗
∑ 𝑛𝑗ℎ𝑗𝑖𝑗
   (2) 
 
The sequence will be repeated until the map converges, i.e. until the models for the input 
vectors are accurately represented in the output space. Due to the neighbouring 
properties, the more contributing factors in common they have, the closer the vectors will 
be located in the output. If more than one model in the output space contained exactly the 
same contributing factors, they would be positioned in the same grid node.  
 
In the current study, the tension of the neighbourhood function (or the radius of the 
neighbourhood Gaussian function) was defined as the smallest value to produce 
meaningful clusters and maintain a close resemblance among adjacent neurons, and the 
map converged after 111 batches. Further details on the SOM algorithm, the network 
settings, the choice of the neighbourhood function and the clusters’ quality criterion for the 
specific application can be found in Moura et al. (2017b).  
 
After the application of the SOM algorithm, the clusters where the highest incidence of 
interfaces was identified during major accidents will become apparent. Further 
examination of the intricate relationship among contributing factors within the clusters of 
interest will reveal common patterns and accident tendencies, highlighting principles that 
must be taken into account when developing risk assessment studies.  
 
The conversion of relevant interfaces in a set of principles will support the verification of 
risk analysis and risk management documents, by applying the lessons learned from major 
accidents. Accordingly, a straightforward requirement list to be crosschecked against risk 
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studies will be developed, and further implications to enhance stakeholders’ trust will be 
then discussed. 
 
3. Results 
The application of the SOM algorithm to the MATA-D dataset resulted in four different 
accident clusters containing dissimilar influencing factors, as shown in Figure 1. The 
contributing factors label sizes are proportional to their effect within the grouping. For 
example, the Inadequate Task Allocation factor in Cluster 1 (blue) occupies 95% of the total 
cluster area, while Wrong Place occupies 52.5%, and the Incomplete Information frequency 
is 36.2%. This is one example of the usage of the visualisation power of the clustering 
method to interpret accident data. Figure 1 synthesizes information from a 238 x 53 Matrix 
(number of major accidents x possible contributing factor per event) in a single 2-D image. 
 
 
Figure 1. MATA-D SOM Clustering output labelled by most relevant contributing factors 
 
The first cluster (blue) covered 35% of the SOM map area, containing the highest number of 
data points, with 34% of the accidents. Cluster 2 (red) has 25% of the total area and 24% of 
the dataset. The third grouping (yellow) occupies 20% of the total area and has the lowest 
event’s frequency, with 16%. Cluster 4 (green) also holds 20% of the map area, but 
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embraces 26% of the dataset events. Figure 2 depicts the rate of contributing factors per 
event, discriminated by clusters. 
  
 
Figure 2. Number of Contributing Factors Histogram 
 
Figure 2 shows Cluster 1’s events with four to twenty-four contributing factors per accident 
and mode of nine, as it appeared in fifteen events. 86.2% of the accidents within this 
cluster have seven or more contributing factors, constituting a very rich grouping for 
further interpretation. Cluster 2 events were influenced by one to ten features with 72.2% 
of the grouping having six or less contributing factors, while the totality of the events in 
Cluster 4 have six or less features. Both groupings show the same low mode of two factors, 
indicating a lower prospect for the identification of multiple interactions among 
contributing factors. For Cluster 3, the total number of contributing factors per accidents 
varied from five to twenty-two. 79.5% of the events contained seven or more contributing 
factors, with eight factors the mode value. This grouping also tends to provide good 
opportunities for enhanced interpretations of the genesis of major accidents. 
 
Results show that the application of the SOM algorithm largely improved the visualisation 
of interfaces, by confining events with lower frequency of contributors in Clusters 2 and 4, 
as well as elevating the features’ mode for Clusters 1 and 3, highlighting special structures 
within the dataset.  
 
Table 2 details the results of the SOM clustering, indicating the outcome of the data mining 
process for selected contributing factors, in relation to the overall dataset. The variation 
columns compare the overall dataset statistics with the individual factors’ influence in each 
cluster. Negative or very low variations are not indicated, as the preservation or reduction 
of the frequency of a contributing factor in a grouping (in relation to its overall incidence) 
means that the factor was not significant to the formation of the cluster. Twenty-seven 
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features contributed to less than 10% of the individual clusters and will not be represented, 
due to their low significance to the groupings formation. Contributing factors with strong 
dominance (more than 50% of the individual cluster areas) are highlighted, as well as 
frequencies higher than 10% and with positive cluster effect in relation to the overall 
dataset.     
 
Table 2. Dataset overall statistics vs. clustering distribution for significant features 
Contributing 
Factor 
Overall C1 Effect C2 Effect C 3 Effect C 4 Effect 
Wrong Time 14.7% 13.8% - 10.5% - 41.0% +178.8% 3.2% - 
Wrong Type 11.8% 11.3% - 7.0% - 30.8% +161.8% 4.8% - 
Wrong Place 31.5% 52.5% +66.6% 36.8% +16.8% 12.8% - 11.3% - 
Observation 
Missed 
15.5% 20.0% +28.6% 12.3% - 23.1% +48.6% 8.1% - 
Faulty 
diagnosis 
13.0% 26.3% +101.9% 8.8% - 12.8% - 0.0% - 
Wrong 
reasoning 
11.3% 20.0% +76.3% 1.8% - 25.6% +125.7% 0.0% - 
Decision error 9.2% 5.0% - 17.5% +89.3% 17.9% +93.6% 1.6% - 
Inadequate 
plan 
9.7% 10.0% - 7.0% - 25.6% +164.9% 1.6% - 
Priority error 7.1% 6.3% - 8.8% +23.2% 15.4% +115.6% 1.6% - 
Distraction 5.9% 11.3% +92.1% 3.5% - 7.7% +30.9% 0.0% - 
Cognitive bias 7.1% 15.0% +110.0% 1.8% - 10.3% +44.2% 0.0% - 
Equipment 
failure 
55.0% 33.8% - 22.8% - 94.9% +72.4% 87.1% +58.2% 
Inadequate 
procedure 
44.1% 78.7% +78.4% 42.1% - 38.5% - 4.8% - 
Incomplete 
information 
17.6% 36.2% +105.1% 7.0% - 20.5% +16.2% 1.6% - 
Communication 
failure 
10.5% 16.3% +55.2% 5.3% - 20.5% +95.2% 1.6% - 
Missing 
information 
20.6% 37.5% +82.1% 14.0% - 15.4% - 8.1% - 
Maintenance 
failure 
34.9% 56.3% +61.4% 14.0% - 33.3% - 27.4% - 
Inadequate 
quality control 
60.9% 81.3% +33.4% 24.6% - 79.5% +30.5% 56.5% - 
Management 
problem 
9.2% 12.5% +35.2% 5.3% - 23.1% +149.9% 0.0% - 
Design failure 66.0% 85.0% +28.9% 50.9% - 87.2% +32.2% 41.9% - 
Inadequate 
task allocation 
60.1% 95.0% +58.1% 68.4% +13.8% 48.7% - 14.5% - 
Social pressure 7.1% 17.5% +145.0% 3.5% - 0.0% - 1.6% - 
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Insufficient 
skills 
36.1% 56.3% +55.8% 12.3% - 76.9% +112.8% 6.5% - 
Insufficient 
knowledge 
35.3% 60.0% +70.0% 17.5% - 56.4% +59.8% 6.5% - 
Adverse 
ambient 
conditions 
7.1% 2.5% - 14.0% +96.0% 10.3% +44.2% 4.8% - 
Irregular 
working hours 
3.8% 10.0% +164.4% 1.8% - 0.0% - 0.0% - 
 
Figure 3 summarises the most relevant contributing factors to the formation of the clusters, 
rearranged by categories according to the dataset framework.  
 
Figure 3. Categories of the most significant contributing factors per cluster 
 
From a human factors perspective, Cluster 1 accidents were dominated by the Wrong Place 
phenotype, when an action from an expected sequence is skipped, carried out in the 
incorrect order or substituted by an unrelated movement. Action errors interfaced with 
intermediate levels of human cognition, as operators were required to observe a signal or 
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event (observation missed) and diagnose a situation or system state (faulty diagnosis). 
Inference or deduction errors (wrong reasoning) were also observed. This was the grouping 
where person-related features were more significant, as shifts in attention (distraction) or 
constraining the information search to confirm a pre-defined hypothesis, attributing events 
to specific factors or believing that actions have controlled the system state developments 
(cognitive bias) contributed to 11.3% and 15% of the cluster, respectively. Technology 
issues included procedure shortcomings (78.7% of the cluster) and situations where the 
information provided by the system interface was poor (incomplete information). Many 
organisational issues interacted within the cluster. Inadequate Task Allocation (95%), 
Design Failure (85%) and Inadequate Quality Control (81.3%) were the most significant 
ones, but training (Insufficient Skills and Insufficient knowledge) and communication issues 
(Communication Failure and Missing information) were considerable as well. Maintenance 
issues were visible in 56.3% of the cluster, and the effects of other organisational aspects 
such as social pressure (17.5%), management problem (12.5%) and irregular working hours 
(10%) were also majored by the application of the clustering technique. 
 
Cluster 2 has Inadequate Task Allocation as the most relevant factor, covering 68.4% of the 
grouping, followed by an erroneous action (Wrong Place) associated with an inability to 
decide, a partial/incomplete decision or making the wrong decision among alternatives 
(decision error). Accidents where Adverse Ambient Conditions were significant are mostly 
grouped within this cluster. 
 
As indicated by Figure 2 histogram, Cluster 3 shows several important interactions among 
contributing factors, being a rich grouping for further interpretation. Many action errors 
were captured during the investigation of these events, where movements were performed 
earlier or later then required (Wrong Time), or with insufficient force, wrong speed, 
direction or magnitude (Wrong Type). Erroneous actions were accompanied by all three 
levels of cognition (observation, interpretation and planning). The fact that complex 
cognitive functions such as Inadequate Plan (25.6%) and Priority Error (15.4%) contributed 
to the formation of the cluster, together with observation missed (23.1%), wrong reasoning 
(25.6%) and decision errors (17.9%), gives us an opportunity to understand how cognitive 
functions leading to erroneous actions interact with organisational and technological 
aspects. Equipment failures contributed to almost the totality of the grouping. As in Cluster 
1, Design Failure, Inadequate Quality Control and training (Insufficient Skills and Insufficient 
Knowledge) records were very high, and other aspects such as incomplete information and 
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communication failure were also significant for both groupings. Management problems 
were observable in 23.1% of Cluster 3. 
 
Cluster 4 is largely dominated by Equipment Failures (87.1%), the only noteworthy factor to 
influence the formation of grouping. 
 
Figures 4 to 22 represent the cluster results for individual features. They give further insight 
into the general map (Figure 1), in the sense that the interactions among individual 
contributing factors can be visualised. Figures are read as topographical or heat maps, 
where one can directly observe the regions of the general map affected by individual 
properties or dimensions. In the current work, blue tones indicate the absence of the 
contributing factor, while red tones represent its manifestation. Shadowed regions 
highlight and exemplify special interactions among contributing factors.  
 
Two graphical methods will be used to present individual maps and highlight the main 
results for further discussion:  
(i) disclosing multiple intersections (superposition of images) of the most frequent 
contributing factors, which represent strong interaction patterns between 
human factors, technology and organisations (e.g. Figures 4 to 10 and 18 to 22); 
and  
(ii) analysis of special features (e.g. communication issues in Figures 11 to 14, 
human-related factors in Figures 15 to 17). 
 
In Cluster 1, three map regions (1A, 1B and 1C) represent the intersection between 
Inadequate Task Allocation, Design Failure, Inadequate Quality Control and Inadequate 
Procedure (Figures 4 to 7). Region 1A is deeply related to Insufficient Knowledge (Figure 8), 
while 1B is mostly associated with Insufficient Skills (Figure 9). Accidents represented in 1C 
tend to combine with Maintenance Failures (Figure 10).  
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Figure 4. Inadequate Task Allocation Map
 
Figure 5. Design Failure Map
  
      
Figure 6. Inadequate Quality Control Map Figure 7. Inadequate Procedure Map 
 
  
Figure 8. Insufficient Knowledge Map    Figure 9. Insufficient Skills Map 
       
   
 
  
Figure 10. Maintenance Failure Map 
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Figures 11 and 12 present the SOM maps for communication issues. These issues largely 
overlapped Inadequate Task Allocation in Cluster 1, as can be seen in the shadowed region 
in Figure 13. Exceptions are the two small-circled areas, where task allocation issues were 
substituted by the person-related feature named Cognitive Bias (Figure 14). 
  
Figure 11. Missing Information Map 
 
Figure 12. Communication Failure Map
   
 
 
Figure 13. Inadeq. Task Allocation Map Figure 14. Cognitive Bias Map
   
 
64.1% of Cluster 3’s area contained two erroneous actions: Wrong Time (Figure 15) and 
Wrong Type (Figure 16). The faded region depicts the incidence of the three levels of 
specific cognitive factors within this grouping, showing the human-related contributing 
factors’ representation. Consequently, a combination of observation (Observation Missed), 
interpretation (Wrong reasoning and Decision Error) and mental planning (Inadequate Plan 
and Priority Error) was expected to take place, suggesting that a profounder judgement of 
the confronted situation was necessary to solve system deviations. It can be observed that 
a technological issue (Incomplete Information – Figure 17) interacted with erroneous 
actions related to timing in the regions where specific cognitive functions are not identified, 
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suggesting that supervisory control system and data display limitations led to some of the 
Wrong Time occurrences. These areas are circled in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15. Wrong Time Map 
 
Figure 16. Wrong Type Map
    
 
    
 Figure 17. Incomplete Information Map 
 
Figures 18 to 22 show how the main technological (Equipment Failure) and organisational 
aspects (Quality Control, Design Failure and training) interacted among them and with 
human-related issues (shadowed region) to result in system control problems within 
Cluster 3. The shaded region is 79.5% of the grouping area, representing the incidence of 
human erroneous actions, specific cognitive functions and person-related functions.  
 
 Figure 18. Equipment Failure Map 
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Figure 19. Inadeq. Quality Control Map 
 
Figure 20. Design Failure Map
    
 
Figure 21. Insufficient Skills Map Figure 22. Insufficient Knowledge Map
  
 
4. Discussion 
4.1 Main Clusters Interpretation 
The analysis of the maps indicate an intricate combination of factors contributing to the 
major accidents contained in the MATA-D database, including the significance of the human 
factors to the undesirable outcome. Previous studies (Graeber, 1999, McLaughlin et al., 
2000,  Leveson, 2004) using different industrial sectors as a data source also emphasised 
the importance of considering human issues when assessing risk, relating between 70% to 
80% of accidents to some kind of operator error.  Therefore, it seems to be clear that a 
satisfactory risk assessment study must take into account the relationship between 
humans, technology and organisations to convey realistic scenarios. Otherwise, the safety 
analysis will not offer a trustworthy and sufficiently broad view of the major hazards that 
industrial facilities are exposed to throughout their lifecycle.  
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So why has limited attention, especially if compared with traditional risk assessment 
approaches focused on engineering technical systems, been paid to the consideration of 
human factors in risk studies (Hollywell, 1996; Skogdalen & Vinnem, 2011, 2012)? When 
analysing occupational risk assessments, Cuny and Lejeune (2003) pointed out some 
problems to the consideration of the human influence, particularly the preparation of data 
for processing and the estimation of probabilities to feed deterministic approaches. The 
complexity of organisational interfaces and the variability of human behaviour also make a 
socio-technical system modelling a challenging task, maybe explaining the reason behind 
the disproportionate focus on purely technical aspects and discrete components in risk 
evaluation. 
 
The interpretation of the maps enables the possibility of considering the whole range of 
contributors without previous assumptions of their conjectural importance, focusing on 
their interactions and on the disclosure of tendencies, instead of concentrating on 
individual factors. The application of the SOM algorithm and the joint analysis of maps 
highlighted topographical areas containing similar interfaces, allowing a targeted 
examination of the genesis of the MATA-D accidents and the development of an attribute 
checklist with the most frequent observations. Some of these interfaces will be illustrated 
with the accident narratives as positioned in the map, all accessible through the MATA-D 
database. Examples of specific items developed to raise the awareness for the discussed 
interactions will be given, and the complete list will be presented in Table 3. 
 
An analysis of Cluster 1 accidents from area 1A (Figure 8) indicates that these events are 
related to situations where components were designed and implemented on an individual 
fashion, rather than as a holistic system. A deeper examination of the contributing factors 
description for the major accidents contained within this region, according to the MATA-D 
stored data, indicates that safety studies failed to adequately address risks related to the 
system interaction with the environment as well as possible interferences among individual 
components. The shortcomings in design, procedures, quality and task allocation joined the 
loss of situational awareness during operation, and insufficient theoretical knowledge led 
to the misperception of risks. A practical example of this tendency was the widely-known 
Varanus Island incident in June 2008 (Bills & Agostini, 2009), when a pipeline rupture and 
explosion caused a shortage in the gas supply for Western Australia, resulting in three 
billion Australian dollars in economic losses. In summary, the lack of an integrated approach 
to design and risk management led to problems in the cathodic protection system, most 
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likely due to electrical interferences from adjacent pipes and other structures, causing 
alternating current corrosion. The assumption that safeguards are always active and the 
sense that their failures are unconceivable are also patterns observed within the grouping. 
In order to ensure that these common major accident tendencies are addressed by risk 
studies, it is suggested that holistic verification questions (e.g. items 10, 11, 15 and 59 of 
the checklist in Table 3) should be developed to raise reviewers and designers’ risk 
awareness level. 
 
Accidents within area 1B (Figure 9) presented situations where process changes 
undermined the original recommendations from risk assessment studies. Equipment or 
system replacements, product modifications and procedures updates lacking a proper 
hazard evaluation (or management of change) enabled the deterioration of the system. The 
necessary training to operate under the new conditions was also insufficient, causing a 
human performance failure. The verification checklist items 4, 5, 23 and 33 are examples of 
checkpoints aimed at neutralising these accident patterns highlighted by the MATA-D data 
mining using the SOM.    
 
The shadowed region 1C (Figure 10) contained many events where seemingly minor 
maintenance issues, i.e. keeping vessels and pipes free of deposits, consumable parts (e.g. 
filters) replacements, lubrication and calibration, drains obstruction and dust/particles 
accumulation, were combined with quality problems, task allocation issues, design 
shortcomings and inadequate procedures to generate a major failure. These common 
accident causation trends gave rise, for instance, to the items 26, 27, 28, 29 and 39 of the 
verification checklist. 
 
Figures 11 and 12 highlighted the map regions where communication problems attained 
their highest incidence, mostly combined with task allocation issues (Figure 13). These 
events were prone to poor communication between workers, which was made worse by 
background noise (mainly alarms and usual process sounds) or by the low quality of the 
transmission. Deficiencies in reporting to supervisors some unusual situations observed in 
the process plant and to convey important information from hazard studies to the 
personnel were frequent within this grouping. In addition, data transfer from paper to 
computer-based systems, incorrect coding and poor communication between shifts were 
risk-increasing factors commonly observed.  
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Through the results shown in Figures 13 and 14, it is possible to scrutinise a few regions 
where inadequate task allocation was not as relevant as in the rest of the cluster. 
Nonetheless, communication issues tended to interact with person-related issues such as a 
Cognitive Bias, particularly when critical information was not communicated, supporting an 
illusion that actions taken were sufficient to control the situation, or when actions were 
constrained by a strong (and wrong) assumption of the current system status. An example 
extracted from these regions would be the 2011 helicopter crash in Missouri (NTSB, 2013) 
during a patient transfer from one hospital to another, which resulted in 4 fatalities. The 
Pilot knew that he has misinterpreted the fuel level to some extent (he reported 26% or 
forty-five minutes of fuel in the pre-flight check, but post-accident investigation indicated 
only 18%, or a thirty-minute supply), but his alternative refuelling plans were constrained 
by the hypothesis that he was able to reach a station 34 minutes away from the departure 
point. Having visual contact with the refuelling point (three-minute distance) when the 
gauge indication approached to zero, the pilot sustained his course (instead of landing 
immediately) until fuel exhaustion. A communication with qualified land-based staff 
(available at the Operational Control Centre) would have exposed his plans as inadequate. 
Other interesting tendencies were also identified in the cluster region, such as having the 
attention caught by phone calls or texting using portable devices.  
 
Examples on how to check if the tendencies identified by the interpretation of Figures 11 to 
14 SOM maps were adequately tackled by safety studies are presented on items 19, 21, 34, 
35, 36 and 65 of the verification list in Table 3.  
 
Cluster’s 3 erroneous actions and cognitive functions’ frequencies are generally higher than 
in any other grouping, especially the most complex ones, involving the need for mental 
planning. These human-related factors merged with design shortcomings, equipment 
failures and quality control issues. A tendency to underperform under non-standard 
operations (e.g. start-up or partial plant operation) was also observed, repeatedly 
combined with training issues (Figures 21 and 22). Cases where an equipment failure 
caused a shutdown, and operators focused on fixing the equipment and restarting it 
without further consideration are recurrent in this grouping. Some of the common failure 
modes observed are: (i) catastrophic failures due to the hot flow of products into cold pipes 
and vessels (brittle fractures); (ii) valves and seals which were damaged or partially 
closed/opened during a pause in operations and were not inspected (a quality control 
problem) before the restart; and (iii) omitting to realign valves and restart 
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control/signalling/alarm systems. After the identification of specific patterns in Cluster 3, 
some suggestions on how to check if safety studies considered these interactions are given 
by items 30, 32 and 33 of the risk verification checklist. 
 
The grouping also contained some regions where insufficient information from supervisory 
control and data acquisition systems shaped human erroneous actions (Figures 15, 16 and 
17). The growing dependence on information systems is a pattern to be considered when 
assessing hazards, thus verification schemes must verify if the risk growth due to 
inadequate/unsatisfactory human-machine interfaces is carefully addressed. The lack of 
direct indications of problems; panels not providing accurate process overviews; 
information that is not displayed in relevant places (e.g. in the control room and/or locally); 
general/critical alarms not taking precedence in relation to local, less important alarms; 
delays in the information presented, undermining operators’ efforts to diagnose system 
status; and incorrect information display are some of the human-machine interface 
problems extracted from Cluster 3. These accident causation tendencies resulted in the 
development of the items 37, 38, 62, 63 and 64 of the proposed example of a safety study 
verification checklist.  
 
4.2 An Application Example for Safety Studies Verification 
A safety study generally comprises a planning process (describing the context, regulatory 
requirements, scope of the study, risk acceptance criteria etc), a hazard identification 
phase, a risk assessment (e.g. events frequencies, reliability, event modelling, 
consequences, level of risk estimation) and a final report (e.g. presentation of results, 
uncertainties appraisal, recommendations, study quality assurance), to generate input to 
the decision-making process.  
 
Those stages involve different techniques, combining quantitative (e.g. probabilistic 
analysis), semi-quantitative (e.g. fault-trees) and qualitative (e.g. Failure Modes, Effects and 
Criticality Analysis – FMECA; Hazards and Operability Studies – HAZOPs) approaches. The 
wide range of techniques and possibilities to assess risk turn the verification and validation 
of safety studies into a challenging task, especially if it is recognised that a non-integrated 
approach to validation may result in relevant gaps in the overall consideration of risks, 
leaving outside the scope important interactions that might contribute to major accidents. 
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The international standard for quality management systems (ISO 9001, 2015) defines 
verification as the process to ensure that input requirements are met by design and 
development outputs. It includes activities which aim to certify that the results of the safety 
study are aligned with the chosen assessment approach and accurately reflect the 
conceptual description of the system/facility. Correspondingly, validation (ISO 9001, 2015) 
includes a set of activities performed with the intent to ensure that the output meet the 
requirements for the projected usage. This process aims to confirm that the safety study 
contains a sound representation of risks, considering the intended application of the model.  
Therefore, the current study contributes to verification activities by providing practical 
means to confirm if lessons from past major accidents have been contemplated by safety 
assessments. The ultimate objective is to ensure that patterns and tendencies leading to 
disasters are anticipated and mitigated, thus assisting the development of societal and 
stakeholders’ trust on safety studies. 
 
Once the application of the SOM algorithm successfully supported the disclosure of 
common patterns in major accidents, the interpretation of the most important interactions 
can be further used to check if safety studies present a consistent representation of risks, 
by testing its robustness against the complex and realistic scenarios extracted from the 
MATA-D.  
 
An example of how to use the accident patterns to contribute to verification schemes is 
given in Table 3. Accident tendencies disclosed by the application of the SOM approach and 
the consequent analysis of the maps, as illustrated in section 4.1, are being used to 
construct a checklist comprising common hazards, major risks and shortcomings involving 
the interactions between humans, technology and organisations. The checklist aims to give 
some insight into how these lessons learned from past accidents in different industrial 
environments can be used as part of a verification scheme, to ensure that recurring 
accident causation patterns will not escape from scrutiny in new safety studies. A general, 
comprehensive language is being used, in order to facilitate the direct application of the list 
or the integration with existing verification and validation approaches.  
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Table 3. Checklist for risk studies verification 
No. Item Yes No n/a
* 
01 
Were the premises, hypothesis and justifications for the chosen 
design concept clearly stated? Was a safer known 
alternative/approach to achieve the same objective discussed? 
   
02 
Are the underlying basis and limitations of the method, the origin of 
the input data and further assumptions (e.g. duration of an event, 
flammable vapour clouds expected drifts, maximum spill size, release 
composition) that support probabilities, scenarios and results clearly 
stated? Are they consistent? 
   
03 
Are events’ frequencies used in probabilistic risk analysis reliable? Are 
they used exclusively when historical data is comparable (e.g. same 
operation type, facility or equipment)? Would alternative approaches 
(e.g. non-frequentist) be more suitable to estimate the events’ 
likelihood in the study case (e.g. no sufficient past experience or 
previous operation data)? 
   
04 
Although some regulations prescribe periodic reviews to risk studies, 
there is a tendency that assessments may fall into disuse due to 
people, process or environmental changes in between revision 
deadlines. Modifications usually lead to a management of change and 
some sort of risk analysis, but more complex, previous deeper safety 
studies are not revisited at this point. Are design verifications, as-built 
drawings, production checks, field data collection or other approaches 
required to confirm/maintain trust on the major/approved risk study 
throughout the facilities’ lifecycle, instead of using a rigid deadline for 
review? Have the facility’s critical factors / performance indicators 
that could indicate an up-to-date and trustworthy risk assessment 
been identified/listed? 
   
05 
Were possible critical changes affecting the original studies (e.g. in the 
operational philosophy, control logic and process modernisations) 
acknowledged? Are the conditions with the potential to invalidate the 
current safety study clearly stated? 
   
06 
The safety studies must contemplate a list of recommendations and 
safeguards, which can be rejected on a technical basis. Is the value of 
the implementation of risk reduction measures clearly stated? Are the 
justifications for favoured alternatives or rejections consistent with 
the best available knowledge? Do the underlying principles for 
rejections contemplate safety benefits over cost matters? 
   
07 
Is the data extracted from databases and standards (as well as 
calculations made) logical, traceable and consistent with the 
operational reality? 
   
08 
Were previous assessments in analogous installations used to give 
some insight into the hazard identification process? 
   
09 
Were the recommendations and risk control measures previously 
applied to analogous facilities? Is there any feedback about their 
suitability from previous designers and operators? 
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10 
Safety studies have shown a tendency to fail to adequately address 
risks related to the system interaction with the environment as well as 
possible interferences among individual components and systems. 
Was a comprehensive and integrated approach to design and risk 
management achieved? Were components and systems designed and 
implemented in a holistic way rather than on an individual and 
secluded fashion? Are human factors analysis integrated with 
engineering studies? 
   
11 
Some high-technology facilities are likely to start their operations 
before the whole system and all safeguards are in place. Offshore 
platforms may have to adapt their process while a pipeline is not 
operating or a pump/compressor is not commissioned. Refineries may 
be designed (or obliged) to operate without some processing 
modules, due to technical or economic reasons. Does the risk 
assessment contemplate all modes of operation (e.g. commissioning, 
start-up, partial operation, maintenance breaks) for the facility 
examined? Are transitory states (e.g. warm-up and cooling down 
times) also considered? 
   
12 
Have the studies taken into consideration thermal properties, 
hydraulics and electrical/electronic parts of components, equipment 
and systems, not being overly focused on mechanical/structural 
aspects? 
   
13 
Equipment and structural failures tended to arise from problems 
during the material selection stage and due to poor understanding 
and monitoring of well-known damage mechanisms. Has the material 
selected for construction, equipment fixation, pipelines and support 
structures identified and analysed by safety studies? Was a 
compatibility assessment (with loads, system and environment) 
conducted, including thermal, chemical and electrical properties?  
   
14 
Are the specificities of the assessed facility or process clearly 
identified, in a way that specific risks will be identified and addressed? 
Where expert advice is required to assess risk, are the correspondent 
technical reports included in the safety studies (e.g. to assess the 
possibility of catastrophic failures due to stress corrosion cracking in 
stainless steels, or corrosion mechanisms emerging from the 
saturation of wet hydrocarbons with dissolved carbon dioxide and 
sour environments)?  
   
15 
Are risks associated with the interaction of different materials 
addressed (e.g. with different temperature gradients leading to 
deformations and ruptures or with distinct electric potential resulting 
in galvanic corrosion)? 
   
16 
Are major hazards, complex areas and critical operations clearly 
identified? Are the level of detail, the methodology to assess these 
problematic cases and the safeguards proposed by studies compatible 
with the magnitude of the risks identified? 
   
17 
Are the steps taken to construct the risk scenarios developed in a 
logical way? Does the study sequence lead to a clear and rational 
understanding of the process and its possible outcomes? 
   
18 
Does the criterion for setting accident scenarios, especially the worst-
case one(s), consider common-cause, domino or cascading effects and 
simultaneous/multiple scenarios? 
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19 
Are the risks associated with third-party operations (material 
delivering, fuelling, electrical power, water supply) addressed by the 
safety studies? Are these risks considered in a holistic approach, 
occurring simultaneously and integrated with the facility’s risks? 
   
20 
Are risks associated with auxiliary systems (e.g. cooling and heating) 
contemplated? 
   
21 
Is technology evolution naturally considered by safety studies? Is the 
increasing usage of operational and non-operational portable devices 
(e.g. mobile phones, tablets, cameras, smartwatches and fitness 
wristbands) considered, for instance, as potential ignition sources in 
explosive/flammable atmospheres? Does human reliability analysis 
and task allocation processes consider the new technologies potential 
to impact the performance of workers (e.g. attention shifters)? 
   
22 
Have the studies evaluated the process plant safety when 
experiencing the effects of partial or total failures in critical elements 
(e.g. emergency shutdown valves fail in the safe position)? 
   
23 
Are process changes that modify the risk level clearly identified when, 
for instance, safety critical equipment or systems are removed, 
deactivated or bypassed/inhibited for maintenance? 
   
24 
Is the availability of safeguards and further risk control/mitigation 
measures addressed? 
   
25 
Were critical equipment and components with limited life spam 
properly identified? Were replacement operations affecting 
safeguards and/or increasing risk addressed? 
   
26 
Is quality control an active element of the risk assessment? Is it 
compatible with operational requirements for systems and 
equipment? 
   
27 
Are suitable quality indicators proposed to verify critical system 
elements status? Is there an auditable failure log, to confirm that the 
expected performance of components and systems is maintained 
through time? 
   
28 
Are chemical reactions and adverse events associated with 
housekeeping procedures (e.g. cleaning and painting substances, dust 
management), inertisation processes, equipment and pipeline 
deposits removal and necessary tests (e.g. hydrostatic tests) 
contemplated by the studies? 
   
29 
Were the design and process reviewed aiming at their optimisation to 
avoid pocket/stagnant zones for dusts, gases, fumes and fluids (e.g. 
reducing elevated spaces and corners prone to dust/particles built-up 
or minimising lower pipeline sections subjected to particles/heavier 
fluids decantation)? 
   
30 
Is the necessary information supporting non-routine tasks aiming at 
the risk reduction (e.g. pre-operational or restart inspections) 
sufficiently detailed, allowing the identification of process weak-points 
such as deposits accumulation, valve misalignments, damaged seals 
and rupture disks and equipment condition after, for instance, a 
process halt, or after maintenance works nearby and before resuming 
operations? 
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31 
Are permanent cues and signals (e.g. pipeline and equipment marking 
to indicate content, maximum pressure and direction of flow) 
proposed as risk reduction measures for standard and non-standard 
operations?  If so, is the permanent marking wear through time a 
factor considered? 
   
32 
“The operator” is an entity sometimes subjected to extreme 
variations. When human intervention is considered by safety studies, 
are the expected skills (e.g. practical experience, acceptable 
performance variability level) and knowledge (e.g. the situational 
awareness level and the academic level – technician, engineer, expert) 
clearly indicated? 
   
33 
Underperforming when conducting non-standard operations (e.g. 
start-up, commissioning or partial plant operations) was also a 
noteworthy pattern. Were situations and conditions where an 
enhanced level of training (skills or knowledge) or even the support of 
specialised companies (e.g. to control an offshore blowout) are 
required to keep risks controlled or to reduce the consequences of 
undesirable events identified? 
   
34 
Is the essential risk information and knowledge arising from safety 
studies, which should reach the involved personnel, identified? Are 
there any special provisions to ensure that critical information will be 
conveyed by proper means (e.g. awareness campaigns, training, 
written procedures, simulation exercises) and will be accessible where 
needed? 
   
35 
Is operational reality such as process conditions (e.g. background 
noise, fumes, heat, wind from exhaustion systems or alarms) 
considered as a possible disturbance when some sort of 
communication is required to convey important information? 
   
36 
Are administrative/management aspects affecting the seamless 
continuity of operations (e.g. loss of information due to shifts, 
personnel replacement or reduction) addressed during the 
identification of safety critical tasks hazards? Is the prospect that 
obvious unusual situations (e.g. seemingly small leakages, unfamiliar 
odours and a flange missing some screws) may not be reported to 
supervisors promptly, affecting the effectiveness of risk reducing 
measures such as process plant walkthroughs, considered? 
   
37 
Do supervisory control and data acquisition systems produce a real-
time operation overview, not being excessively focused on individual 
parameters? 
   
38 
Were the accessibility and visibility of instruments and equipment 
identified as critical in the risk studies and been ensured by an 
examination of the design drawings? Were 3-D models and/or mock-
ups used to facilitate the visualisation of complex areas and reduce 
the possibility of interferences/visualisation issues? Are the external 
critical indicators/gauges fitness to the operational environment 
verified (e.g. visual impairment or working issues due to snow, rain or 
sun radiation)? 
   
39 
Was the possibility of obstruction of water intakes, air inlets, sensors 
and filters (e.g. by water impurities, air particles or formation of ice) 
assessed? Are mitigation measures in place? 
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40 
Have operators examined if the information supplied by indicators, 
panels and displays are sufficient, as active members of the safety 
assessment team? Do they have similar training level (skills and 
knowledge) as required for the operation of the system? 
   
41 
Is there an assessment of the usefulness of the information provided 
by supervisory control and data acquisition systems? Are the functions 
and outputs clear, in particular to operators? Do they know when and 
how to use the information provided, or some of the signals are 
perceived as excessive/useless? 
   
42 
Was the need to diagnose the system status and conduct special 
operations from alternative places (e.g stop the operation from 
outside the control room) considered? 
   
43 
Are supervisory control and data acquisition systems failure modes 
assessed as critical hazards? Is the possibility that spurious or 
ambiguous error messages or information insufficiency/delays 
triggering human or automatic actions that can jeopardise the stability 
or integrity of the system carefully analysed? Were adequate 
mitigating measures put in place? 
   
44 
Is the damage to power and control cables, pipelines and hydraulic 
systems, their routing and its consequences to the supervisory control 
and data acquisition systems considered by the risk assessment? 
   
45 
Are safety critical alarms clearly distinguishable from other 
operational alarms? 
   
46 
Are process facilities and hazardous materials located within a safe 
distance from populations, accommodation modules, administrative 
offices and parking spaces? Is the storage volume of hazardous 
substances optimised to reduce risks? Is the transportation route for 
hazardous materials optimised in a way that the exposure of people to 
risks is reduced to the minimum practical? 
   
47 
Are control rooms and survival/scape structures protected from 
damage and located within a safe distance from the process plants? 
Does the risk study consider a scenario of control room loss? Is there 
any redundancy in place for emergency controls (e.g. fire control 
systems, shutdown systems)? 
   
48 
Are visual aids used as risk-reducing measures to increase the 
awareness level of operators? Are reactors, vessels and equipment 
arrangement and dimensions visually distinctive from each other (e.g. 
by position, size or colour) to minimise swap-overs or inadvertent 
manoeuvres? 
   
49 
Is the possibility of inadvertent connections of similar electrical, 
mechanic and hydraulic connectors an assessed risk? Are measures in 
place (e.g. using different connector dimensions or distinct thread 
types) to minimise hazardous interchangeability among connectors, 
elbows and other parts from different systems or functions? 
   
50 
Is the inadvertent operation of temporarily or permanently disabled 
components, equipment or systems considered as a risk-increasing 
factor? Are measures in place to enhance the visualisation of non-
operational parts such as isolated valves? Are overpressure 
safeguards (e.g. safety valves and rupture disks) accessible and visible 
from the operational area of the equipment or system they are 
designed to protect? 
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51 
Are ignition sources (e.g. exhaustion, electrical equipment) optimised 
in order to be located within a safe distance from significant 
inventories of flammable materials (including piping) or in a position 
in which ignition is minimised, in case of leakage? Was the position of 
flares and vents revised by safety studies? Are exhaust gases routed to 
and flares and vents located in areas where the risk of ignition is 
minimised? 
   
52 
Are different scenarios (e.g. in distinct plant locations, with variable 
volumes) for pipeline and vessels leakages considered by safety 
studies? Are there risk-reduction strategies to limit the released 
inventory in case of leakage (e.g. the installation of automatic 
emergency shutdown valves between sections)?  
   
53 
Are safeguards prescribed by safety studies to minimise the possibility 
of creation of explosive atmospheres in enclosed compartments (e.g. 
deluge or inertisation (CO2 or N2) systems; exhaustion/vents)? Have 
the possibility of backflow in heating, refrigeration or ventilation 
systems been examined? Have the logic of automatic systems (e.g. 
automatic shutoff of air intakes after the detection of gases) and the 
reliability/availability of surrounding-dependent systems (e.g. 
positively pressurised rooms and escape routes) been assessed? 
   
54 
Are fire systems, emergency equipment, escape routes and rescue 
services designed to withstand extreme conditions expected during an 
accident (e.g. blast, fumes and intense heat)? Are accident probable 
effects (e.g. impacts from fragments of explosions or the 
duration/intensity of a fire) considered in the evaluation of the 
effectiveness/survivability of these systems? 
   
55 
Are alternative emergency power sources provided? Do the safety 
studies assess their functionality under distinct accident scenarios 
(e.g. main power cuts, flood, lightning storms and local fires)? Does 
the transition time from main to alternative power sources pose non-
considered risks? 
   
56 
Is there a main safe escape route and further alternatives designed, 
including load-bearing structures such as anti-blast and firewalls 
calculated to resist until the facility has been fully evacuated? 
   
57 
Does the escape route contain clearance warnings by means of visual 
and audible cues? Are local alarm switches located in adequate 
positions to alert the remaining workers about the best available 
escape route? Are emergency lighting and alarms connected to the 
emergency power system (or have their own battery power source)? 
   
58 
Have safety studies assessed the possibility of collisions (e.g. with cars, 
boats and airplanes) and external elements (e.g. projectiles from 
firearms) affecting equipment and the structure of the facility? Are 
measures in place (e.g. mechanical protection, administrative 
prohibitions, policing) to minimise these risks?  
   
59 
Are distances among pipelines, equipment and modules optimised in 
order to consider the contents volatility, temperature, pressure and 
other risk-increasing factors? Is the separation among adjacent 
elements sufficient to avoid electromagnetic interferences, energy 
transfer or domino/cascading effects in case of failure? Were 
additional measures (e.g. physical separations and blast and fire 
protection walls) evaluated? 
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60 
When physical separation is not possible, does the safety study 
evaluated if the surrounding equipment endurance time is sufficient 
to withstand the consequence of possible failure modes (e.g. a release 
followed by a jet fire from a failed adjacent element, for the inventory 
depletion time)? 
   
61 
Does the safety study consider multiple safety barriers prone to 
common cause failures as a single barrier? Are alarms and sensors 
subjected to the same failure modes (e.g. same power supply or same 
cable routing) considered as non-redundant systems? Were 
redundant safety barriers subjected to an independence evaluation by 
safety studies? 
   
62 
Are the risk scenarios demanding automatized responses (e.g. fire 
alarm demanding the activation of deluge systems or gas detection 
demanding the neutralisation ignition sources) identified and 
assessed? Does the supervisory control and data acquisition system 
have the capability of interpreting multiple alarms and command 
automatized actions or present consistent diagnostics to operators 
though the interface? Is the harmonisation of automated functions 
and personnel actions assessed? 
   
63 
Is the position and type of sensors representative of the category of 
information they intend to convey? Are failures in sensors and 
indicators auto-diagnosed and clearly indicated by the interface? 
   
64 
Is there a consistent assessment of safety alarms? Is the alarm 
precedence logic based on its safety significance? Are they prioritised 
according to how quickly personnel should respond in order to avoid 
undesirable consequences?  
   
65 
Is the number of simultaneous alarms considered as a risk-increasing 
factor capable of disturbing cognitive functions? Are less important 
signals and alarms reduced/supressed (to minimise mental 
overburden) when the supervisory control and data acquisition 
system diagnoses a critical situation demanding full attention from the 
personnel involved?  
   
66 
Are reduction measures for the initiation and escalation of fires and 
explosions proposed (e.g. reduction of ignition sources, material 
selection based on flammability level, ability to spread flames, 
generate smoke or propagate heat and the toxicity level)? Is the 
likelihood of ignition assessed in susceptible sections of the 
installation, by consistent means? 
   
 Total    
non-applicable to the assessed study* 
 
It is suggested that a large number of positive answers would represent a safety study that 
intrinsically contains solutions for the accident causation patterns encountered in the 
MATA-D scenarios, which caused major disasters in high-technology systems. Negative 
answers would indicate possible weaknesses in the safety study, which should be 
addressed in order to improve trust. For items that are neither relevant nor related to the 
assessed installation or system, a neutral answer (non-applicable) can be given. After 
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confirming that the major problems raised by the list were addressed, the safety study can 
be seen as robust, from a “lessons learned” perspective. 
 
Although this work present a general list as an example, applicable to virtually any 
industrial sector, the tendencies drawn from the MATA-D with the SOM approach are 
perfectly adaptable to specific industries such as oil & gas or aviation, and can be further 
developed for particular applications, e.g. design reviews. The accident causation patterns 
can be also used as input to the development of risk scenarios.   
 
5. Conclusions 
Verification and validation schemes must analyse proposed risk reduction measures, taking 
into consideration that systems are dynamic. Assumptions such “as good as new” 
systems/equipment, perfect procedures and faultless operators are accurate only on paper, 
and should be challenged by verifiers. Table 3 presented a sixty-six-item attribute list, which 
enables this debate and exposes possible shortcomings, addresses major hazards and 
stimulates improvement. The objectives are to give impetus to broader considerations 
about risk in real projects and raise the discussion about the implementation or dismissal of 
recommendations and solutions, enabling the dialogue among stakeholders and bringing 
transparency to the whole process. 
 
Also, the prime attribute of a project is its feasibility, which means cost. This attitude is 
absolutely normal and engrained in our social behaviour (Does anybody check safety 
records before booking a flight, or the price is the first – sometimes the only – attribute 
considered in the decision-making process?). Therefore, promoting the coexistence and 
balance between economic aspects (i.e. resources, budget) and safety performance is the 
ultimate goal pursued by risk managers. It is a permanent persuasion exercise to which the 
current research intends to contribute, by developing means to enlighten stakeholders to 
consider a wider picture of risk.  
 
The problem of trust in risk management and risk validation is not surprising at all. Risk 
assessment is a complex and multidisciplinary matter, and there is no such thing as a 
definite standard reference on how to perform a safety study. Distinct techniques and 
approaches are not mutually exclusive and should be simultaneously used, making the 
development of a single verification/validation method or procedure hardly possible. 
116 
 
However, the most import outcome of a risk study is to support the decision-making 
process. Hence, it must be able to communicate risks to stakeholders, addressing potential 
problems and solutions in a clear way, and using visual aids such as maps can help tackling 
this challenge.   
 
In this regard, the conversion of the MATA-D dataset into self-organised maps and their 
subsequent interpretation successfully converged into a comprehensive checklist 
containing items representing major accident tendencies, to be verified against risk studies 
and to help developing confidence that critical issues were taken into consideration. These 
concerns arose from shortcomings in many different industrial segments, also promoting an 
inter-industry exchange of valuable accident lessons. The questions can be easily traced 
back to regions in the maps, and practical examples of flawed interfaces between humans, 
technology and organisations can be extracted, in order to illustrate the possible adverse 
effects of not dealing with specific conditions. The 2-D SOM maps can be used to 
communicate and describe complex interfaces to a broader public in a simpler way, 
enhancing stakeholder’s confidence that genuine strategies to mitigate risks are in place 
and the study was adequately completed. 
 
Acknowledging that there is not a single method to verify and validate risk studies, the 
application of the widest possible range of approaches to stimulate the comparison of 
alternatives and different experts’ opinion can give some insight into how to enhance trust 
in risk management. This work focused on ensuring that lessons from several past accidents 
are considered by new risk studies as good engineering practice and a sensible approach to 
reduce risk, by means of a straightforward risk study verification checklist.   
 
Furthermore, the verification framework can be easily applied by a range of independent 
reviewers from industry and academia, which could use the checklist output to involve 
experienced people and develop innovative risk approaches, bringing new ideas and 
insights to safety studies in a structured way. 
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Chapter 5: Human factors influencing decision-making: tendencies from first-line 
management decisions and implications to reduce major accidents 
 
Overview 
This chapter presents a second application example for this research. At this time, the 
scrutiny of accident’s tendencies from the MATA-D dataset will focus on specific 
interactions involving managerial judgements and decisions. Decision-making processes 
control the development of organisations and shape operations, constituting an essential 
capability to fulfil companies’ immediate and long-term objectives. Major accidents, 
however, can severely disrupt operations, and many investigation reports relate to poor 
managerial decisions as relevant contributors to recent catastrophes. These seemingly 
imperfect decision-making processes usually encompass field managers, which tend to be 
vulnerable to pressures related to the facilities’ result (e.g. time constraints to solve a 
failure, poor incentives). First-line management is typically responsible for guiding 
employees, directing everyday objectives and dealing with production efficiency, while 
having to demonstrate satisfactory results to upper hierarchical levels, especially regarding 
companies’ pre-defined goals (e.g. productivity, quality requirements). Thus, the purpose of 
this study is to analyse first-line management critical decisions in the field, by comparing 
them with tendencies and common patterns extracted from the MATA-D, in order to better 
understand the surrounding factors impacting human judgements and to discuss 
implications to improve decision-making processes. 
 
Intricate interactions among different levels of a production oil & gas platform 
management will be initially presented, highlighting relevant changes in staff roles as soon 
as the facility shifts from a standard organisational arrangement (Figure 2, pp. 131) to an 
emergency response arrangement (Figure 3, pp. 131), due to a significant deviation from 
normal operation. Under a new set of responsibilities formally assigned by the organisation, 
personnel previously concerned with the operation will now interact for the duration of an 
apparent high-hazard scenario in a unique way, in order to return the industrial 
environment to its previous safe state. This decision-making process, which is designed to 
cope with critical decisions regarding safety, will be described. 
 
Then, management decisions which culminated in the worst accident occurred in offshore 
Brazilian waters in the past 15 years (i.e. and explosion resulting in nine fatalities) are 
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scrutinised, through the analysis of publicly available investigation reports from the two 
official regulatory bodies. 
 
The SOM data mining and classification approach presented in Chapter 2 is revisited in the 
search for analogous tendencies, allowing the comparison of the MATA-D common 
patterns with the offshore facility case study. Shared features between specific regions of 
the MATA-D clustering (i.e. interactions involving Inadequate Task Allocation) and the event 
under scrutiny are successfully recognised, suggesting that well-defined patterns involving 
organisational issues and human factors shaped favourable conditions for the accident.  
 
Human performance shortcomings arising from the lack of managerial rules and principles, 
inconsistent planning and inadequate working practices are then investigated, and practical 
implications to improve critical decision-making processes are finally discussed. Evidence 
suggested that deep changes, such as the development of a dedicated decision-support 
system and having personnel fully devoted to ensure the safety of the crew, should be 
considered, in order to minimise the possibility of similar process safety accidents. 
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1. Introduction 
Decision-making processes are in the helm of organisations, constituting an essential 
capability to promote companies’ mission and objectives. Although researchers exploring 
the fundamental causes of disasters (Pigeon & O’Leary, 2000, Hopkins, 2005) indicated that 
keeping the focus on top management is crucial, it seems to be reasonable to assume that a 
successful safety program will rely on the implementation capacity and on numerous local 
decisions from lower hierarchical levels. Many of these decisions are not trivial and involve 
constant trade-offs between safety, productivity and quality requirements.  These trade-
offs, particularly the conflict between safety goals and production, were summarised by 
Reason (2000), who pointed out an interesting paradox: although both safety and 
production are deemed to be equally indispensable, production is, in reality, the attribute 
that pays the bills.  Therefore, while responsible for guiding employees, directing everyday 
objectives and dealing with production efficiency and safety, first-line management is 
expected to deliver satisfactory (and sometimes daily) results to upper hierarchical levels, 
mainly concerning companies’ pre-defined productivity goals. 
 
Major accidents, however, can deeply affect the continuity of operations and put an end to 
productivity goals, dramatically shifting the stakeholders’ attention from periodic and 
consistent productivity indicators (e.g. barrels per day, in an offshore production platform) 
to the search for causes of the adverse event. Many of the findings arising from some well-
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known recent investigation reports (e.g. National Commission on the BP Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011, Kurokawa, 2012) relate to poor managerial 
decisions in all hierarchical levels, which triggered operational arrangements that resulted 
in undesirable outcomes.  
 
In February 2015, an explosion at the Floating, Production, Storage and Offloading Unit 
Cidade de São Mateus (FPSO CDSM) resulted in the most shocking accident occurring 
offshore Brazil in the last decade, and one of the top-three worst offshore disasters in 
Brazilian Offshore Oil & Gas history. Nine people passed away, and twenty-six workers 
sustained from minor to serious injuries after a hydrocarbon leakage and its consequent 
ignition at the FPSO’s pump room. The facility was producing non-associated gas and 
condensate by the time of the event. The investigation from the Oil & Gas regulator (ANP, 
2015) identified seven causal factors and twenty-eight root-causes, highlighting inadequate 
managerial decisions which exposed the facility to unmanaged risks. The investigation 
report from the Maritime Authority (DPC, 2015) mentioned that inconsistencies from the 
safety management system gave room for improvised decisions, ultimately resulting in non-
conformities. Those supposedly flawed decisions involved middle and operational 
management working in the field, where dealing with dynamic pressures related to the 
facilities’ result (e.g. time constraints to solve a failure, improper incentives) can be a 
substantial challenge. 
 
The conclusions arising from those investigations leave us with some important questions 
regarding decision-making processes and the practicability of adopting alternative 
approaches to ensure facilities are designed and operated in a safer way. To what extent 
were these decisions actually poor, in the face of organisational scenarios and operational 
challenges encountered by decision-makers? Were these decisions improvised and 
unreasoned, or did they follow a well-defined and recognisable pattern, which could be 
considered natural and predictable if the outcome was different? How can we turn people 
in-between top management and workers at the sharp-end of operations into better 
decision-makers? 
 
The overriding purpose of the current work is to analyse decision-making processes by 
using the real-life event that occurred in offshore Brazil waters to uncover the intricate 
conditions leading to questionable (at least in hindsight) human decisions. The ultimate 
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objective is to give some indications on how to tackle decision-making limitations by 
improving managerial rules and principles. 
 
2. Analysis Method 
Moura el al. (2016) developed a major-accident dataset, which contains 238 disasters from 
different high-technology industrial sectors, including nuclear, aviation and oil & gas. The 
Multi-attribute Technological Accidents Dataset (MATA-D) was fed with information from 
detailed investigation processes conducted by independent investigation commissions, 
regulators, insurance companies and experts, in order to disclose the circumstances 
surrounding the undesirable events and prevent their reoccurrence. Although each 
investigation team followed particular directives, procedures and terminology to scrutinise 
the major accidents, the dataset classification method based on Hollnagel (1998) facilitates 
the application of a single framework, allowing the comparison of events from different 
industries and the search for common patterns. Previous work (Moura et al., 2017a) 
successfully applied a clustering approach, i.e. Kohonen (2001) self-organising-maps, to 
identify major design shortcomings and develop a checklist focused on the improvement of 
design. The development of this design checklist was based on common features identified 
in Cluster 3, where accidents containing design failures interfaced with human factors in 
most of the grouping cases. Figure 1 presents the clusters’ arrangement after the 
application of the self-organising maps algorithm. 
 
Figure 1. MATA-D Clustering Results using SOM, adapted from Moura et al. (2017b) 
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The SOM data mining results will be revisited, in an attempt to disclose new links associated 
with decision-making processes and support the understanding of critical FPSO Cidade de 
São Mateus management decisions prior to the major event occurred in February 2015. 
Examples from the cluster of interest will be given, in order to illustrate similarities.  
 
The reports on the FPSO CDSM accident (ANP, 2015, DPC, 2015) provide very detailed 
information about the disaster, based on engineering analysis of the facility, examination of 
documents and investigative interviewing of company staff in different hierarchical levels. 
 
Therefore, after presenting the intricate interactions among different levels of an offshore 
production oil & gas facility management, basic responsibilities regarding safety will be 
assigned, in order to make the decision-making process exposed for further analysis. Based 
on the aforementioned in-depth accident accounts, critical decisions which were identified 
as contributing factors or root-causes of the event will be highlighted. 
 
The deficiencies in the case study decision-making process will be then considered in the 
light of the tendencies disclosed by the application of the SOM algorithm, in order to 
enable the discussion of inherent conditions which increase the likelihood of flawed 
judgments and mistaken choices in a high-technology industrial facility. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 MATA-D mining for decision-making shortcomings 
In the current work, the intention is to recognise common patterns associated with 
decision-making processes. In this regard, the statistical results from the SOM map 
indicated that Cluster 1 was dominated by the contributing factor named “Inadequate Task 
Allocation”, identified in 95% of the cases within this grouping (Cluster 1’s shadowed region 
in Figure 1).  
 
The overwhelming incidence of this factor highlights situations where managerial 
instructions were poor and lacked clear rules or principles, task planning was largely 
inadequate and/or work execution directives were poor. Table 1 presents the leading 
features for Cluster 1, which contains 80 major accidents. Contributing factors in italic 
attained slightly higher scores in other clusters, but were still significant for the grouping. 
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Table 1: SOM Cluster 1 Main Statistical Results 
Human  
Factors 
Execution Error Wrong Place 52.50% 
Specific  
Cognitive 
Functions 
Observation Missed 
Faulty diagnosis 
Wrong reasoning 
20.00% 
26.30% 
20.00% 
Temporary  
person-related 
functions 
Distraction 11.30% 
Permanent  
person-related 
functions 
Cognitive bias 15.00% 
Technology 
Procedures Inadeq. procedure 78.70% 
Interface Incomplete info 36.20% 
Organisation 
Communication 
Communic. failure 
Missing information 
16.30% 
37.50% 
Organisation 
Maintenance failure 
Inadeq. quality ctrl. 
Design failure 
Inadeq. task alloc. 
Social pressure 
56.30% 
81.30% 
85.00% 
95.00% 
17.50% 
Training 
Insufficient skills 
Insufficient knowledge 
56.30% 
60.00% 
Working  
Conditions 
Irregular working 
hours 10.00% 
 
In Cluster 1, the map region occupied by the Inadequate Task Allocation factor was 
combined with design shortcomings, quality control problems, maintenance failures, 
training issues and communication difficulties, from an organisational perspective. The 
most relevant technological problem was having inadequate (incomplete or ambiguous) 
procedures. Inaccuracies in sequences of operational actions due to incorrect diagnosis of a 
situation or a faulty reasoning were also frequent. 
 
3.2 The Decision Structure at the FPSO CDSM 
The Offshore Installation Manager is typically the top authority on-board and the 
designated Offshore Incident Commander in case of an emergency. He is the key decision-
maker and his personal judgment will direct the response efforts. Thus, his decisions will be 
now defined, considering the existing information and the available choices. 
 
The standard organisation of a Production Oil & Gas Platform (Figure 2) is instantly 
transformed to respond an emergency, according to previous definition from the 
company’s Emergency Plan. Figure 3 depicts the new roles for the operating staff. 
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Figure 2 - Standard Organisational Chart, after ANP (2015) 
 
 
Figure 3 - Emergency Response Organisational Chart, after ANP (2015) 
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Three groups were effectively involved in the Offshore Installation Manager decisions in the 
case study: (i) the Decision Board; (ii) the Emergency Response Team; and (iii) the Technical 
Advisory Response Team. The decision-making response structure for the FPSO CDSM is 
typical, having well-defined actors to pick a solution, to discuss options and recommend 
alternatives, to provide technical information about potential choices and their effects, and 
to confirm the capability and execute a sequence of tasks. Table 2 relates the FPSO CDSM 
personnel functions with standard roles of a classic decision or problem-solving structure. 
 
Table 2: FPSO CDSM Decision Structure, adapted from Herrmann (2015) 
FPSO CDSM Personnel 
Roles 
(Spetzler, 2007) 
Roles 
(Rogers & Blenko, 2006) 
- Offshore Installation Manager - Decision-maker - Decide 
- Marine Sup. 
- Production Sup. 
- Maintenance Sup. 
- Decision Staff - Recommend Alternatives 
- Technical Advisory Response Team 
- Emergency Response Team (x2) 
- Content Experts 
- Implementers 
- Provide Input 
- Agree (confirm feasibility) 
- Perform 
 
The Decision Board was composed by the Offshore Installation Manager, the Marine 
Superintendent, the Production Superintendent and the Maintenance Superintendent. 
There were two Emergency Response Teams aboard, composed of five members of the 
crew and having Safety Officers as leaders. The technical advisory response team had been 
created by initiative of the Offshore Installation Manager and was not on the formal 
Emergency Response Plan of the platform. Based on his experience in other platforms, he 
felt that it would be useful to have a technical advisory team to be consulted upon 
particular topics. It was made of relevant technical staff, e.g. the Pump Man. The informal 
group has participated in the three decision meetings, and its members accompanied the 
on-site fire brigade to the Pump Room in all occasions. 
 
Although the investigation report (ANP, 2015) had suggested that the Onshore Emergency 
Central was contacted as soon as the gas alarms sounded, there was no input from the land 
staff to the Decision Board until the emergency had escalated after the explosion.          
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All decision meetings took place at the Central Control Room, and additional people (e.g. 
production supervisor, control room operators, radio operator) were available to perform 
any action required and modify the production system configuration. 
 
3.3 Response for a multiple-alarm event in the FPSO CDSM Pump Room 
Dealing with a multiple-alarm indication in the Pump Room was a non-routine event, and 
its possible causes and effects were neither certain nor obvious to the crew. Formal 
emergency response procedures contained general instructions: (i) to deploy an equipped 
operator (with portable gas detector) to examine a single detection, or initiate the general 
alarm for a multiple detection; (ii) use the Public Address System to announce an indication 
of a fire or gas release; (iii) Order a local evacuation in the single detection case, or direct 
personnel to muster points under a multiple detection; (iv) confirm the designed automatic 
shutdowns (only for multiple detection); (v) Inform the Offshore Installation Manager.  
 
According to the ANP’s (2015) investigation report, there were no further formal 
procedures, and the Offshore Incident Commander (the Offshore Installation Manager in 
the case study) was responsible for assessing the situation and deciding what to do, after 
the initial steps above. For that reason, the Emergency Response Plan was considered 
incomplete by the investigators, and thus one of the root-causes for the accident. 
 
The first response group assembly took place approximately four minutes after multiple 
alarms sounded. It was attended by The Decision Board and the Technical Advisory 
Response Team. The supervisory control and data acquisition system had automatically 
isolated the Pump Room by closing the ventilation dampers and entering the air circulation 
mode (DPC, 2015). Also, visual and audible alarms were activated in the whole facility and 
the personnel were directed to the muster points by the Public Address System. The 
Onshore Emergency Centre was also informed. As the leaked substance and its volume 
were unknown, the Incident Commander ensured the pumps stoppage (to eliminate 
possible ignition sources and reduce the leakage) and deployed a response team (members 
from the official Emergency Response Team and from the informal Technical Advisory 
Response Team) to the Pump Room, in the search for additional information. Gas detectors 
were inhibited and alarms were silenced to facilitate radio communications. 
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The first response team successfully executed their mission and brought new information. 
They identified the leakage point (i.e. liquid dripping from a flange) and encountered a two 
square meters pool. The second decision meeting took place approximately fifteen minutes 
after the initial assembly. On this occasion, the Emergency Response Team joined the 
Technical Advisory Response Team and the Decision Board to evaluate the current 
situation. The Incident Commander decided to partially restore the ventilation system, in 
order to avoid any electrical overheating and maintain production, and a second team was 
deployed to the Pump Room to define the corrective measures required. 
 
The second team accomplished their goal and communicated via radio the required tools 
for the repair implementation. The team left the Pump Room, allegedly to breathe fresh air, 
and the Emergency Response Team leader and one member of the Technical Advisory 
Response Team went to the Central Control Room to join the third decision meeting.  
 
The third decision meeting occurred approximately fifteen minutes after the previous one. 
As a result, non-essential personnel were authorised to leave the muster points and have 
lunch. The necessary apparatus (e.g. absorbent pads, tools, fire hose, and ladder) to repair 
the piping joint was prepared, and a cleaning and repair team, composed of five workers, 
was sent to the Pump Room.  
 
The cleaning and the repair activities were executed concurrently. During the cleaning, the 
absorbent pads were considered ineffective, and a water jet cleaning was initiated. After a 
request to increase the water jet pressure had been implemented, a major explosion 
occurred. Figure 4 represents the decision-making flow. 
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Figure 4 – Decision-making flowchart 
 
3.4 FPSO CDSM surrounding factors and their connection with MATA-D tendencies 
The application of the SOM algorithm grouped accidents with similar characteristics. The 
data mining process indicated a particular cluster of interest containing 80 accidents 
(Cluster 1), which has Inadequate Task Allocation issues as the prevailing contributing 
factor. The patterns disclosed by the SOM grouping were deeply associated with the 
sequence of events witnessed in the FPSO CDSM prior to the disaster. The complexity of 
the operation of an offshore platform is extraordinary, and there are many contextual 
factors embedded in such organisation which might prove to be pivotal in case of an 
accident. Latent failures such as design shortcomings and operational weaknesses can 
deteriorate the system to the point that people cannot compensate for a degraded 
operating environment. 
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The FPSO CDSM investigation revealed many surrounding factors contributing to the events 
on the day of the accident. According to the report (ANP, 2015) the marine team was 
largely undermanned. The lack of a safety critical function (senior marine operator or 
marine supervisor) and the regular accumulation of management and operational roles (an 
operator was performing marine superintendent functions for a long period prior to the 
event) led to difficulties to control cargo transfer tasks and to undertake judicious 
handovers between shifts. The handover between Offshore Installation Managers also 
failed to convey significant information regarding the ongoing cargo transfer manoeuvre 
(DPC, 2015). Human resources management problems and the lack of clear definition of 
responsibilities were contributing factors directly identified under the tag Inadequate Task 
Allocation in Cluster 1 (Table 1) of the Self-organising Map (Figure 1). 
 
There is an expectation that the organisation will provide enough personnel not only to 
operate the industrial facility under standard conditions, but also to deal with abnormal 
situations. However, the recurrent approach to operate with low manning levels results in 
serious vulnerabilities, particularly in case of atypical operational scenarios, a recognisable 
pattern heightened in Cluster 1 accidents. Many examples are in line with the conclusions 
from the FPSO CDSM report. The investigation on the Varanus Island accident (Bills & 
Agostini, 2009), for instance, highlighted low manning levels in various disciplines and 
having key competences outsourced or restricted to specific members of the team as 
contributing factors to the disaster. Deficiencies in the shift handover and communication 
issues were also considered contributors for the Buncefield accident, according to the 
COMAH report (2011). 
 
Another pattern identified in Cluster 1 suited the FPSO CDSM event surprisingly well, i.e. 
the link between inadequate procedures, flawed safety analysis and inadequate task 
allocation. The investigation report indicated that emergency procedures were short on 
detail, lacking adequate hazard mitigation measures for a scenario of confirmed gas 
detection in the pump room. Moreover, operational procedures (e.g. cargo transfer) and 
plans (e.g. Process & Instrumentation Drawings) directly related to the manoeuvres which 
caused the gas leakage were obsolete and mismatched the existing process plant 
configuration. Many examples showing similar tendencies can be extracted from the 
cluster, such as the incomplete procedures for cargo transfer (i.e. tank filling) in the 
Buncefield accident, or the lack of emergency procedures for safe and proper response to a 
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hazardous scenario (i.e. diesel engine over-speed) in the Rosharon plant vapour cloud fire 
(US-CSB, 2003).  
 
The normalisation of deviance was also a recurring issue in the FPSO CDSM operation. 
Normalisation of deviance occurs when the group incorporates erratic operational 
conditions and accept risks as part of their work culture (Vaughan, 1996). In those cases, 
individual risk perception and consideration of hazards are shaped by group thinking and, in 
a broader perspective, can be interpreted as a social pressure mechanism. It was known 
that the seat rings for the cargo transfer valves, which had a key sealing function, were 
inadequate for the type of condensate stored. The seals manufacturing material was 
susceptible to chemical attack, but maintenance and quality control measures failed to 
address the source of the problem, adopting alternative approaches to live with it instead. 
The storage of condensate itself played a significant role in the event. According to the 
investigation (ANP, 2015), the design conception and safety philosophy did not anticipate 
pure condensate storage, as the system was originally designed for petroleum or a mix of 
petroleum/condensate. Operational studies and safety analyses had taken place, but these 
were superficial and failed to identify hazards and address increased risks due to the 
modified storage and cargo transfer process. Other deviations identified, such as the 
regular use of in-house manufactured blind flanges without ensuring compliance with the 
adequate pressure class, were also discernible tendencies in Cluster 1, where mismatches 
between equipment/accessories and the required certification to operate under specific 
conditions were observed. Correspondingly, unsuitable bunds (were not impermeable) 
were evidenced during the Buncefield investigation (COMAH, 2011), and fixtures and 
further fittings in the Rosharon plant (US-CSB, 2003) were not certified for the operational 
environment. 
 
Further significant design weaknesses, such as the lack of effective blast protection for the 
living quarters and muster points, also coincided with Cluster 1’s patterns. Accidents 
involving failures in the fire/blast protection and the consequent impairment of relevant 
equipment and locations were persistent within the grouping. The control room damages 
after a jet fire in the Castleford Petrochemical plant (HSE, 1994) and the spreading fire to 
nonproduction areas in the Corbin facility (US-CSB, 2005a) which killed eight workers, are 
examples, to name but a few, of analogous cases. 
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3.5 Comparison between the FPSO CDSM decision-making and MATA-D task 
allocation shortcomings 
The environmental factors surrounding the decision-making process in the FPSO CDSM 
showed deep correspondence with the tendencies disclosed by the SOM clustering 
method. Once the scenario is set and the surrounding factors are exposed, the decision-
making process immediately preceding the explosion can be disclosed under a well-defined 
context. The decision context is vital to comprehend the strategy, the objectives and the 
available choices to solve a problem, i.e. a gas release in the Pump Room.  
 
Snowden and Boone (2007) suggested a context classification scheme for decision-making, 
dividing it into 5 groups: simple, complicated, complex, chaotic and disorder. According to 
their approach, the existing decision context in the FPSO CDSM ranged between 
complicated (relationship between cause and effect is clear but not recognisable by 
everyone; may contain multiple right answers and thus require investigating several 
options; requires expertise) and complex (right answers cannot be ferreted out; 
unpredictability; experiments which can safely fail lead to instructive patterns). 
 
The context faced in the FPSO CDSM is very similar to the patterns from the SOM Cluster 1. 
The application of the SOM algorithm revealed particular cognitive mechanisms underlying 
failures to perform a sequence of actions in analogous cases. The diagnosis of system state 
was incomplete, as the gas presence in the Pump Room was acknowledged, but not its 
possible effects (i.e. explosion). A faulty reasoning links to the decision-maker strategy, 
inferring that the solution applied before (enter the compartment and execute repair 
services) would work well again. Some personal cognitive biases also exist, such as: (i) the 
belief that the situation was under control (reinforced by two successful excursions to the 
Pump Room); (ii) the incorrect review of probabilities, after people returned from the Pump 
Room with portable detectors indicating that the atmosphere was significantly above the 
lower explosive limit; and (iii) the hypothesis fixation, as the decision-maker was focused on 
a single solution and thus constraining the sequence of actions to a particular approach 
which matched his assumptions. 
 
Additionally, the Offshore Installation Manager only boarded on the day of the accident, 
and was not aware of all ongoing operations, including the one which gave rise to the 
flammable gas cloud. After the alarm, the organisation adapted to a non-routine 
arrangement (From Figure 2 to Figure 3), and the required decisions were of uncommon 
132 
 
nature. The lack of practical experience to define and perform tasks (lack of skills) and the 
unsatisfactory theoretical knowledge regarding the scenario and associated risks indicated 
that the FPSO CDSM manager lost the overall situation awareness.  
 
The decision-maker, with the support of experts, was confident in accomplishing the final 
goal (stop the leakage by detecting and repairing the escape point), but missed a crucial 
step: making the compartment safe and serviceable, despite all relevant signals (initial 
detection from fixed sensors, and later from portable detectors). The task planning was 
inconsistent, the work procedure was poor and the managerial rule lacked clear principles 
such as reducing the personnel exposure to risks. All these elements are satisfactory 
captured under the Inadequate Task Allocation tag, which was the dominant element for 
Cluster 1, as many analogous examples show. 
 
4. Discussion 
The analysis of the MATA-D clustering after the application of the SOM algorithm revealed 
common patterns linking Inadequate Task Allocation, a key managerial problem, with 
several surrounding factors found in Cluster 1. Similar patterns and linkages among 
contributors were disclosed by the post-accident examination of the explosion in the Pump 
Room of the FPSO CDSM, which occurred in February 2015.    
 
Many contributing factors arose from earlier decisions, such as the modifications of the 
original design to adapt the operation to new conditions without a thoughtful consideration 
of risks. Therefore, the decisions with the intent to interrupt the leakage in the day of the 
accident were taken under a previously degraded decision-making environment, as 
production objectives appear to have prevailed upon safety in some design, maintenance 
and quality control choices.  
 
During the event on the FPSO CDSM, the decision-maker was essentially left on his own, as 
clear instructions on how to proceed in case of gas confirmation in the Pump Room were 
missing from the emergency procedures. Therefore, he appeared to be in need of further 
information to decide what to do next. Accordingly, his first objective was to search for 
additional data, which he accomplished by gathering information from operators in the 
Control Room and by sending a recognition team to the Pump Room. Before sending 
people there, he ensured that the pumps were disabled, valves from the cargo system were 
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closed and the air exhaustion system was shut. The leaked gas was certainly confined to the 
Pump Room. Moreover, he might have assumed that the local system halt reduced the 
leakage and/or eliminated possible ignition sources inside the compartment.  
 
The first excursion to the compartment was very successful, and this repeated action – 
groups were sent to the gas-filled room three times – might have reinforced the (wrong) 
impression that it was safe to go there. Not only the decision-maker appeared to be 
confident that the developments of the system were under his control, but also the 
remaining participants of the decision-making process, including the emergency team 
members. It is important to notice that the investigation reports (ANP, 2015, DPC, 2015) did 
not capture any signal of opposition to the strategy of entering the compartment, not even 
from the most vulnerable ones – the people who were responsible for performing the 
recovery tasks in an extremely dangerous site, and eventually died doing so. 
 
Signals of overconfidence are overwhelming. After the second excursion to the 
compartment, the Offshore Installation Manager decided to release people from muster 
points and authorise them to have lunch, retaining only essential people to execute the 
required repair. The belief that the strategy was good – the leakage point had been 
identified and a repair plan was conceived – made the members constrain their alternatives 
to current assumptions, i.e. that the situation was reasonably controlled. This appears to be 
due to the absence of active ignition sources and the compelling fact that people do have 
entered the place twice, with positive results. 
 
The whole group – decision-maker, decision staff, experts and implementers – restricted 
their choices to a sole hypothetic solution. Under an unusual, complex scenario, the 
individuals immediately jumped to the only definitive solution available (repairing the 
leakage), disposed to solve the problem as soon as possible and return to a safe operating 
status. This recognisable hypothesis fixation might have made them skip two alternative 
solutions. The first one, to conduct operational manoeuvres to ventilate the room, in order 
to eliminate the explosive atmosphere indicated by the local sensors and later confirmed by 
the crew. The second option would be a more conservative one: to abandon the ship. If the 
Offshore Installation Manager had recognised the imminent risk of explosion, he could have 
commanded an evacuation, aiming at the safety of the personnel. 
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The uncertainties related with all possible scenarios, even in hindsight, turn the review of 
probabilities for the outcomes into a subjective problem. We can only be sure that the 
solution adopted had a negative consequence (thus was an error), but we cannot guarantee 
that the alternative solutions would present a positive outcome. In the case study, trying to 
ventilate the flammable gas cloud from the compartment, for instance, is a very complex, 
high-knowledge dependent procedure. For the first alternative solution, the design of the 
ventilation system, especially of the location of air outlets, should be understood to the 
point that people could make sure the discharge would not find an ignition point in a 
location even closer to the ship living quarters. Special knowledge about the ducts 
dimension and flow speed would be required, to minimise the possibility of forming an 
explosive atmosphere in another place. It would be an exceptional operation, without any 
parallel with the routine of the crew and with no guarantee of success. Additionally, it 
would still require the repair of the leakage point afterwards.   
 
The second option, consisting of directing the crew to muster points, shut-down the plant 
and directing the evacuation, is the most conservative one. Since the accident investigation 
indicated that the possible ignition sources were static electrical or mechanical sparks 
introduced by the repair procedure, it would be sensible to assume that the ship 
abandonment would be successful. However, some individual and corporate negative 
effects would be certain. The decision-maker was the Incident Commander, but above all 
he was the full-time Installation Manager, predominantly responsible to deliver a 
production result to his superiors. If he evacuated the unit and the explosion did not occur, 
he might have been considered excessively conservative, and jeopardise his career as a 
manager. Furthermore, having a high-potential event stressed by the abandonment of the 
unit would put the company in the glare of the media spotlight, and under regulatory 
scrutiny.  
 
Therefore, the latter option involves a situation where the main objective of the company 
(continuous production) would be unquestionably compromised (with 100% certainty), 
against responding and tolerating some degree of risk (in fact, a subjective probability that 
safety will be compromised) to attempt an immediate solution to the problem.  
 
This is the main reason why the decision-making process outcomes at the FPSO CDSM are 
not surprising at all. On the contrary, it followed a very well-defined pattern, exposed by 
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the region of the self-organising maps where the work organisation lacked clear framework 
guidelines and safety values/principles. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The decision-making process developed during the FPSO CDSM event resulted in an 
unsatisfactory but plausible outcome. Several relevant aspects leading to the disaster, 
which were embedded in the organisation, were revealed by the two official investigation 
reports considered in this research. These factors were successfully related with common 
patterns belonging to one of the areas (i.e. Cluster 1) of the SOM map, indicating that 
known trends prevailed in the FPSO CDSM accident. It was made clear that the workgroup 
has inherited many organisational latent failures, including unsound design choices, which 
might have consciously or unconsciously encouraged an atmosphere of decisions favouring 
production over safety. Considering the environment and the nature of the position of the 
decision-maker, it should be anticipated that a predilection for a quick solution, which 
would pose less impact to his (and the company’s) perceived key objectives, would 
overpower any presumably safer but certainly riskier choice to the production upkeep.  
 
The decision-maker has not entirely overlooked safety principles. He took rational 
preventive actions before sending the team to the Pump Room (e.g. confirmed shutdown 
of possible ignition sources and the closure of ventilation dampers to avoid escalation), 
monitored the risk (through the information he received) and updated his decision-making 
process in an optimistic way: he believed (and most likely received ratifying indications 
from local teams) that the repair was possible and reasonably safe. Of course, some 
measures taken were questionable, such as having members of the Technical Advisory 
Response Team entering the Pump Room along with the Emergency Response Team. This 
exposed a larger than necessary group to the explosion and challenged any cautionary 
principle. It is not very surprising though, as it might be the case that he diagnosed the 
likelihood of an explosion as extremely low, during his quick mental review of probabilities, 
and understood that the risk was worth taking. 
 
It is not possible to assume that another Offshore Installation Manager, with the same level 
of skills and knowledge and under the same scenario, would adopt a different solution. 
Hence, considering the intrinsic and immediate goals of the work position, the specific 
training and information required to solve complex, non-routine problems, the normal 
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variability in human behaviour and the organisational pattern in line with many major 
accidents from MATA-D, it is supposed that improved organisational configurations would 
be necessary to reduce major accidents. 
 
For example, in the case of production platforms, a conceivable solution to improve 
emergency on-board decisions would be to dedicate one or two people to damage control. 
These people would take responsibility for leading emergency operations, immediately 
exchanging information with the land Emergency Control Centre and gathering data from 
on-board operational personnel. The key objective of the damage control personnel would 
be safety, substantially reducing any conflicting goals, especially with production 
maintenance. Skills and knowledge of these professionals would be planned to improve the 
understanding and operation of important systems during an emergency. In the case study, 
gas detectors and alarms were disabled to improve radio communications. It is obvious that 
the human-machine interface was not ideal. Therefore, it appears that a dedicated console 
(e.g. a Damage Control Console) would be desirable, in order to provide adequate 
information for the recovery of emergency scenarios and assist the decision-making 
process.  
 
Certainly, these changes in the sharp-end of the process would need to be accompanied by 
high-level measures involving, for instance, the design. In the case study, many latent 
failures imbedded in the concept of the plant (e.g. lack of blast protection for the living 
quarters; decision to convert a Very Large Crude Carriers into a Production Platform, 
inheriting the arguable location of the accommodation module above the Pump Room) 
appear to have contributed to the event. Those earlier decision-making processes could 
also be thoughtfully investigated and discussed, in order to identify further improvement 
opportunities. 
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II. Conclusions 
i. Research Highlights    
This thesis delivered an in-depth assessment of the intricate interactions between human 
factors, technology and organisations, focusing on major accidents in high-technology 
environments. Common patterns associated with disasters from different industrial 
backgrounds were revealed, enabling an improved understanding of the mechanisms 
leading to human errors and major accidents. The information arising from the creation of 
the MATA-D and the accident tendencies disclosed by the application of advanced data 
classification and clustering methods assisted the development of novel approaches to (i) 
understand and communicate risk; (ii) to build trust in safety studies; (iii) to minimise 
human errors; and  (iv) to develop mitigation strategies, satisfying the objectives set for the 
research project. 
 
The first objective was to develop a dataset capable of capturing major accidents from 
different industries under a common framework, in order to enable further analysis and the 
identification of shared features. The statistical analysis of the MATA-D confirmed that 
multiple interactions among a number of influencing factors are necessary to cause major 
accidents in high-technology facilities. Most importantly, accidents were made comparable, 
and results cast some light on the most frequent factors leading to disasters. Organisational 
factors were recognised as the foremost contributors, being identified in 95.38% of the 
cases. Specifically, design failures (66%), inadequate quality control (60.5%) and inadequate 
task allocation (60.1%) were the most frequent factors disclosed by the general dataset 
analysis. A very significant tendency has been identified among the major accidents 
contained in the dataset: 72.8% of the human erroneous actions and 74.34% of the 
identified flaws in specific cognitive functions were associated with design failures. Specific 
cognitive functions are the mental processes generally involved in the human ability to 
react to stimuli, represented in the current research by the sequence of (i) observing cues 
and signals, (ii) interpreting the scenario; and (iii) developing an accurate mental plan to 
respond to it. This key association provided unambiguous indication that design problems 
can be considered a major triggering factor for failures in mental processes and for 
erroneous actions, disclosing a clear path to the genesis of human errors. The identification 
of design shortcomings and the understanding of the interfaces among these accident 
contributors, especially in earlier stages of the lifecycle of engineering systems, are crucial 
to improve human performance and reduce the likelihood of accidents. The design 
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influence is an important finding highlighted by this work, which added value to the 
successful completion of the first research objective, i.e. to develop a suitable multi-
industry accident dataset. 
 
A profounder analysis of the data indicated that the human capacity to interpret systems’ 
status was severely compromised by the lack of suitable input (e.g. visual prompts, cues, 
signals and measurements) from the design. Dissonances between expectations on 
operators’ performance (i.e. to detect, analyse, diagnose or formulate accurate hypothesis) 
and situations observed in real accidents, which resulted in human active failures, were 
highlighted by the current research. It has shown that design should take into account 
some performance variability and consider the non-mechanic behaviour nature of humans. 
Consequently, general guidelines for a design review, which consider the interfaces 
between human erroneous actions, cognitive functions and design failures, were 
successfully proposed. The lessons learned from the MATA-D allowed the development of a 
systematic verification process, focused on the quality of the inputs intended to support 
the diagnosis of undesirable operating circumstances, leading to actions that effectively 
control the developments of industrial systems.  
  
The second objective of the research was to produce further insight into the genesis and 
perpetuation of human errors through the application of advanced clustering and 
classification methods to the MATA-D. Fully achieving the proposed objective, major 
findings were disclosed by the application of an artificial neural network approach, 
specifically the self-organising maps algorithm. The representation of the multidimensional 
data (a 238 x 53 matrix) in a graphical interface whose output are 2-D topographic maps 
exposed the mechanisms underlying human, technology and organisational interactions. 
Accidents were grouped by attribute similarity, enhancing the influence of certain 
contributing factors in each of the four distinctive clusters found, thus revealing key 
tendencies behind major accidents. The disclosure of a novel method to understand 
complex data and the interpretation technique for the SOM maps thrived, and some of the 
key findings will be summarised below. 
 
The first cluster contained events in which design failures, inadequate quality control and 
inadequate task allocation were the leading factors, also emphasising a connection 
between inadequate procedures and insufficient knowledge. It became clear that written 
operating instructions were incomplete, ambiguous or open to interpretation, as it was 
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expected from operators a certain situational awareness level to perform a task. These 
organisational and technology asynchronies resulted in failures to perform a logic sequence 
of manoeuvres, mostly related with basic to intermediate cognitive issues, i.e. to observe 
cues and signals and interpret the system status properly.  
 
Major accidents involving adverse ambient conditions were primarily grouped in the second 
cluster. The key lesson from this grouping is that more frequent natural events like 
torrential rain, electrical storms and airborne particles can be as harmful to high-technology 
systems as extreme phenomena, such as hurricanes and earthquakes. 
 
The third grouping was largely dominated by equipment failures, reaching approximately 
95% of the cluster area. Design shortcomings and quality control problems, such as in 
Cluster 1, played a relevant part in these events, but now strongly associated with other 
organisational factors, such as communication failures and management issues. The 
incorrect use of equipment or having little experience or insufficient skills to perform 
properly were also noteworthy. Interestingly, the interpretation of the SOM maps showed 
that more complex cognitive functions were demanded in these cases, and the humans 
involved were required to not only observe and interpret, but also to create a mental plan 
to control the developments of the system. These cognitive failures tended to be associated 
with action errors involving wrong timing or wrong type, such as the anticipation, delay or 
omission to act, as well as using disproportionate magnitude, speed or moving in the 
incorrect direction. In addition, the comparison of individual maps indicated that the 
combination of maintenance problems with equipment failures is not as significant as one 
could expect, unequivocally showing that maintenance improvements per se are likely to 
have little impact in the prevention of major accidents involving equipment faults.  
 
The last cluster was also dominated by equipment problems, occasionally accompanied by 
quality control issues and design shortcomings. Accidents contained in this grouping have 
shown the lowest incidence for human factors. It can be seen that the application of the 
SOM algorithm successfully isolated events with lower number of contributors (i.e. six or 
less factors, with mean of 3.1 events and mode of two), indicating that the grouping offered 
fewer opportunities for the disclosure of clear accident tendencies, if compared to former 
clusters. 
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Apart from the effective disclosure of key features and significant trends in major accidents, 
the reduction of the multi-dimensional data to two-dimensional maps without any 
information loss successfully provided alternative means to disseminate risk information, 
opening the possibility of using graphics and visual aids to reach and influence wider 
stakeholder groups, entirely satisfying the third proposed objective for the research. 
 
In the search for interesting features and in order to demonstrate the stability and 
usefulness of the dataset structure, different data analysis approaches were applied to the 
MATA-D. In Chapter 3, a tailored distance measurement was chosen to indicate proximity 
among events, and the hierarchical agglomerative clustering method output was presented 
in a dendrogram, which is a branch-type diagram hierarchically organised by property 
similarity. Consequently, accidents were displayed in nine clusters: (i) one remarkably 
different from the rest of the diagram and containing only two leaves (accidents); (ii) four 
containing organisation-technology events; and (iii) four containing organisation-human 
events. Results confirmed that accidents purely justified by human factors are extremely 
rare, representing less than 1% of the sample. This study also disclosed situations where 
personnel were unable to fully understand and recover from an accidental path, as a result 
of indistinct/incomplete error messages associated with the failure from the organisation to 
promote appropriate communication exchanges among peers. These poor feedback 
circumstances were accompanied by inadequate work conditions, such as irregular working 
hours and excessive demand, justifying the incidence of psychological stress, distraction 
and fatigue, and undermining the problem-solving capacity of operators. Some human 
erroneous actions were found to be based on failures to observe an indication or alarm, 
while others were associated with a wrong interpretation of the system status, usually an 
induction or deduction error. The former cases were mostly accompanied by equipment 
failures, while the latter were associated with inadequate procedures. It clearly indicates 
the lack of awareness to deal with degraded systems after equipment failures, and the 
limitations of written instructions to be representative of the operational reality, especially 
in abnormal situations. 
 
Despite the productive application of alternative approaches, such as the hierarchical 
agglomerative clustering, the SOM results were revisited and further analysed in Chapter 4, 
with the main purpose of building trust and improve the quality of safety studies. This was 
the fourth objective established for the current thesis. The findings of this research project 
made clear that safety analyses will not be able to convey truthful results if the complex 
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relationships between human factors, technologies and organisations are not properly 
considered. Therefore, strong connections among contributing factors in specific areas of 
individual clusters were mined, revealing common tendencies from past major accidents, 
which should serve as input to the verification of future safety assessments. 
 
Examples of new findings included many designs that considered some components, 
equipment or sub-systems in isolation, disregarding risks related to the interaction with 
other systems and the environment. Besides, regions where system modifications took 
place without an adequate consideration of their impact, including the need to reshape the 
required training to understand and operate under new conditions, were clearly identified 
by the maps interpretation. Another relevant trend is the fact that routine, unpretentious 
maintenance issues (e.g. cleaning of drains and vessels, dust removal and simple repairs), 
usually executed by personnel with partial awareness of the system behaviour, can increase 
risk and decisively contribute to major accidents. Non-routine operations, such as the start-
up of a process plant, testing or partial operating conditions, were also combined with 
training shortcomings, resulting in a tendency to underperform under special 
circumstances.   
 
Specific communication issues were also highlighted. These include several occasions 
where verbal messages among personnel were misunderstood, due to common 
background noise or the poor quality of transmissions. Problems involving information 
transference between shifts and to computer-based systems were recurrent, as well as 
occasions where safety critical data was not properly examined or further communicated, 
because the information holder thought that his actions were sufficient to control the 
system. Interface problems, especially concerning the availability of information from 
supervisory control and data acquisition systems, were also an observed tendency in 
specific mapped regions, which gave rise to human errors. Situations causing analogous 
effects were identified when the absence, delay in displaying or excess of alarms and 
indications, among others human-machine issues, affected the human ability to understand 
an adverse scenario. 
 
These are examples, to name but a few, of accident patterns mined from the MATA-D with 
the support of the SOM algorithm. Those trends were successfully mapped during the 
research project, and then converted into a checklist, as presented in Chapter 4. The 
verification process provided practical means to enhance stakeholders’ confidence that 
142 
 
safety studies have assimilated lessons from past major accidents. The disclosed tendencies 
can be now easily tested against and assimilated by new engineering developments, 
effectively completing the fourth thesis objective. 
 
A subsequent application was envisioned by focusing on undesirable interfaces associated 
with the inadequate task allocation organisational factor. The primary goal was to shed 
some light on decision-making processes under high-hazard circumstances. Issues such as 
inappropriate task planning, inadequate managerial rules and principles, and poor work 
instructions (all captured in the MATA-D under the task allocation label) were compared 
with operational decisions that intended to control a real hydrocarbon leakage in an 
offshore platform. Eventually, the decision-making process was considered ineffective, as 
the course of actions resulted in a major disaster with nine fatalities. It was found that the 
operating environment has held staggering resemblance with undesirable interactions 
previously identified by the application of the SOM algorithm in many other facilities, thus 
deeply influencing the decision-making process. This gives strong indication that the 
decisions made and the resulting actions taken were not exceptional, but followed a well-
defined pattern driven by multiple dynamic elements, meaning that tackling contributing 
factors individually (e.g. better detailing written procedures or improving training) will not 
suffice.  
 
The case study scrutiny has shown that the mental review of probabilities during decision-
making is highly influenced by some biases, such as the impression that it would be 
tolerable to enter a gas-filled compartment a third time, provided that an explosion has not 
occurred in two previous occasions. Another important finding was the crew hypothesis 
fixation in a single and definitive solution, which would solve not only the safety critical 
issue, but also would allow the return to normal operation. It is important to notice that 
this is perfectly explainable, as the emergency team was composed by technical crew 
normally responsible for running the maritime unit, thus the prime goal of resuming 
operation quickly and safely was deeply ingrained in their minds. Therefore, to 
simultaneously satisfy these two objectives (continue to operate the facility and restore 
safety), the repair of the source of the hydrocarbon leakage would be the perfect solution. 
However, other approaches could have given a satisfactory outcome for one of the 
objectives, e.g. ensuring the safety of personnel, by abandoning the facility and thus 
reducing the crew exposure to the effects of a possible explosion. This apparently less-than-
perfect but, to some extent, effective solution was not even considered, as it would fail to 
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entirely fulfil the initial premise (i.e. the resuming operation objective) set by the decision-
makers. It was also pointed out that the man-machine interface, originally designed to deal 
with regular operations, failed to provide adequate information to support the recovery 
from emergency scenarios. 
 
Accordingly, this research project, with the support of the MATA-D output, identified new 
solutions to improve decision-making processes, encouraging deeper organisational and 
technological changes. In facilities such as the one considered in the case study, for 
instance, having personnel entirely dedicated to damage control, with a new man-machine 
interface designed to give relevant information to the control of emergency scenarios, 
might offer an effective approach to reduce the likelihood of a major accident. This is a 
practical example on how the assessment of the complex interactions between human 
factors, technological aspects and organisational contexts in high-technology facilities can 
minimise the possibility of human errors, satisfying the last objective set for the current 
thesis.  
 
ii. Concluding Remarks 
This PhD research project reflected in the current dissertation successfully proposed a new 
method to learn from past accidents, through the creation of a major-accident dataset and 
the subsequent application of advanced data clustering and classification methods to 
disclose common patterns. The dataset structure has shown flexibility and aptitude to 
capture accidents from different industrial backgrounds, allowing the inclusion of several 
low-frequency, rare events, such as major accidents. The investigation reports were 
collected from knowledgeable institutions responsible for conducting thorough 
examinations of disasters, which are, presumably, the most reliable and wide-ranging data 
source available to offer profounder insights into the manifestation of these complex 
events.  
 
Learning from accidents is not a simple process, as it involves not only the laborious 
collection and classification of meaningful data, but also the translation of the information 
into useful outputs to researchers and practitioners who need to understand how human 
factors, technology and organisations can come together to produce undesirable outcomes. 
Yet, the results obtained from the application of innovative data mining techniques to the 
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Multi-attribute Technological Accidents Dataset strongly suggest that the aim and the main 
objectives of the research project were entirely satisfied. 
 
The large-scale analysis of major events promoted an enhanced understanding of the so-
called human errors, exposing the complex mechanisms and interactions behind 
disturbances in cognitive functions, which affected human performance in high-hazard 
environments. The lessons arose from the disclosed tendencies among major accidents, 
indicating a well-defined path to the genesis and perpetuation of human errors and to 
tackle complex risks.  
 
The fact that major accidents are rare events, arising from a seemingly unique combination 
of multiple contributing causes, might give room to some biases, such as the belief that “it 
could not happen to us”, resulting in some resistance to use lessons from disasters to 
recognise risks. The research findings, however, challenged this objectionable perspective. 
Provided that unambiguous patterns during the developments of catastrophes were 
successfully recognised, the “learning from accidents” experience can now be motivated by 
robust evidence that major accidents are not isolated events, but can be considered a 
product of repeatable dynamic processes. The existence of some high-technology sectors is 
very much dependent on the capacity to better understand these intricate processes. 
 
The understanding of the tendencies associated with major accidents was boosted by the 
application of different data clustering techniques, which converted the multidimensional 
data to graphical interfaces and thus assisted the disclosure of significant features. The 
dataset responded well to a tailored hierarchical agglomerative clustering technique and to 
the application of an artificial neural network approach, which provided innovative means 
to identify and mitigate major risks.  
 
The Self-Organising Maps algorithm proved to be extremely effective: the representation of 
significant features in 2-D topographical maps facilitated the communication of relevant 
risk information to wider stakeholder groups. The visual aids promoted a good alternative 
to traditional risk communication tools, successfully depicting complex, multi-attribute 
industrial engineering events in simple and clear images. The data mining strategy also 
supported the development of a novel risk assessment verification scheme, derived from 
the interpretation of the most relevant interfaces leading to major accidents. The 
verification list generated by this research can help specialists to confirm if major risks were 
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taken into account and serve as input to the development of enhanced major hazard 
control strategies. The disclosure of common major accident patterns also allowed an 
improved interpretation of decision-making processes, undermining unbalanced efforts to 
improve risk, which might be excessively focused on individual human issues, or in the 
sharp-end of the process. Accordingly, raising stakeholders’ awareness to critical safety 
data justifies profounder changes to sociotechnical systems, especially in the organisational 
level, as indicated by the current research project findings. 
 
The exploration of the dataset by alternative means, i.e. multidimensional scaling, has 
shown a fair degree of similarity with the SOM output, supporting the implications of the 
SOM findings. Regions dominated by individual factors such as Equipment Failure, 
Inadequate Task Allocation and Design Failure were preserved. Furthermore, relevant 
features, such as the intersection between Inadequate Task Allocation, Design Failure, 
Inadequate Quality Control and Inadequate Procedure (discussed in Chapter 4), were also 
visible, suggesting the consistency of the thesis results. 
 
iii. Future Work Recommendations 
The establishment of the dataset, the statistical analysis and further data analysis 
approaches indicated a well-defined path to understand human errors and the interactions 
resulting in major accidents. Future research could focus on specific interfaces and 
approach other data relevant features, in order to improve particular organisational 
processes such as management, training or quality control. In Morais et al. (2015), for 
example, data mining was applied to MATA-D in order to disclose undesirable interactions 
between quality control and maintenance, which were compared to findings from routine 
offshore inspections. The study revealed that some offshore nonconformities were 
equivalent to the tendencies extracted from the MATA-D, indicating that these existent 
failures had the potential to trigger major events.  
 
Following the same principles, practical applications could use the MATA-D output to 
analyse the current risk level of facilities, to assess the criticality of nonconformities or even 
to justify the need for investments in specific areas. Future research can build on the 
theoretical framework presented so far to develop more sophisticated accident causation 
models, including the investigation of broader influencing factors which are supposed to 
146 
 
play some role in industrial disasters, such as the regulatory, political or the economic 
environment.   
 
The current research project made use of two specific data analysis approaches to support 
the findings and conclusions presented. However, due to the characteristics of the dataset 
structure, other data mining and classification methods can be applied, in an attempt to 
disclose further features. Doell et al. (2015), for instance, applied frequent itemset followed 
by association rule mining to the MATA-D, to gain further insight into the main driving 
forces leading to undesirable outcomes. The dataset structure, containing binary indicators 
as well as detailed descriptions for contributing factors, favours the application of a wide 
range of data examination techniques, which might be tested and further interpreted in the 
search for features of interest. A version of the dataset containing the binary indicators for 
contributing factors is available upon request (to the Institute for Risk and Uncertainty, 
University of Liverpool, United Kingdom). The prospect of adding the detailed descriptions 
for contributing factors to the public version and further disclosure requirements will be 
discussed with sources, in an attempt to publish the dataset and make it fully available in 
the future. 
 
Efforts to integrate or compare the MATA-D with existing datasets might well succeed, 
provided that the taxonomy is general and can be aligned to other dataset structures. The 
integration can be used to feed datasets with relevant data regarding critical events, and 
the comparison of the MATA-D with, e.g. a near-misses dataset, can give some indication of 
facilities or processes demanding special attention. This is particularly useful to institutions 
(e.g. companies and regulators) which hold extensive portfolios of facilities to manage, 
being advisable to allocate inspection and audit resources on risk-based grounds. 
 
Apart from developing trust on safety studies, the checklist presented in Chapter 4 could be 
further adapted to give input to processes such as design reviews, or aligned with 
regulations to provide an effective verification tool to ensure that technical or mandatory 
documents (e.g. offshore safety cases) comprises the lessons learned from major accidents.  
 
It is recognised that the major-accident common patterns revealed by the current study 
were fully based on the 238 events contained in the MATA-D, and future efforts to include 
further input data might not only strengthen existing findings, but also disclose new 
patterns and demand further solutions. 
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The study of sociotechnical systems is a complex, multidisciplinary field, with intrinsic 
challenges still to overcome. Hence, applications requiring critical data from major 
accidents and a wider comprehension of relevant interactions involved in these undesirable 
events can take advantage of the findings hereby presented. 
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